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Cover
A sampling of recent cover and poster art
by the Graphic Arts Branch of the Naval
War College’s Visual Communications
Department. This by no means exhaus-
tive selection suggests the scope and vari-
ety of the College’s publications and
events, and it reflects the striking diversity
and quality of the images that the Col-
lege’s graphic artists and illustrators have
produced to support them. Reading from
the top, left to right, on the front cover:
the Combined Force Maritime Compo-
nent Commander Flag Course series
(Course 08-2C was held in Naples, Italy,
in July 2008); a China Maritime Studies
Institute (CMSI) conference held in De-
cember 2007; the Naval War College
Press Newport Paper monographs for
2008 (no. 33 in the series, pictured, is
U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Se-
lected Documents, edited by John B.
Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, forth-
coming as this goes to press); a December
2006 product of a long-term CMSI study;
the Navy Title X War Game, known as
Global ’08, held at the College in August
2008; the August 2007 Naval War Col-
lege ethics conference, an ongoing pro-
gram; Prof. Jeffrey H. Norwitz’s Armed
Groups, which appeared in 2008; the
June 2008 Current Strategy Forum; and
the International Programs office’s next
regional symposium, scheduled for Octo-
ber 2008 in Bahrain. On the back cover: a
Jerome P. Levy conference held in Febru-
ary 2007; a war game at the College con-
ducted in June 2008; a workshop held at
the College in August 2008; the multicity,
multiyear “Conversations with the Coun-
try” program; a conference held at the
College in June 2008; and the Naval War
College’s most recent graduation cere-
mony, on 20 June 2008.
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FROM THE EDITORS
The sudden escalation of hostilities between Russia and Georgia over the status
of the breakaway Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in early Au-
gust 2008 has provided an unpleasant reminder of the strategic salience of the
ethnic conflicts that continue to fester along the periphery of the former com-
munist world. The United States has been forced to divert its attention from the
ongoing conflicts in the greater Middle East to the problem of a geostrategically
resurgent Russia and its implications for the NATO alliance. In this context, it is
essential to reassess the current state of play in the former Yugoslavia, where
Russian interest and influence remain a significant factor and NATO has a con-
tinuing military presence. John Schindler of the Naval War College provides a
timely overview of the recent history of Western intervention in Bosnia and
Kosovo as well as an assessment of what has been achieved and what remains to
be done. Much depends, he argues, on whether Serbia can be persuaded to cast
its lot definitively with the West—or whether, perhaps encouraged by Russia’s
recent defiance of the international community, it will continue to be a source of
ethnic tension and instability in the Balkans.
The Navy’s recently promulgated maritime strategy continues to attract at-
tention and commentary around the world. In this issue, Andrew Erickson, of
the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, discusses the reac-
tions to the maritime strategy by military intellectuals and commentators in the
People’s Republic of China, providing translations and in-depth analysis of
three especially informed and thoughtful essays on the subject. While these as-
sessments do not entirely agree, they share a generally positive view of “A Coop-
erative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” treating this document as a highly
significant development in American naval thinking—and perhaps American
national strategy.
The Review maintains a long-standing commitment to military historical
subjects, and in this issue we are pleased to offer readers two outstanding articles
on intelligence and operational deception in World War II. The gradual opening
of sensitive military intelligence archives of all kinds in recent decades continues
to provide many opportunities for fruitful reconsideration of the history of re-
cent wars, but World War II in particular continues to offer important lessons
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for the present concerning the integration of intelligence and military opera-
tions and—especially—the sophisticated employment of intelligence-derived
information for purposes of operational deception. Commander John Patch,
USN (Ret.), tells the fascinating story of the intricate deception planning that
accompanied Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of North Africa in Novem-
ber 1942, at that time probably the largest amphibious operation in world his-
tory. This operation, over long distances and essentially uncommanded seas,
would have been at high risk of failure without the extraordinary intelligence
support that enabled it to thread the needle of Axis air and naval power in the At-
lantic and Mediterranean. Commander Patch concludes with a cogent distilla-
tion of the lessons of Operation TORCH for American operational planners
today. Robert Hanyok then offers a detailed recounting of the denial and decep-
tion efforts that gained the Japanese battle fleet surprise in its attack on Pearl
Harbor in December 1941.
Finally, as Colonel Gary Ohls, USMC (Ret.), demonstrates in this first-ever
fully documented account of Operation EASTERN EXIT, the Marine-led evacua-
tion of U.S. embassy personnel from Somalia in January 1991, it is important to
capture the lessons of very recent history while the memory of events remains
fresh and participants in them are still accessible. Though overshadowed at the
time by the developments leading up to the outbreak of the first Gulf War later
that month, EASTERN EXIT, as Ohls shows, represents a kind of preview of post–
Cold War maritime operations; indeed, it would prove a significant reference
point for the refashioning of Navy and Marine Corps doctrine later in the de-
cade, with a new emphasis on the littoral environment. This article is part of a
larger body of research being conducted by Colonel Ohls on U.S. military opera-
tions in Somalia in the early 1990s, to be published by the Naval War College
Press as a Newport Paper in 2009.
WINNERS OF OUR ANNUAL ARTICLE PRIZES
The President of the Naval War College has awarded prizes to the winners of the
annual Hugh G. Nott and Edward S. Miller competitions for articles appearing
in the Naval War College Review.
The Nott Prize, established in the early 1980s, is given to the authors of the
best articles (less those considered for the Miller Prize) in the Review in the pre-
ceding publishing year. Cash awards are funded through the generosity of the
Naval War College Foundation.
• First place: Colonel Gary Solis, USMC (Ret.), “Targeted Killing and the Law
of Armed Conflict,” Spring 2007 ($1,000)
6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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• Second place: Captain Arthur M. Smith, MC, USNR (Ret), Captain David A.
Lane, MC, USN, and Vice Admiral James A. Zimble, MC, USN (Ret.),
“Purple Medicine: The Case for a Joint Medical Command,” Winter 2007
($650, shared among coauthors)
• Third place: Peter Dutton, “Carving Up the East China Sea,” Spring 2007
($350).
The Miller Prize was founded in 1992 by the historian Edward S. Miller for
the author of the best historical article appearing in the Review in the same pe-
riod. This year’s winner is Dr. George H. Quester, “Two Hundred Years of Pre-
emption” (Autumn 2007) ($500). In addition, two articles received honorable
mention: “Did a Soviet Merchant Ship Encounter the Pearl Harbor Strike
Force?” by Marty Bollinger (Autumn 2007) and “Expectation, Adaptation, and
Resignation: British Battle Fleet Tactical Planning, August 1914–April 1916,” by
Jon Tetsuro Sumida (Summer 2007).
NEW AND FORTHCOMING NEWPORT PAPERS
A flurry of additions to our Newport Papers monograph series is now ap-
pearing. Number 31, Perspectives on Maritime Strategy: Essays from the Ameri-
cas, edited by Ambassador Paul D. Taylor, collects thoughtful observations on
the U.S. Navy’s new maritime strategy process offered by naval war colleges of
our Western Hemisphere neighbors, from Canada to Argentina. Newport Paper
32, U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents, edited by John B.
Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, furthers the invaluable series of Newport Pa-
pers in which Professor Hattendorf (the College’s Ernest J. King Professor of
Maritime History) has compiled the Navy’s key strategy documents of recent
decades. (Newport Paper 19 treated the Maritime Strategy of 1986, number 27
treated the 1990s, and number 30 the 1970s. A further volume, for the 1950s, is
planned.) Finally, in Newport Paper 33, Major Naval Operations, Dr. Milan Vego
of the Naval War College addresses in a comprehensive way a key aspect of naval
operational art, a discipline in which he is an internationally recognized author-
ity. All three are available electronically on our website and portal. As this issue
goes to press, all are in press and will soon be available in hard copy.
F R O M T H E E D I T O R S 7
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Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford was commissioned in
1974 from the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps
program at the University of South Carolina. His initial
assignment was to USS Blakely (FF 1072). In 1979, fol-
lowing a tour as Operations and Plans Officer for Com-
mander, Naval Forces Korea, he was selected as an
Olmsted Scholar and studied two years in France at the
Paris Institute of Political Science. He also holds mas-
ter’s degrees in public administration (finance) from
Harvard and in national security and strategic studies
from the Naval War College, where he graduated with
highest distinction.
After completing department head tours in USS Deyo
(DD 989) and in USS Mahan (DDG 42), he com-
manded USS Aries (PHM 5). His first tour in Washing-
ton included assignments to the staff of the Chief of
Naval Operations and to the Office of the Secretary of
the Navy, as speechwriter, special assistant, and per-
sonal aide to the Secretary.
Rear Admiral Shuford returned to sea in 1992 to com-
mand USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG 60). He assumed
command of USS Gettysburg (CG 64) in January 1998,
deploying ten months later to Fifth and Sixth Fleet oper-
ating areas as Air Warfare Commander (AWC) for the
USS Enterprise Strike Group. The ship was awarded the
Battle Efficiency “E” for Cruiser Destroyer Group 12.
Returning to the Pentagon and the Navy Staff, he di-
rected the Surface Combatant Force Level Study. Fol-
lowing this task, he was assigned to the Plans and Policy
Division as chief of staff of the Navy’s Roles and
Missions Organization. He finished his most recent Pen-
tagon tour as a division chief in J8—the Force Structure,
Resources and Assessments Directorate of the Joint
Staff—primarily in the theater air and missile defense
mission area. His most recent Washington assignment
was to the Office of Legislative Affairs as Director of Sen-
ate Liaison.
In October 2001 he assumed duties as Assistant Com-
mander, Navy Personnel Command for Distribution. Rear
Admiral Shuford assumed command of the Abraham
Lincoln Carrier Strike Group in August 2003. He be-
came the fifty-first President of the Naval War College
on 12 August 2004.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
Operational and Strategic Genius: Building the Main Battery for
the New Maritime Strategy
The “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” suggests new
ways to design and operate the Navy. How do we anticipate what our
leaders must learn to implement the Navy’s new strategy and its en-
abling concepts?
ONE OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE’S key missions is to prepare fu-
ture leaders to operate effectively at the operational and strategic levels. This is
the realm of the senior operational headquarters, a realm characterized by a
wide scope of responsibility, geopolitical consequence, complexity, and uncer-
tainty—a realm where the diplomatic, military, economic, and informational el-
ements of national power intersect and must be managed. This is a realm where
no one gives the leader a playbook or clear terms of relations with other stake-
holders; nor is there likely to be an agreed-to organization chart. A commander
at this level, charged with huge responsibilities, may find that he or she has not
even been given a useful or practicable mission statement. Moreover, the com-
mander and staff may discover that they are effectively “in charge” of very little,
yet expected to deliver much.
How do we know that our curricula in fact prepare our students to meet this
challenge? How do we figure out just what competencies leaders and those in
supporting roles within our various operational headquarters will need to be
successful in such a dynamic—indeed, chaotic—realm? Add to this the fact that
the concept of a maritime headquarters is in full-blown transformation, and
you get some idea of just how difficult a task this is. The Naval War College has
worked with great focus and served as a “thought leader” and implementer of a
range of initiatives to instantiate the Navy’s goal to be “a service focused at the
operational level of war”* and support the broader policy objectives defined in
* This is the primary proposition that emerged in January 2006 from the first “CNO’s Maritime Se-
curity Conference,” which brought together the senior operational leadership of the Navy to con-
sider its most pressing operational issues.
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that strategy. Being at the nexus of this activity, the College is in an ideal position
to help the Navy define both the functions and the competencies necessary to
meet its goals.
Globalization has changed many features of war, and we see many of its rules
changing as well. As our new maritime strategy (www.navy.mil/maritime/
MaritimeStrategy.pdf) points out, maritime forces must play an increasingly
prominent and strategic role, and they require close collaboration with interna-
tional forces and nonmilitary organizations to do so. Coordinating and syn-
chronizing activities across such a wide range of diverse partners emerge as key
functions of a joint force commander. Coordinated and synchronized employ-
ment of joint, multinational, and multiagency forces in both peacetime and
wartime demands a very sophisticated, globally netted command-and-control
(C2) capability and a comprehensive system that develops Navy leaders able to
use it. The maritime strategy emphasizes the necessity of understanding and
employing maritime forces as a continuously engaged, globally distributed im-
plement of national influence. This places an even greater premium on building
the genius necessary to grasp the essence of a problem, to appreciate it in a stra-
tegic framework. It also assumes that the necessary competencies—cognitive
and practical—will be in place to apply that force with strategic effectiveness.
The new strategy has brought into focus the links between maritime capabil-
ity, the stability it ensures, and global prosperity. To achieve the underlying goal
of regional or global maritime security, however, demands a degree of inter-
agency and international cooperation never before achieved. The requirement is
not so much for unity of command as for unity of effort. That unity relies on po-
litical mechanisms, decision processes, information and technical standards,
and protocols to bring diverse stakeholders in global and regional stability into
more cooperative and effective relationships.
Two drivers of naval force design emerge from the doctrinal logic of the strat-
egy: the need for combat-credible forces focused in regions where the potential
for major conventional operations is highest and where the demand for a promi-
nent, war-winning deterrent is greatest; and the need for globally distributed
forces tailored to specific regional strategies. The two drivers signal an evolution
beyond the general-purpose force designed for the Cold War era.
Implications for How We Operate Naval Forces
The Naval Operating Concept supporting the strategy recognizes this evolution
in how naval forces are used. Task forces are being employed less today as inte-
grated formations built around aircraft carriers or big-deck amphibs and more
as arrays of multipurpose platforms. These platforms can be dynamically em-
ployed to create a wide range of discrete operational-level effects—beyond the
1 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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awareness and control horizons of the group commander and his more tactically
oriented staff. Further, naval forces are increasingly understood and valued as
constituting a key strategic element of national power, applicable not just in a re-
serve or supporting role in the case of a major conventional operation but as an
engagement force applied globally in a synchronized, concerted fashion “24/7,”
365 days a year, to achieve strategic effects—to prevent war, to avert crisis, to pro-
vide maritime security, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and to under-
write regional and global stability.
Formerly, strike groups would bring their command and control with them
as a near-autonomous capability, in a virtual “bubble” of situational awareness
and C2. Today, because of the long reach of naval weapons and sensors, the di-
versity and mobility of afloat forces, and their increasing criticality to other joint
commanders for application across a wide range of missions, that bubble must
be expanded and integrated into a joint doctrinal and C2 “blanket” that extends
over and across regions. This requirement for integration is forcing the locus of
planning and assessment to a higher level, into a joint functional maritime head-
quarters. We are maturing now the processes, terms of relations, and functions
of this “Maritime Headquarters” and the “Maritime Operations Center.”*
These concepts are driving the Navy to review how it operates, commands,
and controls maritime forces, in a globally synchronized way and in routine con-
cert with a wider range of partners. The Naval War College has been at the center
of the Navy’s ambitious effort to rethink its command-and-control structures
and its operational headquarters functions. Given the traditional role the Col-
lege has played in developing expertise at the operational and strategic levels,
and given its involvement and leadership in the current raft of operational-level
initiatives, it is well positioned to help the Navy define the competencies neces-
sary to operate these evolved headquarters and operations centers.† Getting
manpower requirements right is always challenging, but the fact that the Navy is
still coming to grips with the broader, more robust command and control
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 1 1
* “MHQ w/ MOC,” or Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center. The MHQ is the
headquarters that supports a maritime commander focused above the tactical level (i.e., at the op-
erational level). The MOC is not the command center but rather that portion of the maritime
headquarters (a combination of personnel, systems, and processes) that supports the operational
requirements of the commander that could have various operational roles assigned (e.g., num-
bered fleet commander, as a designated joint-task-force commander). The MHQ w/ MOC concept
is viewed as a system of systems whereby MOCs around the globe are connected so as to provide
maritime situational awareness, support maritime security, and provide “reachback” to each other
to deliver maritime capabilities to the combatant commanders.
† A Chief of Naval Operations e-mail of 24 November 2006 to the President of the Naval War College
and Chief of Naval Personnel directed the College to identify the personnel and training require-
ments for MHQ w/ MOC. This followed verbal tasking to determine “what kinds of people and
competencies . . . we need in these headquarters and MOCs.”
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implied by its new strategy and operating concepts makes this assignment more
difficult still. Nonetheless, great progress has been made. Even more promising,
the process that the Naval War College has built to respond to this tasking prom-
ises to apply as well to the problem of defining manpower requirements more
broadly across the Navy.
Understanding Manpower Requirements in Terms of Joint Capabilities
The Navy is coming to grips with the need to understand manpower requirements
in terms of joint capabilities. Building on the work of the Quadrennial Defense Re-
view,* the Navy has determined that we need to understand manpower in terms of
“capabilities”—and that this capability-driven aspect of manpower would result in
understanding the Navy’s workforce requirements. Manpower requirements
would, perhaps for the first time, be linked directly to mission-essential tasks in order
to understand the effect of manpower decisions on warfighting readiness. This is
how we must determine what expertise belongs in our operational headquarters
and operations centers—by looking first at what they must do and how they must
do it.
Historically, the Navy has been world class at building competence through
training. Further, its forward-deployed tempo has generated vast experience.
However, competence emerging from training and deployment experience is
predominately tactical in nature. On the other hand, Naval War College re-
search, empirical evidence, and senior leadership assessment demonstrate that
operational- and strategic-level competence is built through a blend of focused
training, education, and experience across a continuum: competencies are built
over time. Experience in tactical tours, no matter how strenuous, simply does
not normally equate to expertise at the operational level of war.
The College’s response to the tasking of the Chief of Naval Operations even-
tually involved a cross-functional team of experts to conduct research in part-
nership with U.S. fleet forces.† Starting with joint warfighting-capability
requirements, the team set out to articulate a comprehensive understanding of
the operational-level-of-war domain; to build from an inclusive view of how
mission-essential tasks, organizational processes, systems, and people need to
1 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is a congressionally mandated vehicle through which the
Defense Department undertakes a wide-ranging review of strategy, programs, and resources. Spe-
cifically, the QDR is expected to delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most re-
cent National Security Strategy by defining force structure, modernization plans, and a budget
plan allowing the military to execute successfully the full range of missions within that strategy.
† This collaboration, defined below as the Capabilities Based Competency Assessment, is led at the
Naval War College by Professor Richard Suttie. Together with Fleet Forces Command’s MHQ w/
MOC Project Team, the College has conducted a two-year study to map the manpower require-
ments and skill sets necessary to support the new concept.
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work together; and then to integrate a dynamic, analytically reliable, valid, and
repeatable methodology that would generate the manpower requirements for
the operational level of war. This effort came to be known as CBCA (Capabilities
Based Competency Assessment) and is viewed as a critical path to implementing
the Navy’s new headquarters concept.
Ultimately, we expect the CBCA process to yield specific manpower require-
ments, including competencies that the warfighter identifies as critical to mis-
sion tasks. It should also give us valid, reliable, capability-focused, and
competency-based manpower requirements for MHQ/MOC operational posi-
tions. It will also identify, for each operational position, the importance, fre-
quency, and duration of use of specific equipment and systems and the
language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness (LREC) competencies
needed. Through process-based analysis and optimization we also expect to
understand the manpower costs and savings.
This work will continue through 2009, but we estimate that the methodology
will lead to fundamental changes in how people are understood—in the context
of tasks, work, and missions. This will alow us at the Naval War College to under-
stand better how the genius of our academic faculty and the curricula that the
faculty creates yield the capabilities demanded by our new strategy and its en-
abling concepts. As this vanguard effort reports out, we will know that what we
are teaching is on target, and if it is not, we—as we have demonstrated the re-
sponsiveness to do—will adjust fires.
J. L. SHUFORD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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From the perspective of the U.S. Department of Defense, Europe has been theworld’s “safe” region for several years. After the tumult and disorder that
plagued the Balkans in the 1990s, resulting in two major NATO-led military oper-
ations—in Bosnia and Kosovo, in 1995 and 1999, respectively—Europe has been
viewed as a peaceful, stable environment for American forces and interests. When
European Command is compared with Central Command, with its ongoing wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan, Europe unquestionably and justifiably appears safe and
happy; even the least-developed corners of Europe lack the endemic human secu-
rity issues that plague portions of Africa, Asia, and South America.
Even the Balkans, the countries of southeastern Europe that until the early
1990s were part of Yugoslavia and whose integration into European and Atlantic
economic and security relationships is incomplete, appear far more tranquil and
promising than just a few years ago. Political, economic, and social progress,
particularly in countries like Slovenia and Croatia, has been palpable and genu-
ine. Also, the keeping of the peace in Bosnia and Kosovo by NATO and European
Union (EU) forces, with hardly a shot fired during the stability phase, is no small
accomplishment, considering how hot the fires of interethnic hatred so recently
burned in those states. The early 2008 recognition of an independent Kosovo
and the announcement that Croatia and Albania will be admitted to NATO have
served as visible signs of progress in this troubled region.
However, beyond high-profile diplomacy, it remains unclear how much po-
litical and economic progress has actually been accomplished in the Balkans
under Western guidance since the mid-1990s. It is far from certain that trouble
spots like Bosnia and Kosovo have achieved much in terms of interethnic
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reconciliation or the rebuilding of civil society—to say nothing of securing
Western-oriented economic and political institutions—while Serbia, the region’s
key country, remains distressingly outside Western political, economic, and
security institutions. The Albanian question—a vexing political, social, and de-
mographic issue that increasingly affects the neighboring states of Macedonia,
Serbia, and Montenegro as well as Kosovo and Albania—remains out of bounds
yet is increasingly important to regional security.
Western, and U.S., accomplishments in the Balkans since the 1990s are genu-
ine and important, but has the mission been accomplished? While Americans
can be forgiven for paying less attention to the Balkans since 9/11, as the Long
War has caused U.S. military deployments in the region to dry up along with
economic aid and political focus, the costs of recent inattention are mounting
and may yet again lead to crisis in the region—something NATO and the United
States will be unable to ignore.
SUCCESS STORIES
The passing of communist Yugoslavia in mid-1991 was met with anticipation by
many of its peoples, glee by some and dread by others, but with a lack of interest
by most Europeans and Americans. While Marshal Josip Broz Tito’s Yugoslavia
got good press in the West, its heretic communist regime serving as a strategic
asset to NATO in the Cold War, it was less popular with many of its citizens.
Tito’s unique brand of communism, with its relatively liberal attitudes on social
matters, allowances for multiethnic expression, and quasi-market economy, was
popular with Western scholars as much as with governments. Yet Yugoslavia’s
secret police was as active as that in any Soviet-bloc state, its prisons filled with
dissidents. By the late 1980s, as the economy contracted and nationalism arose
again after decades of official restrictions, the federation created by Tito from
the ashes of Axis occupation in 1945 was no longer viewed as a happy home by
many Western-oriented Yugoslavs. It was therefore no surprise that Slovenia and
Croatia, the most westward-looking Yugoslav republics—geographically, politi-
cally, economically, and socially—were the first to depart Tito’s doomed state.
Both abandoned Yugoslavia by force in mid-1991, resulting in two wars: one
short and easy, and one long and painful.
Slovenia’s departure from Yugoslavia in the so-called Ten Day War beginning
in late June 1991 with hindsight seems to have ended before it really started.
There were barely sixty killed on both sides, and the conflict unfolded almost
anticlimactically before CNN cameras. Yet the ease with which tiny Slovenia’s
militia forces, equipped with little more than small arms, local knowledge, and
sheer grit, beat back the once-mighty Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) was no ac-
cident; it was the result of months of careful preparation by Slovenia’s clever and
1 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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thorough defense leadership.1 No less important was the fact that the JNA Gen-
eral Staff was deeply divided over how to react to Slovenia’s declaration of inde-
pendence and produced no coordinated military response to the crisis.
Although the JNA vastly outnumbered Slovene forces, especially in firepower
and mobility, paralysis at the top coupled with low morale among Yugoslav con-
scripts, who were unenthusiastic about fighting fellow Yugoslavs, unraveled JNA
efforts from the outset.2
If Slovenia won its independence from Yugoslav cheaply, however, Croatia’s
road out of Titoism would prove arduous and costly. The JNA, the servant of a
disappearing state, was willing to let Slovenia go, but Croatia was another mat-
ter; the officer corps, which was disproportionately Serbian, wanted to keep
Croatia in Yugoslavia by force, not least to protect the large Serbian minority in
Croatia.3 The result was a bitter conflict that cost thousands of lives and raged
into early 1992. The JNA’s grand offensive to subdue Croatia was an utter failure,
yet it did succeed in carving away a third of Croatia’s territory, mostly where eth-
nic Serbs were.4 This Belgrade-backed pseudostate, known officially as the Re-
public of Serbian Krajina, would last not four years. After the fighting died down
in early 1992, with the stalemated front patrolled by UN peacekeepers, the Cro-
atian government in Zagreb devoted serious effort and resources to creating
new, Western-style military forces. Croatia’s maneuver-oriented New Model
Army saw its debut in mid-1995, after long and effective preparation, in two of-
fensives, known as FLASH (May) and STORM (August). These operations to-
gether destroyed nearly all the Serbian-controlled regions of Croatia, at a
minimal cost in military casualties (though at a high cost in refugees, principally
the two hundred thousand Krajina Serbs who fled rather than live in independ-
ent Croatia).5 The struggle for independence, called the Homeland War by
Croats, ended in an unambiguous victory for the government of Franjo
Tudjman in Zagreb.
Given this recent history, as well as Slovenia’s more advanced economy and
closer ties to Austria and Italy, it is unsurprising that Slovenia has integrated into
Western institutions faster than Croatia or any other former Yugoslav republic.
It joined NATO and the European Union in the spring of 2004, and it became the
first postcommunist state to hold the presidency of the Council of the EU, for
the first half of 2008. Such political progress is perhaps remarkable, given that
Slovenia became an independent entity for the first time in 1991, but can be at-
tributed to its stolid, serious politics and avoidance of radicalism of any kind. It
certainly helps that Slovenia is essentially devoid of minorities (nearly all citi-
zens are ethnic Slovenes), and that there is no religious conflict either, since
Slovenes are nearly all Roman Catholics, at least nominally. Because there is no
real Slovene irredenta—the small Slovene minorities in Austria and Italy live
S C H I N D L E R 1 7
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peacefully—relations with Western neighbors are very good, and Austria and It-
aly have been strong supporters of Slovenia’s political and economic
Westernization since the collapse of Yugoslavia.
In economic terms, Slovenia’s progress has been real and impressive. Its per
capita gross domestic product (GDP) is very near the EU average, and Slovenia
is far and away the most economically vibrant and productive of the “new” (i.e.,
postcommunist) EU member accessions. In 2007, Slovenia was the first new EU
state to adopt the euro. While the economy has some structural challenges, prin-
cipally a high tax rate and low foreign direct investment, problems such as the
loss of manufacturing jobs to China and India demonstrate that Slovenia has
rapidly become a “normal” European country. It is important to note, however,
that Slovenia’s impressive economy is nothing new; under communism, it pos-
sessed by far the strongest economy in Yugoslavia, with a robust and diverse
manufacturing sector and a standard of living approaching Western levels. The
end of communism has merely enabled Slovenia to grow and integrate better a
functioning economy that was already impressive and decently integrated with
those of Austria, Italy, and Germany.
Recent changes to the Slovene military have been substantial. Since inde-
pendence, successive governments in Ljubljana have overseen the creation of a
wholly new defense system, centering on the transition from a territorial militia
to a mobile, professional force. Conscription has been abolished, and the Slo-
vene military is today a small (nine-thousand-strong) army, with modest air and
naval support, capable of battalion-sized deployments out of the NATO area.
Peacekeeping missions have included Bosnia and Kosovo, with small contin-
gents elsewhere, including Afghanistan.6 Despite resource constraints, Slovenia’s
military has integrated successfully into NATO and is the most Westernized of
all militaries in the former Yugoslavia.
Considering the undoubted success of Slovenia since 1991, in political, eco-
nomic, and social terms, it is paradoxical that there remains considerable affec-
tion, even nostalgia, for Tito and his multinational state. Such views, derided as
“Yugonostalgia” by critics, have a hold in all parts of the former socialist federa-
tion but are particularly pronounced among the Slovenes, many of whom miss
belonging to a larger, more diverse state, one in which average citizens were
protected from the free market by pensions, limited working hours, and free
health care.7
There is less nostalgia for Tito (who was half Slovene and half Croat) in
neighboring Croatia, where bitter memories of communism are commonplace.
Croatia, with some justice, considered itself the most nationally oppressed of all
Yugoslav republics, and many Croats still denounce “Serbocommunism” with
passion. That said, Croatia’s hard-won independence from Titoism has proved
1 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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less successful than Slovenia’s in political and economic terms, and its recently
announced admission into NATO and candidacy for EU membership mark not
the end of Croatia’s transition but a midway point.
In economic terms, Croatia is doing well for its region but not by EU stan-
dards. Its per capita GDP is only 60 percent of Slovenia’s, and inflation and un-
employment remain perennial concerns. Niche exports, especially shipbuilding,
are strong points—another holdover from the communist era—while tourism
has rebounded vibrantly from its virtual disappearance in the 1990s. Corrup-
tion is perhaps the biggest drag on the economy, infecting the contracting and
judiciary realms, and public-sector reform is stagnant, as it is across much of the
Balkans. The fall of communism brought little in the way of “good govern-
ment”; indeed, corruption in the
1990s, during the presidency of
Franjo Tudjman, was possibly
worse than under Tito. Much re-
mains to be done.8
Croatia is a functioning de-
mocracy, and it has shed the outward vestiges of the Tito era, but its political cul-
ture maintains holdovers in mentality and personnel from the communist era.
The lack of lustration (i.e., decommunization) remains a sore point, including
for the police and security services, while public cynicism about the political
process is widespread and voter turnout generally low. Although President Stipe
Mesi, in office since 2000, has spurred little of the controversy or enmity that
were associated with his predecessor Franjo Tudjman, the “father” of independ-
ent Croatia and head of state until his death in 1999, neither has Mesi accom-
plished as much as many had hoped by way of political reform. In stark contrast
with Tudjman, who was a hard-line nationalist, Mesi has sought better relations
with Croatia’s neighbors and has attempted to heal the regional wounds of the
last decade, with some success; Zagreb since 2000 has taken a much more concil-
iatory and productive line vis-à-vis Bosnia, for instance.9
Many pitfalls of the Tudjman era remain, however, not least the vexing
problem of war criminals. With great difficulty, the Mesi government has
handed over several high-ranking Croatian military officials to face charges
before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in The Hague. The greatest controversy surrounded the capture in
Spain in late 2005 of General Ante Gotovina, considered by many Croats
one of the leading heroes of the Homeland War. Gotovina had been on the
run for several years, facing secret indictments by the ICTY relating to Op-
eration STORM in 1995, and apparently had enjoyed quiet assistance from
Croatian military and security services. Yet it was understood that the
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Mesi government had acquiesced in—and likely assisted—Gotovina’s cap-
ture, causing a firestorm of controversy in Croatia and widespread hard
feelings among veterans.10
Nevertheless, defense reform has been a significant accomplishment of the
Mesi government. While Croatia’s military has some distance to go before it is
fully interoperable with NATO, since 2000 officers with controversial pasts have
been pensioned off and professionalism has replaced political cronyism as the
prime mover of careers. Through the 1990s, the Ministry of Defense, run by
Gojko Šušak, the most corrupt of all Tudjman’s ministers, was a hotbed of graft,
kickbacks, and outright theft; rooting this dysfunctional culture out of the Min-
istry of Defense has taken years, but progress is significant. All efforts have been
focused on NATO accession, and in 2008 Croatia suspended conscription. Un-
der plans known as “Force 2010,” total active personnel will fall to twenty thou-
sand. The ground forces, built around three maneuver brigades (one reserve),
will receive several new types of vehicles (armored and unarmored), tank mod-
ernization, and new artillery; the air force will procure a small squadron of mod-
ern, multirole fighters; and the navy, essentially a coastal defense force, will
receive several new corvettes and fast patrol craft.11
Croatia’s contribution to international peacekeeping has been modest to
date, the only noteworthy mission being Croatia’s 320-strong contribution to
the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Zagreb’s unwilling-
ness to commit troops abroad has as much to do with the domestic political
mood, which is suspicious of foreign adventures en principe, as with the un-
readiness of the armed forces to operate alongside NATO before Force 2010 is
fully implemented.
The Mesi government likewise deserves praise for its regional and coopera-
tive approach to security affairs. Zagreb since 2000 has consistently viewed its
national security as an international matter, and both the Defense Ministry and
the Interior Ministry (responsible for the police and counterterrorism) consider
close partnerships with other former Yugoslav republics indispensable in con-
fronting transnational threats. While few Croats pine for the lost Yugoslavia,
most understand that good relations are a sine qua non for regional security and
prosperity. Lacking any major conventional foes or significant internal security
threats—Croatia’s Serbs, more than a quarter of the population in 1991 and
considered a fifth column by many Croats, are less than 5 percent today, after
Operation STORM—Zagreb in recent years has emphasized unconventional
threats like terrorism, migration, and crime as its primary security concerns. For
several centuries Croatia, as part of the Habsburg empire, stood as the bulwark
of Christendom against the Ottoman Turks to the south and east, an image that
has not been forgotten, particularly in the post-9/11 world.
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BOSNIA: UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Croatia’s security concerns are disproportionately focused on Bosnia, its trou-
bled neighbor to the south. Formally the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina,
the country received its independence from Yugoslavia in April 1992 and was
immediately plunged into a bloody civil war that lasted until the fall of 1995. The
country has been under foreign—first NATO, now EU—occupation ever since.
The Bosnian disaster was the leading foreign-policy story of the last decade,
grabbing the attention of the world’s media and helping drive direct NATO mili-
tary intervention against the Bosnian Serbs in the summer of 1995, in Operation
DELIBERATE FORCE. Claims of “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing” in the summer
of 1992 caused a firestorm of controversy that never abated. With hindsight and
dispassion, it is evident that the international media, encouraged by the Bosnian
Muslim government in Sarajevo, significantly overstated war deaths and the ex-
tent of wanton crimes against civilians. In particular, the number of war dead,
estimated at 200,000 or even 250,000, allegedly mostly Muslim and civilian—a
significant number from a total Bosnian population of 4.3 million at the war’s
outbreak—was grossly overstated. Detailed analysis by Bosnian authorities and
the ICTY independently determined that the total figure for war dead was about
one hundred thousand on all sides: roughly 54 percent military and 46 percent
civilian, with 62 percent being Muslim, 23 percent Serb, and 5 percent Croat.12
That said, it cannot be disputed that prewar Bosnia, a relatively thriving
multicultural society, was destroyed by the 1992–95 conflict. Before the war
Bosnia was almost 44 percent Muslim, 31 percent Serbian (Orthodox Chris-
tian), 17 percent Croat (Roman Catholic), and 5 percent Yugoslav (those, often
of mixed background, who refused to identify with a particular ethno-religious
group). All Bosnians are Slavs, divided by religion and history but speaking a
common language, once known as Serbo-Croatian and today as Serbian, Cro-
atian, or Bosnian, depending on one’s preference (despite differences in orthog-
raphy and vocabulary, these are linguistically nearly identical).13 Although
postwar analysis reveals few changes in population mix (though Muslims, who
now prefer the term “Bosniaks,” constitute 40 percent of the population), the
country has just under four million citizens; many left as refugees in the
mid-1990s and have not returned. More significantly, regional demographics
within Bosnia are notably changed.
The American-backed Dayton Peace Accords of late 1995, which formally
ended the civil war, enshrined two substate entities, the Muslim-Croat Federation
and the Serbian Republic, each comprising about half the country. These enti-
ties, which represented the warring factions—the Muslims and Croats had been
allied against the Serbs since early 1994, under pressure from Washington—
were given substantial powers, which were supposed to be distinctly temporary.
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This division recognized the population shifts that occurred during the war, and
despite Dayton’s pledges to resettle refugees in their prewar homes and commu-
nities, more than a decade after the guns fell silent the strong majority of refu-
gees have not returned. As a result, most Muslims and Croats remain in the
Federation, while Serbs are largely confined to their Republika Srpska. For in-
stance, Sarajevo, the country’s capital and largest urban area, was a multicultural
city before 1992 but today has few Serbs, who are just 5 percent of Sarajevo’s
population, fallen from 38 percent prewar.14
In purely military terms, enforcing the Dayton Accords has been a resound-
ing success. While under foreign occupation, which has coincided with a drastic
drawdown in Bosnia’s military capacity, the country has seen no return to open
conflict, despite high levels of hostility among Serbs, Muslims, and Croats. Be-
ginning in late 1995 as the U.S.-led, corps-strong Intervention Force (IFOR),
which was renamed the Stabiliza-
tion Force (SFOR) a year later,
NATO peacekeeping was robust
and properly resourced, relative
to the size of the local population;
just as important, the warring fac-
tions were exhausted and uninterested in more combat. Over the next several
years, the force’s strength fell from three divisions (one U.S.) to two brigades. By
the time SFOR was closed out at the end of 2005, to be replaced by the smaller,
European-led EU Force (EUFOR, at a current strength of only 2,200), it was
clear that the military dimension of NATO-led nation (re)building was worthy
of praise. Hence the claim of the last SFOR commander, Major General James
Darden, U.S. Army: “If we could do it all over again, I don’t know how we could
do better.”15
However true such claims may be in strictly military terms, it is clear that the
political side of Dayton has been markedly less successful. In the first place, the
political reintegration of Bosnia is far from complete. The two entities still exist,
and the Republika Srpska, in particular, remains jealous of its prerogatives and
unwilling to relinquish power to the ostensible national government in Sarajevo.
Dayton has not changed the basic political fact, which to a considerable extent
lay behind the civil war, that Bosnia’s Serbs do not wish to live in a unitary
Bosnian state politically dominated by Muslims, the largest group in the country.
For their part, most Muslims cannot envision a Bosnia that is not in some way a
unitary state, while Croats are increasingly resentful of their perceived
second-class status vis-à-vis the Muslims in the Federation. Bosnian Croat sup-
port for enhanced status under Dayton, the so-called Third Entity movement,
continues to exist, even though this is a taboo subject as far as Bosnia’s Western
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masters are concerned. Many sore points remain, above all the issue of war crim-
inals. While many Bosnians, heavily but not exclusively Serbs, have been extra-
dited to stand trial in The Hague on war crimes charges, some of the biggest fish
remain at large. The July 2008 move by the new Serbian government to capture
and extradite Radovan Karadi, the civil leader of the wartime Republika
Srpska, appears to be a positive development, yet there is no guarantee that his
upcoming trial will not devolve into a disappointing spectacle like many
high-profile trials at the ICTY. Moreover, General Ratko Mladi, the Republika
Srpska’s wartime warrior-in-chief, a revered figure to many Serbs, remains at
large as of this writing, his whereabouts officially unknown. It is far from clear
whether the ICTY model has worked well for Bosnia—some have suggested that
a South African–style “truth and reconciliation” model might be more politi-
cally healing and empowering for Bosnians—and it is incomprehensible to
many Bosnians that after more than a dozen years NATO has been unable to
track the most-wanted men down.
Since Dayton, Bosnia’s de facto ruler has been the high representative, se-
lected from EU member states. The high representative enjoys essentially colo-
nial powers, including the right to fire ministers and dissolve governments.
Despite, or perhaps because of, this situation, political reform in Bosnia has
lagged far behind where even pessimists expected it to be well over a decade after
Dayton. While recent years have seen belated progress in transferring authority
from the entities to the national government—including, significantly, the uni-
fication of entity militaries in 2005 (since 2006 Bosnia has had modest armed
forces recruited from Muslim, Serb, and Croat volunteers)—much work re-
mains to be done, and Bosnia today cannot plausibly be described as possessing
an effective unitary government.
Whatever the shortcomings of Bosnia’s political reconstruction since 1995,
its economic rebuilding has been even less impressive. The prewar economy,
which included a strong industrial sector, has not reemerged, despite ample
Western aid and direct investment. Much of Tito-era production was military,
which was neither needed nor wanted under Dayton. Just as serious, corruption
in all entities and at all levels of society is entrenched and so grave as to under-
mine any meaningful economic reform. How bad this institutionalized theft ac-
tually is became evident in 2000, when extensive investigation revealed that of
the five billion dollars in aid lavished on the country over the five years since
Dayton, one-fifth—a billion dollars—had simply disappeared. Worse, the cor-
ruption infects all the entities and political parties, and in real terms such back-
room deals have outpaced the country’s notional economy.16 While many
Western firms attempted to open plants in Bosnia after 1995, few remain,
daunted by the culture of theft and corruption that confronts all commercial
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activities. Even major international corporations have been unable to make
headway. After Dayton, the German auto giant Volkswagen AG attempted to re-
build at Vogoša, a Sarajevo suburb, a car plant that had been damaged during
the war. But the project was a bust, and after several years of trying VW pulled
out in frustration, having lined the pockets of local politicos but never getting a
functioning car factory going. Western investment was no solution to Bosnia’s
ills, concluded the VW director for the country: “No chance. You would lose
your money completely.”17
As a result, the unofficial unemployment rate is around 50 percent, and no
one seems to know the size of the grey economy or even how to determine where
it begins and the legitimate economy ends. The country has become, its leading
human rights activists conclude, “the last black hole in Europe.” Despite wide-
spread poverty, there is a wealthy class of Bosnians, usually connected to both
the political and criminal elites (who are not infrequently the same group), but
average citizens continue to be underemployed, to the detriment of societal
happiness and stability.
The painful truth is that since Dayton Western powers have done an inade-
quate job of forcing political and economic reform. Eschewing a fully colonial
approach as politically (and perhaps fiscally) unacceptable, NATO and the EU
have attempted to impose a pseudocolonial superstructure over Bosnian life,
with negative results. Corruption remains endemic, and Bosnians themselves
seem unwilling, or perhaps unable, to remedy the situation. The 2003 verdict of
David Harland, the former head of UN civil affairs in Bosnia, is just as true and
devastating five years on:
Eight years after a devastating war, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a remarkable success
story. Reconstruction is complete. Economic output has passed prewar levels and the
republic’s economy is now among the fastest-growing in Europe. Refugees have re-
turned to their homes, war-time nationalist leaders are dead or in jail. Measured by
the rate of marriage between young people of different ethnic groups, the hostility
that recently led to so much blood-letting between Croats, Muslims and Serbs is re-
ceding. There is palpable optimism in the air. What was recently one of the most
backward areas of Europe is moving forward.
The year is 1953.18
The Yugoslav communists did a far superior job rebuilding Bosnia politically,
economically, and socially than the West has managed fifty years later. Bosnia re-
covered faster under Tito’s leadership from the much more brutal and
devastating Second World War than it has under Western tutelage from the 1992–
95 civil war.
2 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
30
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss4/1
Another major issue confronting post-Dayton Bosnia is Islamic radicalism.
Although Bosnia’s Muslims are hardly radical as a group, there exists among
them a small percentage of very radical sorts, many of them war veterans who
fought in al-Qa‘ida-linked mujahidin units. Such radicals hardly existed before
the war but can be easily encountered today, thanks to lavish Saudi funding of
radical mosques and Islamic “charities” and to quiet support from the wartime
government in Sarajevo for extremist causes. While the number of foreign
mujahidin who fought on behalf of Sarajevo was not large, probably four or five
thousand in all, their political importance was of a high order, both for Bosnia
and for the international jihadist movement. While few Westerners have paid
sufficient attention, it is clear that in the 1990s Bosnia played a role in the growth
of al-Qa‘ida much as Afghanistan did in the 1980s; simply put, the Bin Laden or-
ganization metastasized from a South Asian regional problem into a global in-
surgency in the mid-1990s thanks in no small part to its successes in Bosnia.19
While NATO and the EU have persistently attempted to downplay the extent
of the radicalism problem in Bosnia post-Dayton, some Bosnian Muslims have
been less sanguine and more willing to point out that Saudi-style radical Islam,
which was essentially unknown before the war, now has a visible foothold in the
country.20 With the death in 2003 of Alija Izetbegovi, the Bosnian president
from 1990 to 2000, radical Islam lost its most important benefactor; contrary to
the secular and modern image granted him by the Western media, Izetbegovi
was in fact a lifelong advocate of extremist Islam. He was an early member of the
Young Muslims, a subversive group linked to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,
which was banned by Yugoslav authorities for its links to terrorism (during
communist rule, Izetbegovi was imprisoned twice for his illegal Islamic activ-
ism).21 Of greater concern today is the younger generation, hardened by war and
swayed by radical messages (and Saudi money). The classic case is Nezim
Halilovi, a young preacher in Sarajevo with a considerable following on
Bosnia’s radical fringe. An avowed propagandist for al-Qa‘ida and extremist Is-
lam, Halilovi boasts of his ties to mujahidin in many countries, and his Friday
sermons from Sarajevo’s King Fahd Islamic Center—built after Dayton with
funds from Riyadh, in the “Saudi shopping mall style” loathed by most Bosnian
Muslims—are disseminated across the country and beyond on the Internet.22
Another continuing controversy has been the issue of Bosnian passports
issued to foreign mujahidin during and after the civil war. It is clear that the
Izetbegovi government distributed several thousand Bosnian passports to for-
eign fighters and “aid workers” who fought on behalf of Islam; Osama Bin Laden
is reportedly one of the many holy warriors who received a Bosnian passport un-
der other-than-normal circumstances. (Subsequent investigation revealed that
within two months of the Dayton Peace Accords signing, 741 foreign mujahidin
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received Bosnian passports with assistance from the secret police, and 103 pass-
ports were granted on one day alone in late December 1995.) Sarajevo finally
moved to revoke several hundred passports obtained under questionable cir-
cumstances in early 2007, after years of Western pressure to get serious about the
problem. By that time, more than a decade had elapsed since the issue first arose
in international intelligence and law enforcement circles, and no one knew
where most of the mystery men were living. Some had already turned up dead in
Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq.23
The extremist problem in Bosnia resembles the country’s bigger, broader
challenges. Poorly understood by outsiders, some of whom actively deny the ex-
istence of a problem in the face of ample evidence, it is as much the product of
foreign meddling and Western neglect as of anything done by Bosnians. It is in-
separable from broader problems of corruption and criminality—and it shows
no signs of going away or fixing itself.
KOSOVO AND THE ALBANIAN QUESTION
The political, economic, and social problems confronting Kosovo today are as
grave as those plaguing Bosnia, perhaps more so. There can be no question that
Kosovo remains the most volatile region in the Balkans, and the possibility of vi-
olent confrontation remains real. The emergence of an independent Kosovo in
early 2008 represents not the end of the conflict over this contested land but pos-
sibly only the next round in a struggle that has plagued the Balkans for years, in-
deed generations.
The road to NATO intervention in Kosovo nearly a decade ago was long and
difficult. Rising tension between Serbs and Albanians constituted one of the ma-
jor causes of the collapse of Yugoslavia after Tito’s death in 1980; as communism
waned, nationalism reemerged with a vengeance in Kosovo among both Serbs
and Albanians, and the Communist Party was incapable of keeping a lid on the
problem as it had for decades.24 The Yugoslav military had to be called in to re-
store order with bayonets in Prishtina, the region’s capital, after serious riots in
1981, and by 1987 the JNA leadership was talking openly of a “rebellion” emerg-
ing in Kosovo that aimed at creating an Albanian republic free of Yugoslavia.25
The Serbian crackdown that followed, and would last over a decade, perma-
nently embittered Kosovo’s Albanian majority and convinced even moderate
and nonviolent Albanians that cooperation with the Serbian leadership in
Belgrade was fruitless.
Serious armed resistance to Serbian rule emerged in Kosovo only in 1996,
with the appearance of a shadowy group calling itself the Kosovo Liberation
Army; for the first time since the Second World War Albanians were taking up
arms against Serbian rule over Kosovo. This radical organization sought to
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provoke a wider war by attacking Serbian police and, especially, Albanian “col-
laborators.” Such attacks mounted through 1998, and by the end of that year
large parts of Kosovo were plagued with a bona fide insurgency.
Belgrade’s reaction was harsh, as expected, and in late March 1999 Serbian ex-
cesses against Albanian civilians provoked NATO military intervention, in the
shape of Operation ALLIED FORCE, a seventy-eight-day bombing campaign that
succeeded in forcing Serbian forces out of Kosovo. While it is now known that
the extent of Serbian crimes against Albanians was seriously overstated for pro-
paganda effect—contrary to claims of tens of thousands of noncombatant
deaths in Kosovo, the ICTY was never able to verify more than three thousand
Albanian civilians killed by Serbian security forces—the Serbs lost the propa-
ganda war, as in Bosnia, in the opening round and never recovered.26
NATO then inherited Kosovo, as it had Bosnia less than four years before. In
ethnic terms Kosovo is less complicated; the population postwar is over 90 per-
cent Albanian, with small minorities of Serbs, Gypsies, and Slavic Muslims. Nev-
ertheless, nation building in Kosovo is by any standard even less successful than
in Bosnia. The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) has done a respectable job of
keeping the peace at modest cost; its total strength has dropped from over fifty
thousand in 1999 to sixteen thousand in recent years, with a U.S. Army brigade
as a standing contingent (supplied by the National Guard since before 9/11).
Unlike in Bosnia, KFOR’s commanding general has always been a European.
Yet KFOR’s record has blemishes, and its mandate has been filled with irony.
Within months of KFOR’s arrival in the summer of 1999, on the heels of bomb-
ing and refugee displacement, it was obvious that NATO’s job had become the
protection of the remaining Serbs and other minorities from the victorious Al-
banians. Attacks on Serb civilians and religious buildings had been common-
place, culminating in orchestrated riots in March 2004 that were pronounced a
“failure” for KFOR by leading nongovernmental organizations. The most de-
tailed report of the Albanian uprising is damning: “On March 17, at least 33 riots
broke out in Kosovo over a 48-hour period, involving an estimated 51,000 pro-
testers. Nineteen people died during the violence. At least 550 homes and 27
Orthodox churches and monasteries were burned, and approximately 4,100
persons from minority communities were displaced from their homes.”27
The political progress delivered by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) since 1999 has been even less impressive than the military-security
dimension. As UN veterans have elaborated in detail, UNMIK has singularly
failed to bring about any sort of Western-style “civil society” in Kosovo. Alle-
giances remain anything but civic, rather ethnic, even tribal; few Albanians have
any interest in living alongside Serbs or Gypsies, whom they consider enemies
and traitors. Also, Western concepts of good governance and measures against
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corruption fly in the face of local norms so completely that they are simply un-
translatable without serious coercion, which NATO and the UN have never been
willing to apply.28
The result is a functionally mono-ethnic society that is run by the leaders of
the Kosovo Liberation Army, many of whom are deeply corrupt, boasting ties to
organized crime and little interested in reforming anything. Thanks in no small
part to this disturbing reality, Kosovo’s economy is very troubled. The legitimate
economy provides few jobs, and at least half the workforce is without employ-
ment. Kosovo was the poorest, least developed, and most fecund region of Yugo-
slavia, and these trends have continued after 1999. Per capita income is about
two thousand dollars a year, among the lowest in Europe and far below that of
Slovenia and Croatia, or even Bosnia. Demonstrating how deep corruption and
criminality run in Kosovo, Carla DelPonte, the longtime chief prosecutor for the
ICTY and no friend of the Serbs, has recently asserted that Albanian fighters in
1999 murdered three hundred Serb prisoners, harvested their organs, and sold
them on the international black market.29
In February 2008 Kosovo ended its strange legal status—for nearly a decade it
had been nominally a province of Serbia, while under NATO/UN occupation
and quasi-self-governing—by formally declaring independence. This was pre-
dictably met with howls from Serbia and its ally Russia, but the United States and
most EU members quickly recognized the republic’s new status, as did most of
Serbia’s neighbors. NATO and the UN abandoned their former policy of “stan-
dards before status” (by which Kosovo would have been held to Western norms
on human rights protection before independence was permitted); confronted
with something of a mission impossible, NATO and the UN now considered an
independent Kosovo unstoppable. To date, there is no indication that independ-
ence will ameliorate Kosovo’s grave political, economic, and social problems.
Ominously, the emergence of a new state in Europe has reopened the touchy
issue of border revisions in the Balkans, as well as the perennially vexing Alba-
nian question. While few in Albania proper seem to pine for reunion with
conationals in Kosovo (officially now “Kosova,” per Albanian usage) and the
government in Prishtina is careful never to utter anything about Greater Alba-
nia, the Slavs who live adjacent to ethnic Albanian territory are undoubtedly
worried. Memories are long in the Balkans, and no Slavs have forgotten that a
Greater Albania briefly existed, consisting of Albania plus Kosovo and a good
chunk of present-day Macedonia, as a satellite of fascist Italy during World War II.
Serbia has its own Albanian problem, even after the loss of Kosovo. In the
months after ALLIED FORCE, Albanian militias operating in the Preševo
Valley, adjacent to Kosovo, staged dozens of attacks on Serbian police and
military outposts. Styling itself as a local offshoot of Kosovo’s successful
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Liberation Army and reportedly recruiting among the Albanian population
concentrated in the valley, the Preševo guerrillas were a shadowy, small
force that nevertheless succeeded in scaring Belgrade badly before disap-
pearing.30
The situation in Macedonia was, and remains, much more serious. Although
this small, landlocked country of two million was fortunate enough to leave Yu-
goslavia in 1992 without bloodshed, the years since independence have been
roiled by the ethnic question, to the detriment of peace and prosperity. Con-
ceived by most citizens as a state by and for Slavic Macedonians (who are cultur-
ally and linguistically close to both the Serbs and Bulgarians), they are a young
nation, despite having lived in the region for more than a millennium and a half;
Slavic Macedonians were formally recognized as a distinct nation for the first
time only in 1945, by Tito’s regime.31 Yet Macedonia has a substantial Albanian
minority of about 25 percent—in best Balkan fashion, the Albanians assert they
are a third of the population, while Slavs counter that the real number is only
one-fifth—heavily concentrated in the country’s west and north, adjacent to
Kosovo.
The desire of ardent Albanian nationalists for union with Kosovo is hardly se-
cret, and it took tangible and violent form in late 2000 with the emergence in
Macedonia of an Albanian insurgent force, the National Liberation Army, which
promptly launched attacks on Macedonian security forces.32 Over the next sev-
eral months, the insurgents staged assaults in or near several towns, and in
mid-2001 fighting came close to the capital of Skopje. NATO intervention, in-
cluding the deployment of over four thousand peacekeepers on the border with
Kosovo, helped prevent the conflict from boiling over, but not before several
dozen deaths had occurred; few outside the region realize how close the Balkans
came to another war in 2001. Hard feelings remain on both sides, as do suspi-
cions in Skopje that Albanian extremists are plotting more violence. Given that
the Albanian question remains unresolved, at least in the minds of nationalist
activists, there can be no assurances that such a conflict cannot reoccur, nor can
anyone be certain that a wider war could be averted again.33
“SERBIA IS RISING”: TWENTY YEARS AFTER
Given the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the biggest loser of the Balkans
wars of the 1990s was Serbia, the largest Yugoslav republic and the one most re-
sponsible for the tumult of the previous decade. When Tito’s federation went
over the cliff in 1991, the Serbian government in Belgrade, led by Slobodan
Miloševi, enjoyed de facto control over Serbia, its once-autonomous regions of
Kosovo and Vojvodina, and the neighboring republic of Montenegro. Today the
country has lost nearly everything; Serbs have been expelled from Croatia and
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live under foreign occupation in Bosnia, while Serbia’s borders are reduced to
nearly what they were before the Balkan wars of 1912–13. Most painfully, the
Serbian heartland of Kosovo is now irredeemably gone. In a real sense, the
Greater Serbia project espoused by nationalists has resulted not in glory but
ruin; Serbia has cartographically regressed a century.
It has long been easy to place blame for all this at the feet of the late Slobodan
Miloševi, Serbia’s failed leader, who was extradited to The Hague in 2001 and
died in ICTY custody in 2006. Much demonized by the West, Miloševi has more
recently been a figure for unhappy Serbs to blame for their current predicament.
Miloševi remains an enigmatic character, and he has never inspired balanced
judgments, yet his passing offers Serbia an opportunity to reassess the recent
past. Although Serbs managed to depose Miloševi bloodlessly in October 2000,
they have yet to come to terms with the damage wrought on Serbia during his
years in power.34
Miloševi rose to prominence and power in the late 1980s by harnessing Ser-
bian national feelings, which were emerging from under the ice of decades-long
official proscription. Yet Miloševi was never a nationalist himself; indeed, he
seemed a colorless communist functionary from central casting, and he had lit-
tle feeling for Serbian views (or for Serbs, for that matter). Cashing in on the pa-
triotic slogan “Serbia is rising,” he assured average Serbs they would be able to
preserve their prerogatives as the largest nation in Yugoslavia. When Tito’s Yu-
goslavia fell apart in 1991, Miloševi helped fashion a new, downsized one, con-
sisting of Serbia and Montenegro; under various names, this union would last
until 2006, when Montenegro too wanted out.
Serbia under Miloševi suffered from chronic ills, including profound eco-
nomic collapse, the sinister blending of organized crime and state authority, de-
mographic crisis, and losing wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.35 While
Miloševi was culpable for some of these disasters, he created few of them alone,
and some of the most serious defects in Serbia’s economy and political culture
were holdovers from Titoism. Yet it can be judged that Miloševi did nothing to
improve such ailments. Certainly his cynical brand of divide et impera politics,
particularly his employment of the nationalist bacillus as needed, contributed to
Serbia’s problems long after he left the scene.
Serbia’s current challenge is to form a new, postwar political identity suited to
present-day realities, and there is no indication that this will happen quickly or
easily. This should not be surprising, given the nature of the shocks to the sys-
tem—political, economic, military, and social—that Serbia has absorbed in the
last two decades, yet is not encouraging either. Fundamentally, Serbia’s body
politic is divided between modernists who envision a European future, based on
a market economy, rule of law, and integration into such Western institutions as
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NATO and the EU, versus traditionalists who favor isolation from “Europe,” per-
haps in collaboration with a resurgent Russia and in explicit resistance to NATO,
the EU, and almost everything else perceived as Western.36 While the modernists
have an appealing product, at least to younger Serbs, the traditionalists are able
to fall back on ancient national themes, buttressed by hard feelings caused by re-
cent mishandling by NATO and the West. How near run a struggle this remains
has been laid bare by the spring 2008 parliamentary elections, which resulted in
over three months of wrangling and horse-trading to produce a weak coalition
government; in the winter of 2008, the modernist Boris Tadi required two
rounds of voting barely to defeat the hard-line nationalist Tomislav Nikoli for
the presidency (Tadi actually lost to Nikoli in round one, requiring a runoff
election). While time may be on the side of the modernists, as younger voters in-
creasingly desire a European future, it may take decades for pro-Western atti-
tudes to achieve political dominance over the bitter-enders, and it promises to
be a bumpy road.
Real reform in Serbia will require root-and-branch transformation of large
aspects of public life, especially the breaking up of mafia alliances with parties,
police, and politicians of all stripes. The assassination of Zoran Djindji, the
pro-Western and more or less reformist prime minister, in March 2003 by a team
of mafia-linked secret policemen resulted in a short-term direct assault on the
covert cadres that control much of Serbia’s economy and politics, but much
more effort is required to defeat the perverse system that originated under Tito
and thrived under Miloševi.37
While Serbia presently lacks the military power to harm its neighbors, it is be-
yond question that many Serbs, including numerous prominent politicians,
consider Serbia’s setbacks of recent years to be temporary and reversible; many
assess Kosovo’s “final status” as anything but final. While such views may not be
reality based, given Serbia’s staggering economic and demographic problems, to
say nothing of its inability to confront NATO in military terms, they are held
rather widely and have their origins in Serbs’ deepest-held myths about them-
selves. Softening them will take decades and much patience. To be fair to Serbs
who feel wronged by NATO and the West, it is far from self-evident why some
Balkan borders are considered sacrosanct while others are not. Efforts by the
Republika Srpska to renegotiate Dayton and perhaps leave Bosnia in the after-
math of Kosovo independence were rudely dismissed by the Western powers,
but if Serbia’s borders can be redrawn by international fiat, why cannot the same
be done with Bosnian frontiers? In Kosovo and elsewhere, redrawing state
boundaries to align with ethnic realities on the ground, while temporarily
painful, will undoubtedly solve problems in the long run.
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Bringing meaningful and enduring stability to Europe’s troubled southeast
will require Serbia’s involvement and participation politically, economically,
and militarily. There can be no lasting tranquility in the Balkans without the in-
volvement—not just acquiescence—of the region’s largest and most populous
state. While Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro
cannot be held hostage to Serbia’s weakened political culture, neither can Ser-
bia’s neighbors proceed very far down the road to peace and prosperity without
Belgrade’s active participation. Serbia’s twentieth century, which began trium-
phantly with the Balkan wars and the creation of Yugoslavia on Serbia’s terms af-
ter World War I, ended catastrophically, in defeat and despair. It can only be
hoped that for Serbia, and for all the states of the former Yugoslavia, the current
century, while beginning in difficulties, will end more happily.
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The new U.S. maritime strategy embodies a historic reassessment of the inter-national system and how the nation can best pursue its interests in harmony 
with those of other states. In light of the strategy’s focus on building partner-
ships to better safeguard the global maritime commons, it is vital that American 
leaders clearly understand the frank and unvarnished views of allies, friends, 
and potential partners. The strategy’s unveiling at the Naval War College on 17 
October 2007 with the leaders of nearly a hundred navies and coast guards pres-
ent demonstrated initial global maritime inclusiveness. The new maritime strat-
egy is generating responses from numerous states. As 
U.S. leaders work to implement global maritime part-
nerships in the years ahead, they must carefully study 
the reactions of the nations and maritime forces with 
which they hope to work.
Chinese responses warrant especially close consid-
eration. China is a key global stakeholder with which 
the United States shares many common maritime in-
terests. Beijing has not made any offi cial public state-
ments on the maritime strategy thus far. Yet Chinese 
opinions on this matter are clearly important, even if 
they suggest that in some areas the two nations must 
“agree to disagree.” Chinese reactions to the maritime 
strategy provide a window into a larger strategic dy-
namic—not just in East Asia, where China is already 
developing as a great power, but globally, where it has 
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the potential to play a major role as well. How the United States can maintain its 
existing status and role while China continues to rise—as the world’s greatest 
developed and developing powers attempt to reach an understanding that might 
be termed “competitive coexistence”—will be perhaps the critical question in 
international relations for the twenty-fi rst century.1 To that end, this study ana-
lyzes three of the most signifi cant unoffi cial Chinese assessments of the mari-
time strategy publicly available to date and offers annotated full-length transla-
tions (which follow, in the form of essays) so that a foreign audience can survey 
the documents themselves.2 
A PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL COMPLEX
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has a long tradition of informing its pol-
icy elites on international affairs through the widespread translation of foreign 
news and documents. 
Under Mao Zedong’s leadership (1949–76), offi cial discourse was dominated 
by “doctrinalism.”3  Revolutionary leaders dedicated to “antagonistic contradic-
tions and struggle” used ambiguous ideological statements to mobilize political 
factions and launch personal attacks against their rivals. By the late 1970s, how-
ever, Deng Xiaoping had shifted the national emphasis to economic and science 
and technology development, called for pragmatic debate of policy issues and 
solutions, and thereby opened the way for market forces and more widespread 
circulation of information.4 
These factors have allowed a “public intellectual complex” to emerge 
under Deng’s successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Members of this com-
munity of strategic scholars and policy makers at a wide variety of private and 
public institutions engage in increasingly vigorous debates, publish widely 
in specialized and popular journals, make media appearances, and on occa-
sion brief policy makers and even China’s senior leadership. Some intellec-
tuals are privy to internal deliberations, and a few play a major role in shap-
ing policy, particularly in specialized subject areas. Even when Chinese 
public intellectuals are not directly involved in the policy process, their views 
often matter. Their ideas may inform policy makers indirectly and even be 
adopted as policy. They may also play a role in justifying or socializing already-
established policies.5 When politics or bureaucratic maneuvering comes to 
the fore, public intellectuals may become caught up in a larger competition 
of ideas. For all these reasons, their writings are worth examining for possible 
insights into Chinese policy debates and even, possibly, government decision 
making. Chinese analysts are meticulous students of policy documents from 
major countries (particularly the United States), and they scrutinize their texts 
in the belief that wording contains specifi c insights; any signifi cant U.S. policy 
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document (e.g., the maritime strategy) is therefore likely to receive careful vet-
ting in Chinese publications.6 
In this context, it is hardly surprising that the maritime strategy has been 
subject to Chinese description and evaluation. In the fi rst year since the strat-
egy’s promulgation, it was covered extensively in China’s civilian (and, to a lesser 
extent, military) press. The vast majority of these articles, however, were brief 
and descriptive.7 Some of the more extensive ones touched on the strategy in-
directly in discussing more broadly U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacifi c;8 
a few were rather sensational in their obsession with the idea that the United 
States is attempting to “contain” China.9 
Thus far, three openly published articles stand out from the rest in their focus 
on the strategy, the detail and sophistication of their analyses, and their having 
been written by recognized experts from major institutions; they have therefore 
been selected as the focus of this study. Their respective authors’ affi liations 
suggest that their writings (in terms of variations in coverage) offer windows 
into how different elements of China’s bureaucracy, with their specifi c interests 
and perspectives, assess the new U.S. maritime strategy. While these informed 
commentaries are not defi nitive and should not be overinterpreted, they may be 
suggestive of the Chinese government’s viewpoint and future policy responses. 
The fi rst article is by Lu Rude, emeritus professor at the Dalian Naval Ves-
sel Academy.10 Lu has been a consistent proponent of maritime and naval de-
velopment and contributes frequently to debates on China’s naval priorities.11 
Lu enlisted in the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in 1951, beginning 
a military career that would last for half a century, of which over four decades 
would be devoted to education in maritime navigation.12 Lu’s full-page article 
on the new maritime strategy appeared in People’s Navy, the offi cial newspaper 
of the PLAN, which is published by the service’s Political Department and pro-
vides guidance for offi cers and enlisted personnel.13 Lu outlines the new U.S. 
maritime strategy’s context, content, and implications for international security, 
particularly in East Asia. He lauds the strategy’s emphasis on confl ict prevention 
and international cooperation but places the onus on the United States to dem-
onstrate its strategic sincerity through concrete actions. He highlights the docu-
ment’s emphasis on multinational cooperation against unconventional threats 
but also draws attention to the Navy’s stated mission of “deterring potential 
competitors.”
这是美军海上战略可能发生的重大变化, 应该得到世界各国的肯定.
This could be a major change in the U.S. military’s maritime strategy. It must receive the affi rmation 
of all the world’s nations. 
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The second article is by Wang Baofu, researcher and deputy director of the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense University’s Institute for 
Strategic Studies.14 Wang’s comments and assessments on international rela-
tions and arms control appear frequently in China’s offi cial media, as well as 
in popular media and academic publications.15 His present article appeared in 
Study Times, a journal of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Party School. 
An outspoken critic of the American intervention in Iraq, Wang sees the new 
maritime strategy as the outgrowth of a comprehensive reassessment of U.S. 
military policy, methods, and objectives in the aftermath of both 9/11 and the 
early phases of the Iraq war.16 
The third article is by Su Hao, a well published professor in the Department 
of Diplomacy at the China Foreign Affairs University and director of its Cen-
ter for Asia-Pacifi c Studies.17 He is also a board member in a range of Chinese 
organizations that focus on security, cooperation, and bilateral exchange.18 Su 
has emphasized that Chinese national interests and identity are primarily conti-
nental.19 He displays a deep understanding of the strategy’s wording, having also 
published a full-length Chinese translation.20 Su’s article appeared in Leaders, 
a popular magazine on current affairs and policy published in Hong Kong for 
domestic consumption there, as well as for a select mainland audience.
COMMON ASSESSMENTS
The three articles give a sophisticated and relatively comprehensive summary of 
the U.S. maritime strategy. They differ in assessing various aspects of the docu-
ment, and there is some tension between the commonalities that emerge from 
shared perspectives and those that are products of the articles’ having followed 
the strategy’s original structure. But the three articles unambiguously share sev-
eral major conclusions. 
A New Strategic Direction. All three authors see the new U.S. maritime strategy 
as representing a major shift from the Maritime Strategy of 1986. Each regards 
the strategies issued in the interim as products of post–Cold War strategic un-
certainties, with little lasting infl uence.21 They characterize the current strategy 
as fundamentally different. Su explains that when formulating the 2007 edition, 
“U.S. Navy theoretical circles were faced with the new situation of international 
antiterrorism and the rapid rise of emerging countries.” Wang states that the 
new strategy “not only has new judgments and positions concerning maritime 
security threats, but more importantly has new thinking regarding how to use 
military power to meet national security objectives.” All emphasize the impor-
tance of the subject at hand: in Wang’s words, “As a bellwether of world military 
transformation, U.S. maritime strategic transformation merits scrutiny.”
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Emphasis on Cooperation and Confl ict Prevention. All three analysts praise the 
strategy’s explicit focus on cooperation. Su declares that “it prominently empha-
sizes maritime security cooperation.” Wang states that “the U.S. military’s ‘mari-
time strategy’ has already taken ‘international cooperation’ as an important prin-
ciple. This . . . indicates that the United States security and military strategy will 
face a major new adjustment.” Lu writes, “One can see that the new U.S. maritime 
strategy emphasizes ‘military software’ such as ‘humanitarian rescue missions and 
improving cooperative relations between the United States and every country.’”
The analysts all emphasize that the new maritime strategy elevates prevent-
ing war to an equal status with winning wars. They interpret war prevention as 
involving primarily soft-power operations, as opposed to deterrence based on 
war-winning capabilities to undergird otherwise cooperative approaches. Wang 
terms the emphasis on war prevention the strategy’s “most prominent feature.” 
Lu describes this “conspicuous new viewpoint” as a product of “major change” 
and recognizes the utility of “maritime military operations other than war” and 
increased “international cooperation and noncombat use of navies,” to include 
humanitarian rescue missions and improved cooperative relations with other 
regions. Su describes this as a “major bright spot.” Chinese analysts implicitly 
welcome a U.S. Navy more focused on such missions than on sea control and 
power projection. 
But the Chinese analysts are not prepared to acknowledge fully that war 
prevention may require substantial coercive capabilities. (Wang does mention 
“strategic deterrence theory,” and Su notes that the strategy, in its own words, 
“does not assume confl ict, but also recognizes the historical reality that peace 
cannot be automatically maintained”). They are examining regional maritime 
security from the perspective of China’s national interests. These include em-
phasizing the use of venues in which Beijing is relatively infl uential (e.g., the 
United Nations) to address disputes and limit foreign military infl uence. In the 
views of many Chinese, letting other states unduly shape these areas could—in a 
worst-case scenario—lead to military intervention in a manner that could harm 
China’s regional infl uence and sovereignty claims.22 In the analysts’ apparent 
unwillingness to acknowledge that confl ict prevention can sometimes rely on 
coercive capabilities, one can see an effort to emphasize desired elements of 
the document while deemphasizing or contesting undesired ones—a common 
practice in both policy analysis and international relations around the world.
有一个引人注目的新观点: 明确写入 “防止战争与赢得战争同等重要” 的观点.
There is a conspicuous new viewpoint: it is written unequivocally that “Preventing and Winning 
War Are Equally Important.”
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Mention of Multipolarity. The analysts also note the maritime strategy’s refer-
ence to a “multipolar” world. Lu describes this as a “fi rst time” shift in U.S. 
policy documents. In the translator’s opinion, however, the term “multipolar” 
describes neither the international system as it currently exists nor the world 
that U.S. policy makers would want in the future.23 Moreover, many Chinese 
audiences regard “multipolar” (多极) as having a specifi c meaning: “a world in 
which there are several major regional powers and no single superpower hege-
mon.” This situation would be realized in the near future only by substantial 
relative decline in U.S. power, to the benefi t of other emerging major powers. 
A small but increasingly infl uential Chinese school of thought promoting an 
American “decline theory” (衰落论)—which lost infl uence after it incorrectly 
predicted the emergence of multipolarity immediately following the Cold War’s 
end—has recently gained ground with the U.S. diffi culties in Iraq and else-
where.24 China’s 2006 defense white paper states that “the world is at a critical 
stage, moving toward multi-polarity.”25 The strategy’s very use of the term “mul-
tipolar,” therefore, appears to validate the Chinese government’s vision of the 
potential benefi ts of a decline in American hegemony, which it views as a threat 
to its core interests.26 To be sure, the authors surveyed clearly believe that the 
United States is still hegemonic and thus retains signifi cant deterrence power.27 
But in the translator’s view, while arrogance will only further erode American 
infl uence, actively encouraging the perception that American power is ebbing 
risks undermining deterrence capabilities in the longer term.
Together with other apparent instances of recognition by the United States of 
the limitations of its power and infl uence, the translator believes, such a change 
of attitude is likely to be seen by many Chinese as inspired not by sudden en-
lightenment in an altruistic sense but rather by growing recognition of weakness 
(in light of previously overambitious strategic goals). Indeed, the analysts cited 
here seem to welcome, as Su points out in almost Corbettian fashion, a strategy 
apparently based on recognition of limitations (U.S. “ability is not equal to its 
ambition”) and a consequent reliance on cooperation with other international 
partners. As Su states, paraphrasing the strategy itself (as do Lu and Wang), “no 
country alone has adequate resources to ensure the security of the entire mari-
time area.” In the translator’s opinion, then, the problematic use of the term 
“multipolar” thus potentially risks causing misinterpretation, miscalculation, 
and false expectation on the part of Chinese analysts—or perhaps even worse, 
making the strategy’s rhetoric seem removed from the reality of U.S. force struc-
ture and deployments. Care should be taken in further interactions with Chi-
nese counterparts to counteract potential misperceptions in this regard.
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Appreciation of Domestic Dimensions. The analysts also recognize the inter-
agency aspects of U.S. maritime cooperation and coordination. As Su notes, this 
is the “fi rst time that the U.S. sea services jointly issued a strategic report,” which 
“makes concrete plans for the joint operations of the three maritime forces.” 
He notes the strategy’s injunction “that coordination and cooperation must be 
strengthened among the maritime forces of each military service and each do-
mestic department.” This seems to indicate recognition that cooperation and 
coordination among the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard will be par-
ticularly important to the strategy’s successful functioning. Wang’s analysis, as 
will be discussed in more detail below, displays signifi cant understanding of the 
U.S. defense policy process. 
A Special Role for Naval Forces. The analysts see the maritime domain as vital 
to many nations’ development and recognize the central role that the U.S. Navy 
has played in the world. Wang contends that “the ability of the United States 
to become the world hegemon is directly related to its . . . comprehension of 
sea power, and [its] emphasis on maritime force development.” All three note 
that today “the majority of the world’s population lives within several hundred 
kilometers from the ocean, 90 percent of world trade is dependent on mari-
time transport, [and] maritime security has a direct bearing on the American 
people’s way of life.” Lu additionally observes (using wording similar to that of 
Wang) that naval forces are particularly relevant to fi ghting terrorism, because 
of such “special characteristics” as “mobility, which gives [them] the ability to 
advance and withdraw, to deter and fi ght.” 
Asia-Pacifi c Focus. All three scholars identify the Asia-Pacifi c as a priority area 
for American naval presence. Lu describes the Middle East as a “powder keg” 
and acknowledges the status of the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea—the two 
other areas specifi cally mentioned in the strategy—as strategic energy lifelines. 
But he uses his own interpretation to connect several issues mentioned sepa-
rately in the strategy, concluding that “the Western Pacifi c is determined to be 
‘a region of high tension’ where the United States has the responsibility to ‘carry 
out treaty obligations’ to its allies and to ‘contain potential strategic competi-
tors.’” Wang and Su also take notice of the maritime strategy’s specifi c mention 
of the western Pacifi c. 
Continued Hegemony. Perhaps most important, all three analysts view the 
strategy as part of a larger U.S. effort to maintain its predominant international 
在美国官方正式的文体中首次提出了多极化转化, 建设海上共同利益的 “合作伙伴.”
This is the fi rst time that U.S. offi cial writings have put forward [the concept of] a transition to 
multipolarity and the construction of “cooperative partnerships” based on maritime common 
interests.
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power and capabilities for unilateral action. They do acknowledge that the new 
strategy is far more cooperative than the 1986 version in both concept and rhet-
oric. Wang states that “overbearing, offensive language is relatively reduced, and 
there is noticeably more emphasis on ‘strategic cooperation.’” Lu notes that “the 
new maritime strategy is relatively moderate compared to the previous version 
in its use of words and style.” But, he emphasizes, while the strategy “projects 
the pleasant wording of ‘peace,’ ‘cooperation,’ and ‘war prevention,’ hegemonic 
thinking remains its main thread.” The analysts see the United States as unwilling 
to abandon the traditional “hegemony” and “sea control” that its capabilities 
have long afforded it. Wang judges that the United States retains a long-standing 
“maritime hegemonic mentality,” which he traces to Mahanian thought, and 
that the nation remains “the only superpower in the world today.” He adds: 
“Because the United States . . . places maritime power above all others, its mari-
time strategy can be better described as serving its global hegemony rather than 
safeguarding the world maritime order.” Lu charges that “the hegemonic U.S. 
thinking of dominating the world’s oceans has not changed at all.” In his view, 
“what is behind ‘cooperation’ is America’s interests[;] having ‘partners or the 
participation of allies’ likewise serves America’s global interests.”
The Chinese analysts here are expressing concern that the United States re-
tains power to threaten core Chinese interests. These interests include reunifi ca-
tion with Taiwan, assertion of sovereignty over disputed islands (and associated 
resources, as well as air and water space) on China’s maritime periphery, and 
ultimately some form of sea-lane security and regional maritime infl uence. Chi-
nese concerns in this area offer a useful caution regarding the possibilities of 
U.S.-Chinese cooperation in the near term.
DIVERGING VIEWPOINTS
Despite these shared viewpoints, there are identifi able differences in focus and 
interpretation among the three analysts. By chance, the maritime strategy’s 
promulgation has coincided with a vigorous and unprecedented debate within 
China concerning its own maritime development. The three Chinese assess-
ments of the U.S. strategy, particularly in their judgments about the contours 
and directions of American strategy, cannot help but infl uence that debate.
A Model for PLAN Development?
Lu’s lengthy, complex analysis contains apparent attempts to use the new mari-
time strategy, rightly or wrongly, as evidence of an elevated position of infl uence 
for the U.S. Navy. Lu writes that the new maritime strategy of the United States 
demonstrates that its Navy “has been placed in an extremely prominent posi-
tion” and “continues to serve as the daring vanguard and main force of U.S. 
48
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss4/1
 ERICKSON 43
global strategy.” While the latter point may seem optimistic to some, this for-
mulation does describe realistically the character of U.S. power projection from 
Lu’s strategic vantage point in maritime East Asia. Even with its current fi scal 
diffi culties, the U.S. Navy, in terms of capabilities alone, must seem very im-
pressive to the PLAN. Such a portrayal of American naval power and infl uence 
is consistent with Lu’s longtime advocacy of rapid, robust Chinese maritime 
development. 
There are several indications that his evaluation, in addition to educating 
PLAN offi cers about the U.S. maritime strategy, may also contain an implicit ar-
gument for a similar increase in the PLAN’s mission from access denial to blue-
water defense of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), as consistent with China’s 
growing interests as a great power.28 More than Su or even Wang, Lu appears to 
believe that “the oceans have become a new domain for rivalry.” He notes that 
“the Western Pacifi c is the area of most intense competition among nations for 
maritime sovereignty,” that it “has the highest concentration and fastest growth 
in terms of the world’s naval forces,” and that it “is the sea area where the U.S. 
military conducts the largest and most frequent maritime exercises with its al-
lies.” Lu appears also to hint that PLAN development must inevitably be used 
to balance against American naval power projection. “Some Asian countries are 
rising rapidly, have abundant economic and technological strength, and possess 
nuclear weapons,” he notes elliptically; “they will directly infl uence and chal-
lenge American hegemony.” 
Here Lu may be arguing implicitly for some form of PLAN power-projection 
capability, perhaps in the form of deck aviation (as might be broadly surmised 
from the context). In East Asia, he emphasizes, the United States “dispatches 
carrier battle groups to cruise around in a heightened state of war readiness.” 
Were it operationally feasible, one might infer, China could benefi t from simi-
lar capabilities to protect its sovereignty claims. Also, “by setting up pointed 
defenses and carrying out strategic deployment, the United States is prepared 
to act at any time and to intervene” in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, 
where China has similar interests in SLOC security and energy access. 
In time, at least by Lu’s ambitious standards, China might likewise benefi t 
from a navy that could maximize its forward presence while minimizing its in-
ternational footprint to avoid the tremendous political risk of overseas bases—
which the PRC has foresworn since its founding in 1949. This would seem to 
. . .如此构想, 不能不说是在单边主义和先发制人战略遭受挫折之后, 对运用军事手段
实现国家利益认识上的重大变化.
This new concept . . . can only be regarded as a major transformation in [U.S. military] under-
standing of the application of military force in the realization of national interests, following 
setbacks in earlier unilateralist and preemptive strategy.
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allow for a Chinese approach to power projection: respecting sovereignty while 
infl uencing events ashore. Wang and Su do not appear to share Lu’s emphasis or 
advocacy. But Lu’s arguments should not be dismissed as mere naval promotion. 
While likely refl ecting the PLAN’s bureaucratic interests, naval advocates like Lu 
publishing in offi cial forums must defer to the guidance promulgated by China’s 
civilian leadership. The real danger here is that if Chinese naval development 
were to be inspired by that of the United States, as would be manifest in internal 
bureaucratic debates and budgetary battles, there would be a risk of the sort of 
interaction effects that have triggered arms races.29 
Seeking Explanations in Foreign Policy and Bureaucratic Politics
Wang describes the new maritime strategy as not only representing a major de-
parture from the tone of previous security documents issued by the George W. 
Bush administration but as “one of the most far-ranging adjustments in the last 
twenty years.” He sees it as the logical outcome of three major factors: military 
reversals in Iraq, the failures of transformation in that confl ict, and the need for 
the Navy to justify its share of the defense budget. “The ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks 
produced a tremendous assault on the U.S. security concept,” Wang observes, in 
wording akin to Lu’s; “the U.S. maritime strategy changed accordingly.” The Iraq 
war experience, Wang states, is teaching America the importance of combining 
hard and soft power to develop “rational strength.” This strategic rethinking, 
and the concepts of the “thousand-ship navy” and Global Fleet Stations, “can 
only be regarded as a major transformation in [U.S. military] understanding of 
the application of military force in the realization of national interests, following 
setbacks in earlier unilateralist and preemptive strategy.”30 According to Wang, 
“As Chief of Naval Operations, [Admiral Michael] Mullen repeatedly suggested 
that ‘the old maritime strategy had sea control as a goal, but the new maritime 
strategy must recognize the economic situation of all nations, [and] not only 
control the seas, but [also] maintain the security of the oceans, and enable other 
countries to maintain freedom of passage.’ It is precisely through his promotion 
that the new ‘maritime strategy’ was introduced.”
Wang’s charge of strategic overreach is broadly compatible with Su’s less abra-
sive assessment, but it stands in contrast to Lu’s, which focuses more on U.S. ca-
pabilities than limitations. Wang’s third conclusion is based on a sophisticated 
understanding of the American defense establishment and its policy processes: 
“For the maritime forces to obtain a larger share of the future defense spending 
pie, they must lead strategic thinking and initiatives,” Wang maintains. At the 
same time, like many of his peers, he also alleges that “some people and military 
industrial interest groups have worked together to frequently concoct a ‘Chinese 
naval threat theory.’”
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Su’s largely descriptive article contains a fairly favorable assessment of U.S. mar-
itime power and intentions. Su sees the United States as developing a coherent 
maritime policy in which the maritime strategy and “the so-called ‘Thousand 
Ship Navy’ concept currently being deliberated in U.S. Navy circles are two sides 
of the same coin.” He relates that at a 2007 Naval War College conference, “De-
fi ning a Maritime Security Partnership with China,” at which he presented an 
academic paper, “prospects for cooperation were optimistically forecast.” This 
“atmosphere,” Su concludes, “is consistent with” the maritime strategy “and 
refl ects the efforts of the U.S. Navy to establish a maritime partnership with 
China and integrate China within the maritime security order led by the United 
States.” Where Lu sees a model for PLAN development and Wang sees responses 
within the U.S. military bureaucracy to changing conditions and failed policies, 
Su sees a carefully calibrated and coordinated diplomatic message.
ISSUES NOT ADDRESSED
For all their insights, the three analysts display limited understanding of the 
bureaucratic context behind the strategy’s development. They collectively fail to 
recognize (at least in print) that the new U.S. maritime strategy is not a stand-
alone document, even in the American domestic bureaucratic context. While 
they offer interpretations of the historical background and strategic circum-
stances of its formulation, they do not mention that the new strategy was guided 
by the objectives set out in the U.S. National Security Strategy, the National De-
fense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the National Strategy for Mari-
time Security.31 
Moreover, a number of key uncertainties are neither mentioned nor inves-
tigated by the analysts. U.S. Navy modernization goals would have seemed 
another potential subject for inquiry, especially as the U.S. Navy appears fi rst 
(in 2005) to have derived a goal of increasing its 281-ship fl eet to 313 vessels by 
2020, and then to have developed a strategy for their use.32 These ambiguities 
in the relationship between the ends and means of American policy are not 
explored.
The maritime strategy was issued late in the second Bush administration, 
yet the analysts seem to assume that it will serve as a precursor of future policy 
尽管美军新的 “海上战略” 阐述了 “国际合作” 的重要性, 但并没有使其完全放
弃海上霸权思维.
Although the U.S. military’s new “maritime strategy” elaborates on the importance of “interna-
tional cooperation,” it has not given up its maritime hegemonic mentality.
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regardless of subsequent changes in U.S. government leadership. The strat-
egy seems to be portrayed more as authoritative policy than as a “trial bal-
loon,” yet these analysts give few indications as to how they believe it will 
actually shape U.S. policy. Most American analysts, by contrast, believe that 
the specific effects of the document on future U.S. maritime policy are not 
yet certain.33 Within the Navy, continued support by the Chief of Naval 
Operations and the appearance of the maritime strategy’s principles in key 
service planning documents (as well as national strategy pillar documents) 
will provide important barometers of success.34 None of these documents are 
mentioned directly by the Chinese analysts.35 
As in the past, reactions from other military services, Congress, and the me-
dia will signal policy and monetary support for relevant programs. Wang ap-
pears to allude to this when he states that a major rethinking of military and 
foreign policy remains under way: “The U.S. intellectual elite is in the process of 
comprehensively rethinking the war, and this is beginning to have an impact on 
policy-making departments.” Implementation of the new strategy is certain to be 
subject to budgetary limitations, particularly given the ongoing challenges asso-
ciated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. From Wang’s perspective, by con-
trast, “whether the Republican Party or the Democratic Party comes to power, 
adjustments and changes in the U.S. government’s foreign policy are inevitable.” 
Wang and Su seem to appreciate the fi scal challenges that may impact American 
military spending. None of the analysts appear to entertain the idea, however, 
that funding constraints might limit the development of nontraditional low-end 
capabilities to support the maritime strategy.
Are the Chinese analysts “mirror imaging,” assuming that the strategy is a 
more authoritative document than it may actually be on the basis of their own 
experience with a more centralized policy process? Might their view refl ect a su-
perfi cial understanding of some aspects of the U.S. policy process? Perhaps. But 
just as the strategy cannot be expected to address all possible issues or contin-
gencies in detail—this would take too much space and risk its soon becoming 
outdated—the three analysts cannot be expected to address all of its contents 
and related issues. All three emphasize, however, a most important point, that a 
broad acceptance of and participation in the Global Maritime Partnership initia-
tive by the international community will be essential if the strategy is to fulfi ll its 
intended goals. Nevertheless, these collective omissions suggest that the analyses 
represent a “fi rst cut” at understanding the strategy and how it may affect China. 
The objective seems to be to consider some initial implications for maritime de-
velopment in the United States and China, as well as the prospects for future 
bilateral relations. 
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TRUE TO ITS WORDS AND RESOLUTE IN ITS DEEDS 
The Chinese analysts obviously have major concerns regarding the intentions 
behind U.S. military strategy. With respect to the maritime strategy in particular, 
they worry that beneath a veneer of cooperative rhetoric, they are being asked 
to tolerate, or even directly acquiesce in, projection of U.S. power in a manner 
that they believe threatens China’s core national interests. Here the cooperative 
implications of the strategy may run against the grain of much Chinese thinking 
regarding the United States, particularly its armed forces. 
At the same time, the Chinese analysts are heartened by the new American em-
phasis on cooperation. While retaining concerns about U.S. strategic objectives, 
they do not dismiss the strategy outright. For Lu, Washington stands at a strategic 
crossroads, at which it must demonstrate its true strategic intentions to Beijing. 
On one hand, Lu is concerned about the frequent “transnational and multination-
al maritime military exercises” in East Asia that, he believes, constitute “evidence 
that the new U.S. maritime strategy has already been put into effect.” On the other 
hand, the new cooperative approach may truly represent “a major change in the 
U.S. military’s maritime strategy,” Lu allows. “It must receive the affi rmation of 
all the world’s nations.”
The election of Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan’s president in March 2008 has placed 
cross-Strait relations on an improved trajectory after eight years of instability 
under Chen Shui-bian. Meanwhile, recent developments suggest that PLAN 
missions may become increasingly compatible with the maritime strategy’s 
focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At an expanded Central 
Military Commission conference on 24 December 2004, Chairman Hu Jintao 
introduced a new military policy that defi nes the four new missions of the PLA, 
one of them being to “play an important role in maintaining world peace and 
promoting common development.”36 PLAN writings are operationalizing both 
this theme and Hu’s recent guidance that China’s military should pay attention 
to “diversifi ed military tasks” (多样化任务).37 Such factors may well support 
mission convergence and increase strategic space for Sino-American maritime 
cooperation, though it will take substantial effort from both sides to exploit op-
portunities, and it will not be easy. 
Chinese analysts will therefore likely watch the concrete actions on the part 
of the United States to see how they affect Beijing’s core strategic concerns. In 
future discussions with their American counterparts, they will probably con-
tinue to probe for U.S. willingness to commit to actions that would make China 
全世界人民乐见其战略思维的改变, 更拭目以待, 企盼其真正行动, 取得实际效果.
The people of the entire world are glad to see this transformation in strategic thinking, [but] will 
wait and see, hoping for genuine actions and practical results.
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effort to differentiate clearly among these 
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opinions. All endnotes in this document 
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endnotes. 
The views expressed here are solely those 
of the translator and do not represent the 
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of any other organization of the U.S. 
government.
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feel strategically more assured. They will undoubtedly be looking for the United 
States to, in the words of a Chinese proverb, “言必信, 行必果”—to be true to its 
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are glad to see this transformation in strategic thinking, [but] will wait and see, 
hoping for genuine actions and practical results.”
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In order to cope with threats and safeguard U.S. interests, the new U.S. 
maritime strategy puts forward six major missions for sea power: deploy 
decisive sea power in a forward position in limited conf licts of regional 
scale; deter war between major powers; win wars for the nation; safeguard 
homeland security from long-distance; promote and maintain cooperative 
relationships with more international partners; and prevent or eliminate 
regional destruction before it affects the international system. To accom-
plish these six missions, U.S. sea power must possess the corresponding six 
core capabilities, including the capability to be in a forward position (pres-
ent global deployment), deterrence capability, sea control capability, force 
projection capability, the capability to safeguard public order at sea, and 
humanitarian assistance and disaster response capability.
SPECIAL TEXT FOR THIS PAGE 
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the latest put forward by 
the United States, represents the first major revision of [U.S.] maritime 
strategy in twenty years. The 1986 Maritime Strategy was essentially a Cold 
War era strategy with “war as the nucleus,” mainly for establishing sea 
supremacy. The objective was global confrontation with the Soviet Navy. 
Obviously, with the Soviet Union’s disintegration and the Soviet Navy’s de-
cline, the “1986 edition” of the U.S. maritime strategy was already obsolete. 
Faced with the new international situation of counterterrorism following 
the “9/11” incident and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the 
rapid rise of developing nations and the formation of a multipolar world, 
[and] as a result of over two years of debate and discussion by the U.S. 
Navy’s theoretical circle, the “2007 edition” of the maritime strategy, which 
brandishes the great banner of “international cooperation” and a plausible 
new face, was finally issued. 
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower is composed of six sec-
tions: introduction, challenges for the new era, maritime strategic concepts, 
strategic implementation, tasks prioritized for implementation, and con-
clusion. This essay gives a brief analysis to offer insights into the new trends 
of the U.S. Navy.
THE NEW U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY SURFACES
Lu Rude
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A DUALITY OF THE ANGLE OF VIEW: PREVENTING AND WINNING 
WAR ARE EQUALLY IMPORTANT
In the introduction to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, there 
is a conspicuous new viewpoint: it is written unequivocally that “Preventing 
and Winning War Are Equally Important.” In the past, the U.S. Navy’s strategy 
emphasized “gain the initiative by striking fi rst” and “win by war,” and it was all 
about warfare preparations and operations planning. The new strategy believes 
that “maritime power should both be devoted to winning wars decisively, and 
to increasing war prevention capability,” thus attaching importance to contain-
ing war before it occurs. Elevating war prevention to the same strategic status of 
importance as winning war in military theory represents a major change in the 
U.S. naval strategy. This is a reaffi rmation of the internationally and universally 
recognized “maritime military operations other than war.” It can be foreseen 
that henceforth the international cooperation and noncombat use of navies will 
increase. This will become a new common bright point for activities at sea by 
the world’s navies.
AN ENTIRELY NEW WAY OF THINKING: MARITIME INTERESTS CAN-
NOT BE DICTATED BY ONE COUNTRY
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower describes the current and fu-
ture threats facing the United States as “the continuous increase of transnational 
actors, rogue states, proliferation of weapon technologies and information, and 
natural disasters.” “The vast majority of the world’s population lives within sev-
eral hundred kilometers from the sea. This necessitates an entirely new way of 
thinking about the role of maritime power.” Following the implementation of 
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, world oceanic trends have experi-
enced a great change, and the oceans have become a new domain for rivalry. The 
United States recognized that “no one country alone has suffi cient resources to 
guarantee the security of the entire maritime space.” Therefore, this strategy 
“appeals to every government, non-governmental organization, international 
organization and private institution to develop partnership relationships based 
on common interests to address the frequently occurring new threats.”
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. stra-
tegic goals were confused for a while. Following the “9/11” incident, however, the 
United States has regained its sense, “enemies can very well use unconventional 
warfare to win over America’s superior military strength.” This has forced the 
United States to rethink its maritime strategy and realize that the U.S. homeland 
and global strategic interests were no longer threatened by a fi xed strategic op-
ponent. Rather, the United States faces a multitude of potential threats.
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The United States is the promoter of unipolarity, all along relying on its pow-
erful naval fl eets to dominate the seas and safeguard America’s own interests. 
But the tremendous change in the international system makes it begin to think 
reasonably that the present maritime issues affect each nation’s interests, that no 
one country can dominate, and that all forces must be mobilized in the world to 
jointly safeguard the “common interests” at sea. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower clearly proposes that “collective security activities will be con-
ducted to address common threats and assemble common interests in an open 
and multipolar world, and maritime power will be used to build confi dence 
and mutual trust among nations.” It is important to note that this is the fi rst 
time that U.S. offi cial writings have put forward [the concept of] a transition 
to multipolarity and the construction of “cooperative partnerships” based on 
maritime common interests.
In the section on strategy implementation, the new maritime strategy has 
clear differences from the “1986 edition,” placing the utmost emphasis on “war 
prevention through cooperation in each region, and not waiting for war to break 
out to win it. Particularly when confronting the threat of terrorism, we must use 
forward deployed forces to stop terrorism as far away from the U.S. coastline as 
possible, thus guaranteeing the absolute security of the U.S. homeland.”
One can see that the new U.S. maritime strategy emphasizes “military soft-
ware” such as “humanitarian rescue missions and improving cooperative rela-
tions between the United States and every country,” thus attempting to achieve 
the goals of preventing war and maintaining peace. If it can be achieved, this is 
a rational choice suitable for the present international circumstances. All coun-
tries have a great need to explore the new thinking of developing mutual assis-
tance and common prosperity to remove divergences and jointly safeguard the 
peace of the oceans. This is also the international obligation of “peaceful use of 
the oceans” and “joint management of the oceans” advocated in the U.N. Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea.
This could be a major change in the U.S. military’s maritime strategy. It must 
receive the affi rmation of all the world’s nations.
STRATEGIC FOCUS: SHIFT FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE PACIFIC
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower states: from now on, U.S. mili-
tary strength will be concentrated in “areas where tension escalates, or in re-
gions in which we hope to demonstrate to friendly nations and allies the U.S. 
海军是战略地区的核心力量. 美国海军继续充当美国全球战略的急先锋与主力军.
The Navy is the core force in strategic regions. The U.S. Navy continues to serve as the daring van-
guard and main force of U.S. global strategy.
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resolve to maintain stability, and regions where the U.S. realizes its obli-
gations to its allies.” “The U.S. will continue to deploy strong operational 
power in the Western Pacific, and the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, 
to safeguard U.S. and allied interests and to deter potential competitors.” 
In fact, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy declared: the new strategy “not only 
discusses things that we want to do, we have already begun to do some of 
these things,” such as having already deployed forces in these two regions 
of strategic importance.
The Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea are the “energy lifelines,” 
and they constitute a strategic thoroughfare that America’s global strat-
egy must guarantee. The Middle East is a “powder keg,” and these seas 
were the maritime battlegrounds of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraq “War to 
Overthrow Saddam” and the Afghan War. Moreover, these are regions in 
which several countries possess nuclear weapons and the danger of nuclear 
proliferation exists. By setting up pointed defenses and carrying out 
strategic deployment, the United States is prepared to act at any time and to 
intervene.
The Western Pacific is the area of most intense competition among na-
tions for maritime sovereignty. It is also a region that has the highest con-
centration and fastest growth in terms of the world’s naval forces. Some 
Asian countries are rising rapidly, have abundant economic and techno-
logical strength, and possess nuclear weapons or the capability to devel-
op them; they will directly inf luence and challenge American hegemony. 
Moreover, Asia is the region in which the United States has concluded and 
signed the highest number of defense treaties, an important sea area in 
which the United States has implemented island chain defense. Therefore, 
according to the new U.S. strategy, the Western Pacific is determined to 
be “a region of high tension” where the United States has the responsibil-
ity to “carry out treaty obligations” to its allies and to “contain potential 
strategic competitors.”
Consequently, the United States not only increases its military strength on 
the Japanese mainland and in the Ryukyu Islands, it also dispatches carrier 
battle groups to cruise around in a heightened state of war readiness. For “hu-
manitarian objectives” and “the requirements of international cooperation,” 
the Western Pacifi c is the sea area where the U.S. military conducts the largest 
and most frequent maritime exercises with its allies. Such frequent transna-
tional and multinational maritime military exercises were not possible more 
than a decade ago, and this is the evidence that the new U.S. maritime strategy 
has already been put into effect.
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FORWARD DEPLOYMENT: STRATEGY TO DOMINATE THE OCEAN 
CAN BE TRACED TO THE SAME ORIGIN
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower believes: major changes have 
taken place in the global strategic environment, and the United States faces 
threats dispersed all over the world. Therefore, it is necessary to give full play 
to the “expeditionary” and “multi-role” characteristics of sea power, and adopt 
globally “dispersed deployment to defend the homeland and U.S. citizens, and 
promote our interests on a global scale.”
Obviously, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower has not changed 
the [U.S.] strategic goal of dominating the world’s oceans. The United States still 
attempts to rely on its formidable sea power to control the world’s oceans, carry 
out global deployments, [and] continue to brandish military force to “deter wars 
between great powers,” thus maintaining its domination of the world’s oceans. 
The new maritime strategy pointedly emphasizes “forward deployment” and 
seeks to implement “expeditionary” and “multi-role” [capabilities], thus striv-
ing to keep the battlefi eld far away from the American homeland so that U.S. 
security and interests can be realized.
Over the course of the “9/11” incident and the Afghan and Iraq wars, 
from international counterterrorism operations the U.S. Navy recognized 
that the terror wars it confronted were completely different from traditional 
wars. There was uncertainty concerning the combat opponents, the areas 
of operations, the methods of engagement, and the triggering events. There 
were neither clear boundary lines between countries and regions nor con-
ventional precursors of war. The “Chief planner” of U.S. military strategy, 
[former] Assistant Secretary of Defense Andrew Hoehn, believes: “terror-
ism has unprecedented destructiveness, and it travels and connects various 
continents and regions. To deal with it, you must wage a global war.” As a 
result, “counterterrorism” war must use the “great dragnet” of international 
cooperation for global defense.
The new U.S. maritime strategic concept holds that even if a regional war 
is limited, it is still very difficult to achieve complete victory without in-
ternational support, so only through international cooperation can “terror 
war” be prevented and peace obtained. The new strategic concept integrates 
such clauses as “promoting and maintaining cooperative relations with 
more international partners,” and asserts that “emphasis will be placed on 
亚洲一些大国迅速崛起, 经济, 科技实力雄厚, 国家拥有核武器或具有发展核武器的能
力, 将直接影响, 挑战美国的霸权主义.
Some Asian countries are rising rapidly, have abundant economic and technological strength, and 
possess nuclear weapons or the capability to develop them; they will directly infl uence and chal-
lenge American hegemony.
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conf lict prevention through humanitarian rescue and assistance operations 
and strengthening international cooperation.” It emphasizes that preventing 
war is as important as preventing war from expanding, and that preventing 
war from expanding requires international cooperation, so as to avoid af-
fecting the global system and American interests. This is a transformation 
that has caught people’s attention. 
In objectively analyzing the U.S. Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower, one can see that the “2007 edition” of the new maritime strategy 
is relatively moderate compared to the previous version in its use of words 
and style. It holds high the great banner of “cooperation,” elevates prevent-
ing war to the same strategic status as winning war, and takes it as an im-
portant mission for U.S. maritime power. For the first time, it acknowledges 
that the present world is “multipolar,” and believes that no country alone 
is capable of safeguarding the world’s maritime areas from terrorism and 
other threats. This thinking is suited to dealing concretely with world con-
ditions. But the hegemonic U.S. thinking of dominating the world’s oceans 
has not changed at all. While the new strategy has produced some rhetorical 
changes, what it enumerates are essentially responses to the current global 
security situation and [consequent] requirements for America’s own inter-
ests. Its emphasis on “international cooperation” and demand for “allied 
participation” serve the U.S. global strategy. The people of the entire world 
are glad to see this transformation in strategic thinking, [but] will wait and 
see, hoping for genuine actions and practical results.
NEWS BACKGROUND
On 17 November, at the “International Seapower” Symposium held in the 
U.S. state of Rhode Island, a report entitled A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower was rapidly transmitted all over the world, arousing a 
high degree of attention among the world’s navies. Many articles have been 
written by military-theoretical circles to interpret and comment on the re-
port. Why did this alarm the world? First, this document was jointly signed 
and issued by the three leading figures of U.S. maritime power—Chief of 
Naval Operations Roughead, Marine Corps Commandant Conway, and 
Coast Guard Commandant Allen—a rare occurrence. Second, at the Naval 
War College’s international naval symposium in Newport, Rhode Island, 
the new U.S. maritime strategy was announced in front of the heads of 
navies from over one hundred nations and regions. This is the first time in 
U.S. history that America’s maritime forces—the Navy, Marine Corps and 
Coast Guard—jointly formulated and publicly announced a unified mari-
time strategy at an “international conference.”
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AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY: THE NAVY, DARING VANGUARD OF U.S. 
GLOBAL STRATEGY
The conclusion of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower points out: 
“this strategy focuses on opportunities—not threats; on optimism—not fear; 
and on confi dence—not doubt. . . . In the future, the navy will continue to unite 
in executing this strategy. U.S. maritime forces will always safeguard the nation 
and its major interests.” Obviously, the new U.S. maritime strategy’s issuance 
demonstrates that the strategic status of U.S. maritime forces has been further 
elevated. This is also the motivating reason and the result of the ability of the 
three U.S. maritime forces to work together to issue the new maritime strategy.
The Navy is the core force in strategic regions. The U.S. Navy continues to 
serve as the daring vanguard and main force of U.S. global strategy. The new 
strategy is absolutely unequivocal: “From now on, U.S. sea power will be con-
centrated in areas that have heightened tension or require the United States to 
fulfi ll commitments to allies. The United States will continue to deploy power-
ful operational forces in the Western Pacifi c, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian 
Ocean to protect U.S. and allied interests, and contain potential competitors.” 
The U.S. Navy is hoisting the banner of “humanitarian assistance operations 
and strengthening international cooperation,” and continuing “forward de-
ployment” in maritime hotspots. Wherever a crisis emerges, U.S. carrier battle 
group[s] will appear there; this kind of strategic deployment cannot change.
Although A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower projects the pleas-
ant wording of “peace,” “cooperation,” and “war prevention,” hegemonic think-
ing remains its main thread. For example, “we cannot permit a circumstance to 
arise in which our maritime power is deprived of mobility and freedom to oper-
ate in the sea lanes. Similarly, we cannot permit any enemy to attempt to block 
or disrupt major channels of maritime commerce or communication, thereby 
cutting off global supply lines. In circumstances of necessity, we have the ca-
pacity to control maritime space in any region, ideally with partners or allies 
participating, but alone when necessary.” Clearly, what is behind “cooperation” 
is America’s interests, having “partners or the participation of allies” likewise 
serves America’s global interests.
Strengthening “dynamic deployment.” As a result of the current uncertainty 
concerning maritime crises, the “static deployment mode” of large, fi xed mili-
tary bases is already unsuited to the requirements of the “war against terror.” The 
U.S. Navy’s overseas bases are decreasing in number, and it is shifting toward a 
“dynamic projection mode” of small-scale and temporary bases and globally 
deployed fl eets. In line with the new maritime strategy, through “regular, tem-
porary operations” such as joint military exercises and provision of humanitar-
ian assistance, the U.S. military can leave behind a small number of important 
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military offi cials and turn places of strategic importance into “semi-permanent” 
bases; thus maintaining de facto military presence, still fi rmly withholding the 
U.S. global military strategic network, and implementing strategic encirclement 
of different kinds of maritime fl ashpoints and “potential enemy” through mili-
tary deployment in “chokepoints” of navigation and strategic nodes. In this way, 
[the United States] can not only continue to preserve its military presence in 
strategic areas, but also avoid the “tremendous political risk” from maintaining 
overseas military bases. [The United States] can thus “kill two birds with one 
stone.”
Playing the leading role in the “war against terror.” Because of the navy’s 
special characteristics—such as its mobility, which gives it the ability to advance 
and withdraw, to deter and fi ght—naval fl eets necessarily receive favorable at-
tention. The exceptional document, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea-
power, formulated jointly by America’s three maritime forces, demonstrates that 
[the Navy] has been placed in an extremely prominent position. In peacetime, 
through “forward deployment,” the fl eet “places the city under siege” in its de-
terrent effect. At the outset of war, warships shoot the “fi rst shot” by launching 
guided missiles. In the course of war, naval vessels are both weapon launching 
platforms and mobile arsenals. At the conclusion of war, they can rapidly leave 
the battleground. In the Iraq “War to Overthrow Saddam,” the naval fl eet was 
thoroughly brought into play with essential functions. In the domains of war 
time and space, the Navy has an indispensable role and achieves results that cap-
ture the attention of the world and receive “acclaim” from the U.S. authorities 
and the military, and it is regarded as an indispensable “trump card” for future 
“anti-terrorism” operations.
T R A N S L AT O R ’ S  N O T E 
The article was originally published in People’s Navy, 27 November 2007, p. 3. The chief editor of 
that edition was Wu Chao, the intern editor Yuan Zhenjun.
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In October 2007, the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard jointly re-
leased the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” which aroused 
widespread attention in international military circles. The new U.S. “maritime 
strategy” focuses on future security threats. It not only puts forward some new 
concepts, but also demonstrates many aspects of future military strategic ad-
justment and the development trends of military transformation.
1. THE U.S. MILITARY’S “MARITIME STRATEGY” IS PROFOUNDLY 
INFLUENCED BY [AMERICA’S] SEA POWER TRADITION 
The United States is a country with a tradition of being a “sea power.” It can be 
said that the ability of the United States to become the world hegemon is directly 
related to its understanding of the oceans, its comprehension of sea power, and 
[its] emphasis on maritime force development. And this tradition originates 
from the prominent American geostrategic scholar Alfred Thayer Mahan. Ma-
han’s “Sea Power” thinking had long-term infl uence on the development and 
evolution of U.S. maritime strategy. This point can be seen very clearly from 
America’s modern development and historical trajectory.
After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. maritime strategy was repeatedly 
revised, but never separated itself from Mahan’s sea power theory. In 1991, in 
order to adapt to changes in the maritime security environment, and more ef-
fectively use maritime power, the United States specially established a “naval 
strategic research group” and quickly introduced the maritime strategy white 
paper “From Sea to Land,” [thereby] revising the long-adhered-to “Maritime 
Strategy.” “Forward deployment” changed to “forward presence,” having a foot-
hold in “maritime operations” changed to “from sea to land,” [and] “indepen-
dently implementing large-scale sea warfare” changed to “support army and air 
force joint operations.”
The “9/11” terrorist attacks produced a tremendous assault on the U.S. secu-
rity concept. National security and military strategy underwent a major adjust-
ment. The U.S. maritime strategy changed accordingly. It put forward the goal 
of constructing naval forces possessing information superiority; devoted to de-
veloping forward presence, maritime capability for comprehensive superiority 
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in land assault, and information warfare; and addressing twenty-fi rst century 
maritime security threats.
This time, the introduction of the U.S. military’s new “maritime strategy” 
can be said to be one of the most far-ranging adjustments in the last twenty 
years. It not only has new judgments and positions concerning maritime secu-
rity threats, but more importantly has new thinking regarding how to use mili-
tary power to meet national security objectives. This is the greatest distinction 
between the new “maritime strategy” and its predecessor.
2. THE U.S. “MARITIME STRATEGY” PUTS FORWARD NEW THINKING 
REGARDING HOW TO ADDRESS SECURITY THREATS
The most prominent feature of the U.S. military’s new “maritime strategy” is to 
put “preventing war and winning war” in equally important positions. The pur-
suit of absolute military superiority, stressing the defeat of any opponent, has al-
ways been the core of U.S. military strategy. The objective of using military force 
to prevent war is embodied to some extent in U.S. military strategic deterrence 
theory, but it is very rarely placed at the same level as winning wars in important 
strategic documents. In the new “maritime strategy,” this type of overbearing, 
offensive language is relatively reduced, and there is noticeably more emphasis 
on “strategic cooperation” to jointly address future maritime security threats.
The concept of “cooperation” put forward by the new strategy refers not only 
to cooperation among the three strategic forces of the Navy, Marine Corps, 
and Coast Guard, but also to military strength and national cooperation in the 
fi elds of diplomacy, etc.; even more important is the emphasis on international 
cooperation. The new strategy stresses that the majority of the world’s popu-
lation lives within several hundred kilometers from the ocean, 90 percent of 
world trade is dependent on maritime transport, [and] maritime security has a 
direct bearing on the American people’s way of life. Faced with the increasingly 
serious maritime threats, “no country [in the world] has adequate resources 
or forces to ensure the security of the entire maritime area,” no single country 
has the ability to deal with international terrorism single-handedly. Therefore, 
international “strategic cooperation” is an important way to achieve maritime 
security. Likewise, developments in globalization and informatization* will 
also propel the evolution of naval strategies.
*  Chinese sources use the term “informatization” [信息化] to describe the utilization of information 
technology, networks, and even command automation to improve military performance. For 
details on the role of “informatization” in transforming China’s navy, see Andrew Erickson and 
Michael Chase, “Information Technology and China’s Naval Modernization,” Joint Forces Quarterly 
50, no. 3 (2008), pp. 24–30; and “PLA Navy Modernization: Preparing for ‘Informatized’ War at 
Sea,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 8, no. 5 (29 February 2008), pp. 2–5, available at www
.jamestown.org. 
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To implement the new “maritime strategy,” the U.S. military proposed huge 
programs to develop a “thousand-ship Navy,” [and] build “Global Fleet Sta-
tions.” The purpose for developing the “thousand-ship Navy” is to strengthen 
allied naval cooperation and communication, through joint maritime opera-
tions involving each nation, and deal with the increasingly complex maritime 
security environment. By building “Global Fleet Stations,” naval forces will pro-
vide global protection. To achieve this goal, the U.S. military has already begun 
to deploy new “Fleet Stations” in world focal point regions. This new concept 
advanced in the strategic documents of the U.S. military can only be regarded as 
a major transformation in its understanding of the application of military force 
in the realization of national interests, following setbacks in earlier unilateralist 
and preemptive strategy.
Although the U.S. military’s new “maritime strategy” elaborates on the im-
portance of “international cooperation,” it has not given up its maritime hege-
monic mentality. Regarding core national interests at sea, such as the right to 
freedom of action at sea, sea lane control, and deploying forces in important 
strategic regions, the new strategy and the three sea power principles put for-
ward by Mahan of maritime military strength, overseas military bases, and sea 
line control are exactly the same; it can [therefore] be said that the U.S. “mari-
time strategy” has the same spirit.
3. THE “MARITIME STRATEGY” INDICATES SOME CHANGES IN THE 
NATURE OF THE U.S. MILITARY’S FUTURE EVOLUTION
The U.S. military’s new “maritime strategy” was deliberated for two years be-
fore being issued. This period coincided with a time during which the United 
States was bogged down in a quagmire in the war in Iraq and intense confl icts 
were breaking out between the ruling and opposition parties. Within the Bush 
administration, the neoconservatives fell into disgrace, and a number of indi-
viduals at the helm of the Defense Department such as [Donald] Rumsfeld and 
[Paul] Wolfowitz left one after the other. Regarding such major issues as the Iraq 
War, military transformation, and future military development, many people 
have undergone [a transition to] new thinking. Although the new “maritime 
strategy” is not the result of systematic refl ection, in many ways it has already 
revealed these development trends.
. . .美国能够成为世界霸权国家与其 . . .对海上力量发展的重视有直接关系. . . . 
马汉的“海权” 思想对美国海上战略的发展演变产生了长远的影响.
The ability of the United States to become the world hegemon is directly related to its . . . emphasis 
on maritime force development. . . . Mahan’s “Sea Power” thinking had long-term infl uence on the 
development and evolution of U.S. maritime strategy.
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The new “maritime strategy” indicates a transformation in U.S. thinking 
concerning the use of military force. As the only superpower in the world today, 
on the basis of comprehensive national strength, the United States obviously 
enjoys a superior status. No one doubts U.S. hard power, especially its power-
ful military strength. However, since “9/11,” the United States has pursued a 
unilateralist foreign policy and relied excessively on military means to resolve 
all security problems, not only damaging its hard power, but also seriously set-
ting back its soft power. Damage to hard power can possibly be recovered from 
in a relatively short period, but damage to soft power requires not only a long 
period of great exertion but also policy changes. Since 2007, around the issue 
of the use of soft power, the U.S. academic community carried out an unprece-
dented great discussion. The renowned U.S. think tank “Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS)” held special seminars [in which] former major 
government offi cials and expert scholars such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard 
Armitage, [and] Joseph Nye proposed that in order for the U.S. government to 
extend its hegemonic rule the United States must attach great importance to the 
coordinated use of hard and soft power. [They] proposed to use hard and soft 
power in coordination as “rational strength” [smart power] in order to realize 
strategic national security goals. This is the context in which the U.S. military’s 
new “maritime strategy” was introduced; and many of its proposals refl ect this 
new way of thinking about achieving national security objectives and safeguard-
ing national strategic interests. 
The new “maritime strategy” refl ects tentative rethinking of the Iraq War. 
As the Iraq War enters its fi fth year, the United States has already expended the 
high cost of nearly four thousand human lives and fi ve hundred billion U.S. 
dollars. Because the war is still continuing, it is diffi cult to predict its future de-
velopment. The U.S. military still cannot, and does not, have a systematic sum-
mation of conditions in progress, but the U.S. intellectual elite is in the process 
of comprehensively rethinking the war, and this is beginning to have an impact 
on policy-making departments. At the beginning of the Iraq War, in the face of 
universal opposition from the international community, U.S. Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld advanced the unyielding position that “it is not the coalition 
that determines the mission, but the mission that determines the coalition.” 
Through the passage of time and events, today the U.S. military’s “maritime 
strategy” has already taken “international cooperation” as an important prin-
ciple. This contrast indicates that the United States security and military strat-
egy will face a major new adjustment. The U.S. presidential election has already 
begun, and “change” has already become a demand of mainstream American 
society. Regardless of whether the Republican Party or the Democratic Party 
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comes to power, adjustments and changes in the U.S. government’s foreign pol-
icy are inevitable.
The new “maritime strategy” indicates that future U.S. military transforma-
tion will have new changes. U.S. military transformation issues were already 
mentioned as early as during the Clinton administration, but really started in a 
comprehensive manner after Rumsfeld entered the Pentagon. To promote trans-
formation, Rumsfeld put forward a series of radical measures, causing enor-
mous controversy at the high levels of the U.S. military. The war in Iraq, in fact, 
became a testing ground for U.S. military transformation. Rumsfeld advanced 
restructuring measures, such as large-scale reduction of the army, the reduction 
of large-scale combat platforms, and adjustment of the structure and composi-
tion of troops, etc.; many of which were overturned in the course of the Iraq 
War. The newly appointed U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral [Mi-
chael] Mullen is not only the new strategy’s planner and organizer, but also has 
maintained independent thinking as one of the senior high ranking military 
offi cers. As Chief of Naval Operations, [Admiral] Mullen repeatedly suggested 
that “the old maritime strategy had sea control as a goal, but the new maritime 
strategy must recognize the economic situation of all nations, [and] not only 
control the seas, but [also] maintain the security of the oceans, and enable other 
countries to maintain freedom of passage.” It is precisely through his promotion 
that the new “maritime strategy” was introduced.
Without any doubt, the U.S. Navy chose the timing of the promulgation of 
the new “maritime strategy” to promote its own interests. Military spending 
has always been the focus of competition among the armed services. For the 
maritime forces to obtain a larger share of the future defense spending pie, they 
must lead strategic thinking and initiatives. Six years after the “9/11” incident, it 
is diffi cult to convince people that emphasizing naval development is important 
to combat international terrorism. Precisely because of this, some people and 
military industrial interest groups have worked together to frequently concoct a 
“Chinese naval threat theory” or “Russian maritime threat” argument.
Because of its wide-ranging mobility, the Navy is known as the “international 
service.” This distinguishing feature of maritime forces gives them the advan-
tage of viewing the world from a global perspective. In a period of relative peace 
and stability, how to employ maritime forces to safeguard national security is the 
common task facing each nation’s naval construction. Because the United States 
is a country that places maritime power above all others, its maritime strategy 
作为世界军事变革的领头羊, 美国海上战略变化值得关注.
As a bellwether of world military transformation, U.S. maritime strategic transformation merits 
close scrutiny.
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can be better described as serving its global hegemony rather than safeguard-
ing the world maritime order. As a bellwether of world military transformation, 
[therefore], U.S. maritime strategic transformation merits close scrutiny.
T R A N S L AT O R ’ S  N O T E
This article was originally published in Study Times, 22 January 2008, www.lianghui.org.cn.
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On 17 October 2007, the new maritime strategy, jointly drafted by the U.S. Navy, 
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, was formally introduced at the United States 
Naval War College in Rhode Island. The U.S. Department of Defense website 
published the full text simultaneously. This important strategic report is titled 
“21st Century Sea Power Cooperation Strategy” [A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower]. This is the fi rst time in history that the three joint forces 
have formulated a unifi ed maritime strategy. This strategy report represents the 
fi rst major revision of U.S. maritime strategy in over twenty years. The 1986 
U.S. maritime strategy was developed in the latter part of the Cold War, and was 
a strategy of “war at the core,” for the purpose of establishing maritime hege-
mony for the global fi ght against the Soviet navy. Obviously, with the breakup 
of the Soviet Union and the decline of the Soviet navy, the “1986 Edition” of the 
U.S. maritime strategy has become obsolete. U.S. Navy theoretical circles were 
faced with the new situation of international antiterrorism and the rapid rise 
of emerging countries and the formation of an international multipolar world, 
in the face of various kinds of traditional security and nontraditional security 
threats after the “9/11” incident, the war in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq. 
After more than two years of debate and discussion, the new maritime strategy 
was introduced under the great banner of “cooperation.” 
The report contains a total of sixteen pages, divided into fi ve parts: Introduc-
tion, Challenges of a New Era, Maritime Strategic Principles, Implementing the 
Strategy, and Conclusion. In the introduction, the new strategy puts forward 
its central viewpoint: that coordination and cooperation must be strengthened 
among the maritime forces of each military service and each domestic depart-
ment, [as well as among] all international allies. Mutual confi dence and trust 
must [likewise] be fostered to [further common interests in] answer[ing] com-
mon threats. For a prosperous future, sea power must be a unifi ed force. An-
other important point is that preventing wars and winning wars are equally 
important. The new strategy holds that naval forces should be committed to 
decisively win the war, but at the same time it is also necessary to enhance 
the capacity to prevent war [from occurring]. The report emphasizes that 
THE U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY’S NEW THINKING REVIEWING THE 
“COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER”
Su Hao
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preventing war has been elevated to the same [level of] importance as winning 
war. This is a major bright spot of the strategy.
In the section on Challenges of a New Era, the new strategy systematically 
analyzes each potential threat facing the United States, including the continu-
ous growth of transnational actors, and the proliferation of weapons technology 
and information, [as well as of] natural disasters, etc. The new strategy believes 
that the future is full of uncertainties, particularly [with] the vast majority of 
the world’s population living in areas within several hundred kilometers of the 
ocean, which requires a whole new way of thinking about the role of sea power. 
It stressed that no country alone has adequate resources to ensure the security 
of the entire maritime area. The strategy therefore calls upon each nation’s gov-
ernment, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and the 
private sector to develop partnerships [based on] common interests to deal with 
the new threats constantly emerging. 
In its section on Maritime Strategic Principles, the new strategy puts for-
ward [the following]: In order to fulfi ll the United States’ commitments to the 
security and stability of its allies, U.S. maritime forces will be concentrated and 
forward deployed in order to restrict the area of confl ict, [and thereby] prevent 
large-scale war. In the future, U.S. maritime forces will focus on areas in which 
there is tension or in which the United States is required to fulfi ll commitments 
to its allies. The United States will continue to deploy powerful combat forces 
in the western Pacifi c, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean in order to pro-
tect the interests of the United States and its allies and contain potential com-
petitors. But in the new environment, the United States is facing a variety of 
threats around the world; it should therefore make full use of the expeditionary 
and multirole uses of maritime power and globally distribute forces in a task-
oriented manner in order to defend the homeland and U.S. citizens and pro-
mote U.S. national interests around the world. The report consequently puts 
forward six strategic missions at the regional and global level: make use of for-
ward deployment, limit regional confl ict with decisive maritime power, prevent 
war between great powers, win wars, expand the degree of depth for national 
homeland defense, and develop and preserve a cooperative system with even 
more allies; it is necessary to prevent and contain the damage and instability in 
some areas to prevent endangering the stability of the global system. 
The section on the Implementation of the Strategy puts forward six major 
missions for maritime power, including forward deployment, deterrence, sea 
control, force delivery, maritime security and humanitarian assistance, etc. The 
new strategy calls for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to jointly 
expand their core capabilities of maritime power. In order to increase its oper-
ability, the new strategy explicitly requires that three aspects be regarded as the 
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highest priority missions for maritime power at present: enhancing integration 
and coordinated combat capability, maritime security awareness, and personnel 
preparation.
The conclusion stresses that this strategy is issued based on a comprehensive 
assessment of the nation’s security requirements. It does not assume confl ict, 
but also recognizes the historical reality that peace cannot be automatically 
maintained. It requires building a series of core competencies from a broad, 
long-range perspective, [and] proactively seizing opportunities to protect the 
vital interests of the United States. It recognizes that in this era of rapid changes 
[the United States] face[s] uncertain factors that give rise to challenges. It points 
out, moreover, the importance in the twenty-fi rst century of U.S. naval forces 
working together with other countries to promote global security and prosper-
ity while simultaneously defending the nation’s vital national interests.
Overall, this report has the following characteristics: First, it prominently 
emphasizes maritime security cooperation. The report is entitled “[a] coopera-
tive strategy,” and its content places a great deal of emphasis on “cooperation” 
at two different levels: domestically, coordination and cooperation among each 
maritime force and maritime affairs department; and globally, cooperation 
among sea allies and partners. Second, it is the fi rst multiservice maritime strat-
egy report. This is the fi rst time that the U.S. sea services jointly issued a strate-
gic report. The report makes concrete plans for the joint operations of the three 
maritime forces. Third, [the report] attaches importance to global maritime se-
curity and partnership. The report not only stresses cooperation with allies, but 
also advocates forming partnerships with other nations that possess common 
interests in maritime affairs. Fourth, new maritime opponents. While attaching 
importance to traditional state military opponents, it also attaches tremendous 
importance to threats from nonstate actors, and stresses that the latter cause a 
series of nontraditional security [threats], [which] will determine [useful areas 
for] the maritime security cooperation. Fifth, the strategic means of diversifi ca-
tion. In maintaining maritime security means, the report stresses the combi-
nation of hard and soft power, and attaches importance to both the forward 
deployment of military forces and information gathering capacity building. It 
also emphasizes humanitarian assistance to establish a good international im-
age. Sixth, prevent the outbreak of confl icts. Although the report adheres to the 
viewpoint of winning wars, what is worth noting is that it places a great deal of 
报告与美国海军界正在酝酿的所谓 “千舰海军” 的概念有异曲同工之处.
The [maritime strategy] and the so-called “Thousand Ship Navy” concept currently being deliber-
ated within U.S. Navy circles are two sides of the same coin. 
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emphasis on preventing the outbreak of confl ict, and specially emphasizes using 
powerful force to deter war. 
As can be seen from the report, in the face of the complex intertwining of 
current traditional threats and nontraditional threats in the international secu-
rity situation, the United States seems to have felt to some extent that its ability 
is not equal to its ambition. It therefore needs to cooperate with its allies and 
other partner countries to jointly build a stable maritime security order. The re-
port stressed that this maritime order will be benefi cial to protecting the United 
States’ own maritime interests, by working together with other countries to pro-
mote global security and prosperity. For this reason, the report and the so-called 
“Thousand Ship Navy” concept currently being deliberated within U.S. Navy 
circles are two sides of the same coin. 
On 5–6 December [2007], I attended an academic conference at the U.S. 
Naval War College, entitled “Defi ning a Maritime Security Partnership with 
China.” This is the fi rst symposium on Sino-U.S. maritime security cooperation 
held by the U.S. Navy. Conference topics included: Sino-U.S. relations and com-
mon global maritime interests, maritime awareness, maritime legal issues and 
humanitarian operations, regional security challenges, and the future of Sino-
U.S. maritime security cooperation. The conference revolved around in-depth 
discussion of these subjects; proposals for various ways for maritime security 
cooperation between the two countries were put forward, and prospects for co-
operation were optimistically forecast. In fact, the atmosphere of the confer-
ence is consistent with the new strategic report recently published by the United 
States, and refl ects the efforts of the U.S. Navy to establish a maritime partner-
ship with China and integrate China within the maritime security order led by 
the United States.
T R A N S L AT O R ’ S  N O T E 
This article was originally published in Leaders, no. 19 (December 2007), pp. 29–30.
这 . . . 体现出美国海军方面试图将中国视为海上合作的伙伴, 将中国拉入到美国主导
的海洋安全秩序之中.
[This] refl ects the efforts of the U.S. Navy to establish a maritime partnership with China and 
integrate China within the maritime security order led by the United States.
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FORTUITOUS ENDEAVOR
Intelligence and Deception in Operation TORCH
Commander John Patch, U.S. Navy (Retired)
In the European theater of World War II, 1942 marked the nadir of Allied for-tunes. German forces in the Soviet Union had reached Stalingrad and threat-
ened the oil fields of the Caucasus; Axis forces in Africa seemed on the verge of
pushing the British out of Egypt; and German U-boat wolf packs preyed on Al-
lied shipping with relative impunity. Late in 1942, however, two significant Al-
lied successes served to turn the tide against the Axis powers. At El Alamein, a
British offensive defeated General Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps, while almost
simultaneously a huge Anglo-American force landed in North Africa to contest
Axis control. These two actions led to a final thrust toward Italy through Sicily in
1943, greatly facilitating the eventual Allied victory.
The North African and Mediterranean Allied cam-
paign, however, was also significant for different, very
secret reasons that have only come to light in full de-
tail in recent decades.
This article will demonstrate that the Anglo-American
TORCH effort was a hallmark of effective combined oper-
ational planning and execution—facilitated by military
deception informed by proven intelligence. Specifically,
examining TORCH through the new historical lens
provided by decrypts of German signals intelligence
(SIGINT) cements the contemporary principle that
intelligence preparation of the environment, if done
artfully, not only provides enemy order of battle intel-
ligence but reveals exploitable adversary perceptions.
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In this case, SIGINT not only assisted in the unmolested Atlantic and Mediterra-
nean passage of immense convoys but effectively gauged Axis capabilities and
intentions, as well as the reactions to Allied deception measures, prior to and
during the operation. Thus, the Allies effected the largest-scale combined joint
undertaking in the history of warfare by 1942 virtually unopposed, due largely
to consistent “reading of the enemy’s mail.”1
A brief introduction of Allied signals intelligence in World War II, a TORCH
overview, and a detailed look at SIGINT sources help place the operation in con-
text. Then, an analysis of the threat-assessment process illustrates how insights
into German perceptions helped shape the operational plan. Next, recently de-
classified decrypts fill in historical gaps to show how the Allies used focused in-
telligence efforts to conceal force movements for the operation and gauge the
efficacy of the deception stratagem. These decrypts also reveal the Axis response
as the landings occurred and help explain Allied countermoves. The role of
“all-source intelligence fusion” in the strategic deception effort is then related.
Finally, a discussion of TORCH as a model for intelligence and deception in oper-
ational planning and execution offers lessons for contemporary maritime plan-
ners, warfighters, and intelligence leaders.
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE
Allied signals intelligence dramatically expanded during TORCH planning.
Breakthroughs earlier in the war by British cryptanalysts at the Government
Code and Cipher School (GCCS) at Bletchley Park led to the breaking of
high-grade German ciphers, based on the ENIGMA machine, and in turn a new
source of intelligence information known as ULTRA. Moreover, similar Ameri-
can cryptanalytic efforts led to several significant additions to the many British
special-intelligence sources. The North African and Mediterranean campaign of
1942 under General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Armed Forces Headquarters
(AFHQ) represents the first actual, operational use of ULTRA and other special
intelligence in the planning and execution of large-scale campaigns and the first
instance of Allied collaborative strategic deception. Indeed, TORCH represents a
vehicle for the practical application of signals intelligence to an Allied campaign
that became the model for future operations, such as HUSKY in Sicily and
OVERLORD on the beaches of Normandy.
The Allies formed AFHQ in August 1942, after a July Anglo-American deci-
sion that the invasion of northwest Africa should be made before any attempt to
execute a cross-channel offensive against German-occupied France. Originally,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and General George C. Marshall, chief of staff of
the U.S. Army, were against any offensive not directly aimed at the German
heartland, but London’s persistent and frank assessment of the limitations of
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Allied forces actually available vis-à-vis expected German opposition convinced
them otherwise.2 The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) then agreed upon a fall
offensive, under the code name TORCH, to capitalize on German preoccupation
with the Russian theater, thus initiating the “second front” so desperately
needed by the Soviet Union.
The envisioned TORCH plan was ambitious, considering the obvious dangers
associated with Allied transatlantic and Mediterranean convoys in 1942. For in-
stance, the plan eventually called for over 1,400 ships to sail from American and
British ports carrying enough men and materiel to support an extended cam-
paign in foreign territory and passing through U-boat-infested waters and
Axis-controlled sea-lanes. Historian F. H. Hinsley declares that “the scale of the
Allied undertaking was without previous parallel in the war, indeed in the his-
tory of warfare: never before had states collaborated in dispatching such huge
armadas over thousands of miles of ocean and landing so large an expedition in
hostile or potentially hostile territory.”3
The scheme required that Allied forces establish a base on Africa’s Atlantic
coast from which to launch a campaign aimed at Tunisia through Algeria. The fi-
nal plan envisioned three separate amphibious assaults in the vicinity of Casa-
blanca (in French Morocco), and upon Oran and Algiers on the Mediterranean
coast. The plan called for three task forces: the Western Task Force from the
American east coast and the Central and Eastern task forces from the United
Kingdom. Finally, a concerted Allied push eastward along the North African
coast from Algiers, along with increasing pressure from the east by Montgom-
ery’s Eighth Army, was expected to force an engagement with and then crush the
remaining Axis forces in Tunisia. Berlin, however, could potentially array a sub-
stantial order of battle against TORCH forces.
The primary threat to the task forces was Axis sea- and airpower, though the
potential hostile reaction of French military forces in the African colonies could
not be discounted. As for Axis strength, Italian forces in the Mediterranean,
though not formidable in themselves, could doom the operation if used in a
concerted effort to attack the convoys. These forces consisted mainly of a small
surface fleet with a few capital ships, several torpedo boats, a few submarines,
and limited aircraft for patrol and attack. The Germans, on the other hand, had
numerous long-range patrol and attack aircraft in Sardinia and Sicily (which
might operate out of French Mediterranean bases), many U-boats operating in
the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and Rommel’s armored formations in Tunisia.
Additionally, Germany could order the reluctant Vichy French forces, particu-
larly the fleet in Toulon, into action. These consisted mostly of French warships,
small army garrisons, and shore batteries. Last, the threat of hostilities with
heretofore neutral Spain existed, but Washington seems to have consistently
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overemphasized it. Planners knew that ultimately the speed and stealth of the
Allied operation would decide what additional Axis forces Berlin deployed in
response to the invasion.
Various sources of SIGINT provided the intelligence that TORCH planners
used to estimate enemy forces and intentions. Most of these sources were Brit-
ish, but there were several American ones as well. First (listing the sources in rel-
ative importance, from least to most valuable), the Signal Intelligence Service
broke Vichy French weather ciphers broadcast from North Africa and France in
July 1942.4 These decrypts provided valuable up-to-date weather assessments of
the proposed invasion sites, as the success of amphibious assaults was (and still
is) extremely dependent on weather. Additionally, after September 1942 GCCS
was reading the German air force (Luftwaffe) counterpart to Vichy weather sig-
nals, encoded in a system known to the British as CELERY, providing current
weather data difficult or impossible to gather otherwise.5 Although weather re-
porting was not considered “special intelligence,” it was important nonetheless.
Eisenhower, for example, frequently expressed his vexations with weather as
D-day approached, in one instance declaring, “I fear nothing except bad
weather and possibly large losses due to submarines”—the latter phrase a
seeming understatement.6
Second, Vichy authorities continued to use many of the same naval codes the
French had used before German occupation, an apparent Axis oversight that
produced a consistent SIGINT source. Vichy forces did attempt some novel en-
coding, but the sophisticated GCCS apparatus had no trouble with it, since the
basic ciphers had been in British hands since 1940, when several French war-
ships sailed to the United Kingdom instead of capitulating to the Nazis.7 By the
time TORCH planning began, GCCS was also decrypting similar Vichy air force
signals that described air assets available in North Africa.
Third, several Italian codes also provided important special intelligence to in-
vasion planners. GCCS had in 1941 broken the C38M medium-grade cipher,
which was used and routinely decrypted until the war’s end.8 This naval cipher,
used primarily for Mediterranean shipping, provided special intelligence on
Italian naval forces and intentions—though usually only after the Italians had
organized combined actions with the Germans. Further, the Italian air force
high-grade “book” cipher was broken prior to TORCH and provided similar in-
formation on aircraft disposition; however, Italian aircraft played a minor role
before and during TORCH, only to come into action in reinforcing Tunisia after
the landings.9
Another key special-intelligence source involved Axis and Vichy French dip-
lomatic decrypts. By far the most consistently decrypted and utilized of these,
the Japanese diplomatic PURPLE ciphers, which had been broken by American
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cryptanalysts in 1940, offered consistent insights into the German high com-
mand’s intentions and its reactions to Allied moves. These decrypts, distributed
as “MAGIC Summaries,” provided reliable accounts of Axis order of battle, and,
further, vital feedback as to the efficacy of Allied deception measures from the
highest levels. Until November 1942 the Allies also read Vichy diplomatic ci-
phers, deriving additional insight into French forces and government disposi-
tion and confirming other sources of intelligence on possible future reactions.
Italian and German diplomatic ciphers, however, were not broken consistently
enough to contribute to TORCH planning, the former becoming unreadable af-
ter the summer of 1942 and the latter not being decrypted usefully before 1943.
GCCS consistently broke the German military intelligence ciphers of the
Abwehr and Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the intelligence services of, respectively, the
armed forces and the Nazi Party (and thereby the SS). From them it gleaned even
more information on intentions against, and perceptions of, Allied operations.
Abwehr ENIGMA ciphers known as “ISK” and “GGG” were broken after Febru-
ary 1942, providing key glimpses of the effectiveness of various deception and
cover plans for TORCH.10 SD decrypts represented vital corroboration of other
special intelligence, particularly on Vichy French and Spanish government reac-
tions after the initial landings. Moreover, SD decrypts proved particularly useful
in gauging the effectiveness of false information planted via double agents, as
they contained detailed reports sent to Berlin from Nazi agents in the field.
Thus, several reliable special-intelligence sources gave Allied planners valuable
information on critical Axis moves and countermoves. Another vital source of in-
telligence, however, was that referred to as “Y.” Y intelligence was battlefield-level,
raw information gained by listening posts and small units intercepting radio
transmissions in low- and medium-grade codes and ciphers, as well as uncoded
messages. It was useful for identifying the constitutions, locations, and unit call
signs of enemy forces, as well as for confirming and complementing other,
higher-grade signals intelligence. ULTRA and other special intelligence could
sometimes make sense of otherwise useless Y information. However, even when
successful cryptanalysis eluded GCCS, the presence of Y signals and wireless
transmissions generally—particularly fitting known trends of format, signa-
ture, or volume—could (through “traffic analysis”) indicate enemy activity of a
certain nature. Peter Calvocoressi comments in his Top Secret Ultra that effective
“SIGINT—independent of any deciphering—may bring an element of intelligi-
bility to the babble of the ether and transform it into a picture of the realities on
the ground.”11 TORCH appears to be the first effective Allied fusion of ULTRA and
Y for operational planning and execution.12 From such fusion flows a greater un-
derstanding of how component elements form a system network, revealing ele-
ment criticality and potential vulnerabilities (nodal analysis).
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Further, German army ENIGMA ciphers, known to GCCS as CHAFFINCH I, II,
and III, provided another source of signals intelligence peculiar to the Afrika
Korps. These ciphers were broken consistently after April 1942, producing mate-
rial on logistics, tactics, and strategy.13 For instance, CHAFFINCH contributed di-
rectly to the success of the British offensive at El Alamein by disclosing specific
tactics and confirming Rommel’s desperate supply situation. German high com-
mand signals also gave clues as to intentions and capabilities for the Mediterra-
nean and African theaters.
Other German ciphers, however, would prove much more useful in the
planning and execution of TORCH. German navy ENIGMA ciphers, for exam-
ple, were critical for gauging shipping and naval movements, as well as mari-
time shore activities during the critical weeks just before the invasion. GCCS
decrypted PORPOISE ciphers after August 1942, generating information on
trans-Mediterranean traffic before and during the operation.14 Additionally,
DOLPHIN, read after August 1941, provided information on German
home-waters shipping, occasionally imparting snippets of intelligence rele-
vant to TORCH.15 Furthermore, these decrypts provided routine summaries of
Italian admiralty intelligence assessments—significant in that Italy operated far
more warships, transports, and merchant ships in the Mediterranean than did
Germany. By evaluating the sources and locations of German concerns in such
decrypts, the Allies went far toward accurate assessments of Axis intentions and
capabilities in the Mediterranean.
Finally, by far the most reliable and accurate source of ULTRA comprised
Luftwaffe ENIGMA ciphers. Aside from U-boats, Luftwaffe patrol and attack air-
craft posed the most dangerous threat to the invasion convoys and forces. Ac-
cordingly, GCCS relied heavily upon Luftwaffe signals for indications of
movements and intentions. It read LOCUST ciphers, for instance, after January
1942, deriving from them detailed information on the locations and employ-
ment of Luftwaffe assets in Sicily and Sardinia.16 A factor that made these signals
so valuable was that all Mediterranean reconnaissance and attack aircraft re-
ported findings via Luftwaffe ENIGMA, making them a vital source of data for
planning Allied operations and deceptions. This traffic provided the bulk of in-
dications as to Axis discernment of TORCH, such as convoy sightings and esti-
mates of destinations.
GERMAN PERCEPTIONS
Revelations of key German perceptions shaped the operational plan. Before for-
mulating any concrete operational invasion plan for North Africa, AFHQ had to
conduct a detailed assessment of Axis intentions and capabilities in the Mediter-
ranean theater. This assessment was largely a British one, as American
7 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
84
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss4/1
intelligence agencies had little information to work with beyond general impres-
sions gleaned from MAGIC decrypts. Some divergence, in fact, still existed be-
tween the two allies as to TORCH’s basic purpose. As the two nations’ military
relationship developed through the CCS and AFHQ, however, so did their abil-
ity to learn from each other. A closer exchange of special intelligence at the
higher-levels invasion planning led on the American side to an appreciation of
the more realistic British assessments. American leaders, however, remained
concerned about the contingency of Spanish hostility, and the final draft plan
considered this point. Intelligence from proven SIGINT sources assuaged some
of Marshall’s and Eisenhower’s apprehensions.
Early on, GCCS focused on Luftwaffe ENIGMA decrypts. The Air Intelligence
Section at GCCS had established a good baseline of Luftwaffe information by
the summer of 1942 from longer-term analytical studies. In fact, the director of
this branch described the picture obtained from Luftwaffe decrypts as the most
complete ULTRA source: “The intentions of the German Air Force were the in-
tentions of the German Armed Forces as a whole.”17 He took this knowledge
with him to Eisenhower’s staff at Norfolk House in London.
Specifically, Luftwaffe decrypts provided telling evidence that up to D-day
the enemy had little information on the TORCH plan, affording Armed Forces
Headquarters the advantage of confidently shaping the operation around
known enemy understandings. The gradual but extensive buildup of the British
base at Gibraltar in preparation for the operation, for example, could not long be
hidden from the Axis powers. Luftwaffe decrypts revealed, however, that Berlin
was misinterpreting it as staging for either a Malta resupply convoy via the Cape
of Good Hope or a landing in Tripolitania or Tobruk in support of the British
Eighth Army.18 Decrypts also immediately revealed Luftwaffe movements or re-
inforcements and their intentions—often, in fact, stating their objectives. With
European and African Axis force disposition known to TORCH planners, Armed
Forces Headquarters calculated that if operational security could be main-
tained, the operation could succeed.
An item of particular strategic value that special intelligence provided to
TORCH planners was information on Axis anxiety over the possibility of Allied
invasion. For instance, German references in MAGIC to forces massing in the
United Kingdom and to an apparently impending Allied offensive—presumably
a second front to ease the burden on the Soviet Union—repeatedly mentioned
specific locations of interest. In fact, disturbingly accurate MAGIC signals in
early October projected Allied intentions to invade Africa to open the second
front.19 The Japanese ambassador to Berlin, General Oshima Hiroshi, exchanged
such information routinely with German military and diplomatic leaders. Nev-
ertheless, it appears that a myriad of other sources of information, combined
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with the self-perceived superiority of German intelligence, prevented any Axis
response—a fact revealed, again, by ULTRA. Oshima’s accurate reports on Axis
intentions and disposition were often based directly on discussions with the
highest levels of German leadership, even Hitler himself.20 Similarly, repeated
references in high-grade SIGINT throughout the summer and autumn of 1942
revealed Axis concern about an Allied threat to northwest Europe, Norway, and
the Aegean.21 Finally, diplomatic signals between Madrid and the Spanish
embassy in Washington before the North African landing showed that although
the “neutral” Spaniards discerned the probability of the Allies’ alighting some-
where in North Africa, they knew not when or where.22 Certainly, such informa-
tion on Axis European strategy was useful to both operational and deception
schemers, permitting them to orchestrate an operation in the assurance that the
geographical area was receiving less than maximal Axis scrutiny.
These intelligence sources, then, allowed AFHQ to mold an offensive with the
highest probability of success. By October, TORCH planners assessed the follow-
ing: that German forces were tied down in the Soviet Union at Stalingrad and in
the Caucasus, with no prospect of victory in the foreseeable future; that the war
in the African desert was taxing Axis resources—some of them sent to the bot-
tom of the Mediterranean by ULTRA-forewarned aircraft and submarines from
Malta; that generalized Axis apprehension existed about an Allied offensive in
Europe or the Mediterranean; and that few reinforcements were being diverted
toward the Mediterranean or to support any move into Spain.23
Armed Forces Headquarters drew these conclusions from specific, corrobo-
rated intelligence on enemy intentions. For instance, by October, Field Marshal
Albert Kesselring, Axis commander in the Mediterranean, predicted that Allied
forces would likely land somewhere in North Africa but he was much distracted
by the stalwart British outpost of Malta; repeated bombing and invasion at-
tempts had failed to dislodge its entrenched garrison, and Royal Air Force sorties
from Malta were consistently interdicting his seaborne logistics train. Further-
more, Hitler’s reliance on his own intuition (vice the more prudent counsel of
his marshals) in dismissing Italian warnings of the imminent invasion in North
Africa denied Kesselring assets that he urgently requested.24 Anxious as AFHQ
leaders were, therefore, about the threats to the extensive TORCH flotillas, the re-
alities of an enemy both materially preoccupied with a fluid front line some
1,500 miles away and focused locally on the struggle in Egypt reassured them.
Once the Allies reached the major strategy decisions and AFHQ staff solidified
under Eisenhower, the Americans began to come more fully into the fold of Brit-
ish special intelligence, thoroughly appreciating as they did its depth and its sig-
nificance to TORCH. Indeed, it was the imminence of the invasion that brought the
introduction of American officers to Britain’s most highly guarded secret.25 By
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September American analysts served at GCCS, participating fully in cryptanalysis,
signal watches, and research functions in a cooperative Allied effort.26
By August, a TORCH intelligence picture had been produced that was truly a
combined Anglo-American effort. The first study, dated 7 August, dealt with
three primary issues: the likely reaction of Vichy French forces, the threat of
Spanish hostility and a possible German thrust through Spain, and the forms
and extents of other potential Axis responses.27 The assessment, informed by
special intelligence, predicted the following: Vichy forces would resist only until
a resolute attack demonstrated Allied supremacy; Spain would resist German
pressure to move against Gibraltar unless that pressure were backed by force; It-
aly would not send forces to Tunisia to reinforce Rommel or, probably, risk its
navy beyond the air cover of home waters; German U-boats could not be rapidly
reinforced; and the speed of the Allied advance to Tunisia would dictate the
magnitude of Axis response.
By early August, realizing the need to filter the deluge of intercepted signals
down to a usable core of data, AFHQ G-2 (intelligence) staff had focused on Axis
presence in the Mediterranean. While the Allied picture of enemy intentions was
good, order-of-battle information was in short supply. Over time, Luftwaffe
ENIGMA, Italian C38M, and Italian air force high-grade cipher decrypts pro-
vided a coherent picture of Axis forces. The fact that the draft TORCH naval op-
erational plan, dated 3 October, indicated specific locations, numbers, and types
of Axis and Vichy aircraft and naval units demonstrates that intelligence efforts
had achieved a high degree of success. These forces amounted to the following:
the small but capable Vichy fleet in Toulon and the meager naval forces in
French North Africa; several hundred aged French fighters and bombers at
North African airfields; the reticent Italian fleet, spread among Taranto,
Messina, and Naples; roughly sixteen German U-boats operating out of Greece
and Italy and a few E-boats in the same areas; 170 Luftwaffe fighters, bombers,
and reconnaissance aircraft stationed in Sicily and Sardinia; three hundred less
capable Italian air force bombers and fighters located in Sicily, Sardinia, and
Tripolitania; and Rommel’s Afrika Korps.
The October study concluded that the only serious opposition to the landings
themselves would be offered by Vichy forces, as the distant German forces in the
central Mediterranean could do little without reinforcements. TORCH planners
gauged the Axis aircraft in Sicilian and Sardinian bases to be the greatest air
threat to the operation and shaped the operation around this factor, but they es-
timated that Berlin would send no reinforcements to the Luftwaffe until “D mi-
nus 4” (that is, four days before the planned invasion date) and that seaborne
reinforcements to Rommel could not arrive until two weeks after the invasion
commenced.28 The reinforcement estimates, however, proved illusory, as Armed
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Forces Headquarters based them not on quantifiable data but on conservative
estimates of German responsiveness—not considering the possibility that Hit-
ler would be unwilling to accept the loss of North Africa. In any case, Luftwaffe
flexibility and resilience ultimately proved the planners wrong on this point. On
balance, though, Eisenhower’s draft plan for the operation assessed enemy capa-
bilities fairly accurately on the basis of early October special intelligence.
CONCEALMENT AND ASSESSMENT
Focused Allied deception efforts concealed force movements, and intelligence
gauged the stratagem’s efficacy. After the October assessment, GCCS and Armed
Forces Headquarters scrutinized special intelligence for movements or buildups
of Axis Mediterranean forces. Especially important was any transfer of aircraft
to Luftwaffe Mediterranean airfields from other theaters or between the fields
themselves. AFHQ was also seriously concerned about Luftwaffe and U-boat
buildups in the Mediterranean as TORCH preparations moved forward; ULTRA,
however, indicated no significant reinforcement of the former, and Admiralty
U-boat tracking rooms reported no sign of the latter. In fact, a transfer of
Luftwaffe assets from Sicily to the Aegean on 29 October strengthened Allied
confidence in the lack of Axis foreknowledge of the invasion and, in fact, sup-
ported deception plans.29 A previous transfer of Luftwaffe aircraft to Norway in
the spring of 1942 had also fit Allied interpretations of German invasion fears
for northwest Europe—these aircraft did not return to Kesselring’s command
until early November. Such knowledge was invaluable.30
When in late October Allied forces prepared for sailing, U-boats became a
paramount concern. Armed Forces Headquarters ordered Anglo-American
manpower and materiel assembled only just in time for October sailings; the fi-
nal TORCH plan established 7 November as D-day. Just before the huge fleet be-
gan to move, AFHQ focused on timing the convoys to avoid the U-boat threat.
Unfortunately, this was the one area of German military operations in which
GCCS could provide little signals intelligence to assist the invasion planners.
Two significant cryptologic successes on the German side allowed the U-boats to
operate with such impunity in 1942 that by December they had sunk 1,160 ships,
totaling over six million tons. First, for operational security, the German navy in
February 1942 switched to a four-wheel ENIGMA machine for U-boat signals. This
new key, known to GCCS as SHARK, impeded greatly the ability of the current
code-breaking machinery to decrypt signals.31 German U-boat ciphers were unbro-
ken until December 1942; in the meantime other, less exact means had to be used to
locate the many U-boats and evaluate their threat to Allied shipping. This absence
of U-boat special intelligence created a major risk for TORCH commanders, in that
the sinking of even a few critical vessels could jeopardize the entire operation.
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Second, the German naval intelligence branch, the Beobachtungsdienst,
broke British Naval Cipher Number 3 consistently from February 1942 until
June 1943.32 This was the primary cipher used for communication with, and the
routing of, Anglo-U.S.-Canadian merchant convoys across the Atlantic. Admiral
Karl Doenitz’s wolf packs exploited this precious intelligence on the locations
and timing of Allied convoys, as well as on Allied estimates of German U-boat
dispositions. The commander of the first TORCH convoy to leave the United
Kingdom commented that he “would consider his task successful if he got half
of his convoy to Algiers and Oran through the expected gauntlet of Luftwaffe
dive-bombers and U-boat wolf packs in the Mediterranean.”33 The collaborative
means by which the Allies evaded the wolf packs on this occasion are notable.
First, DOLPHIN ciphers were still being consistently broken and provided at least
some intelligence on U-boat activity in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.34 Sec-
ond, combined Admiralty and U.S. Navy submarine tracking rooms used these
decrypts in conjunction with sighting reports, direction finding, traffic analysis,
and any other available information to establish a picture for both the Atlantic
and Mediterranean. These organizations were amazingly successful in routing
and rerouting convoys, directing convoy escorts and air support to engage
U-boats, and managing photoreconnaissance assets. Complex traffic-analysis
techniques took advantage of frequent reports required from U-boats to
Doenitz’s command center, and of its replies, to follow individual submarines.
Furthermore, special intelligence disclosed to TORCH planners that in response
to Kesselring’s insistent requests for reinforcements, long-range reconnaissance
aircraft in Norway and Bordeaux were shifted to the Mediterranean theater just
before the invasion force sailed; consequently British TORCH convoys were not
observed while in the Atlantic en route to Africa.35 The Allies avoided coordi-
nated U-boat attacks partly because of resulting Axis intelligence gaps. Last, the
highly secure cryptographic and wireless-traffic arrangements made long be-
forehand, along with stringent radio silence observed by all ships, provided little
signals traffic for the enemy to intercept, much less analyze. The propitious envi-
ronment for TORCH sailings was the result of the strategic denial of intelligence
to the enemy thanks to the Allied tracking rooms’ efficacy—all the more impres-
sive in light of estimates that ninety-four U-boats were operating in or en route
to the Atlantic at the time.36
Moreover, beyond the invaluable tracking room assistance, a U-boat con-
frontation with a non-TORCH British merchant convoy off West Africa proved
highly fortuitous for the Allied fleets nearing the Azores. Instead of keeping the
ten U-boats of Group Streitaxt on station outside the Strait of Gibraltar, Doenitz
ordered them south to Madeira to attack northbound British convoy SL-125,
sighted on 27 October.37 The U-boats pursued and fired torpedoes at this empty
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convoy returning from Sierra Leone for seven days, sinking thirteen ships. To
this day it is unknown as to whether this was a strategic sacrifice on the part of
Allied commanders or simply fortuitous; regardless, it was fortunate for TORCH,
in that the diversion pulled the U-boats well south at a critical time, allowing in-
vasion convoys safe passage.
Finally, events in the Mediterranean, partly because of deception operations,
drew U-boats to the east away from invasion shipping arriving in the theater. On
5 November, the bulk of initial British TORCH convoys passed Gibraltar into the
Mediterranean, where the seventeen U-boats alerted to their presence were pre-
paring for coordinated attacks. Special intelligence revealed that Axis
photoreconnaissance aircraft had sighted the convoys and that Berlin expected
them to proceed to Malta.38 Seeing the need to reinforce the Mediterranean but
not divining the purpose of these unexpected convoys, Doenitz ordered seven
U-boats from Biscay ports to sail for the Mediterranean on 4 November—too
late to oppose the successful landings on the 8th. Doenitz then positioned nine
Mediterranean U-boats in a line from Cartagena to Oran in anticipation of the
passing convoys. These U-boats, however, did not intercept the TORCH convoys,
as British naval activity near Cyprus and Port Said caused Doenitz to shift them
eastward to intercept traffic to Malta from either east or west. Finally, a heavy
concentration of antisubmarine ships and aircraft supporting invasion shipping
prevented the few U-boats that actually sighted the convoys from attacking ef-
fectively. Only one, in fact, was able to loose any torpedoes at all, managing only
to disable a U.S. transport.
Strict operational security was a key factor in the flow of this intelligence
from Bletchley Park to TORCH operational commanders. While some Ameri-
cans considered the stringent British security measures an obstacle to opera-
tional use, the strict accountability procedures and destruction by burning
immediately after briefings to cleared parties protected sources and deception
schemes and so contributed materially to operational success.
Thus, the passage of the invasion flotilla without the loss of a single ship before
the landings was due to a combination of special intelligence, skillful convoy rout-
ing, energetic operational security and deception measures, relentless Allied anti-
submarine warfare, and plain good luck—what Eisenhower called an “effective
scheme for helping get our convoys through the submarine-infested zone.”39
AXIS RESPONSES
Insights into the Axis response to TORCH landings informed Allied operational
decisions. Signals intelligence was of prime importance in gauging the Axis re-
sponse after the discovery of the invasion convoys. For instance, although spe-
cial intelligence revealed Axis intelligence had noted the gradual buildup of air
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and naval forces at Gibraltar, Berlin took little action beyond the aforemen-
tioned minor Luftwaffe reinforcements. A reason might have been a German as-
sessment that the arrivals and departures were connected with routine exercises,
as suggested in several decrypted German situation reports of 30 and 31 Octo-
ber.40 As TORCH shipping began passing the strait en masse, however, AFHQ be-
came acutely concerned that early detection would bring an air onslaught that
could endanger the entire operation. After 5 November, repeated German de-
crypts announced convoy sightings by agents in Spain and Spanish Morocco as
well as by Italian and German air patrols, all reporting an easterly or northeast-
erly course toward the Mediterranean. Kesselring began to realize that some-
thing larger than a Malta resupply effort could be under way. Invasion
commanders must have been relieved, however, when his response—known via
Luftwaffe ENIGMA—was to await the convoys west of the Sicilian channel and at-
tack on the morning of the 8th with reinforced aircraft based nearby.41 The East-
ern and Central task forces instead turned due south toward Algiers and Oran
under cover of darkness on 7 November. The Axis inability to ascertain the ob-
jective of the convoys and Kesselring’s limited response to sightings allowed
them to pass unhindered to North Africa.
There were other reactions than Kesselring’s reinforcements of fighter and
long-range bomber aircraft to Sicily and Sardinia, and special intelligence re-
vealed them. For example, knowledge of the specific areas in which Kesselring
had concentrated air and surface reconnaissance warned the Allies what sectors
to avoid. Additionally, special Italian naval wireless service orders in a 7 Novem-
ber decrypt placed aircraft in Sardinia and Sicily into a “state of readiness,” dis-
closing preparations to meet the convoys near Sicily and suggesting the
likelihood of imminent sailings from Italian ports.42 These decrypts all helped
confirm that Axis attention was focused well away from actual objectives.
After TORCH convoys reached their destinations in Casablanca, Oran, and Al-
giers and began the landings, Armed Forces Headquarters was primarily con-
cerned with how the Axis powers would react once they grasped the full scope of
the invasion. The earliest decrypts mentioning the actual landing sites appeared
in an 8 November situation report with incomplete information on “attempted
landings” near Oran and Algiers.43 Berlin quickly appreciated the immense scale
of the landings, however, when follow-up reports gave the numbers of ships in-
volved. In fact, when briefed on the armada’s size by General Albert Jodl, chief of
the armed forces operations staff, Hitler declared, “If these reports are true, this
is the greatest fleet in the history of the world.”44 Signals after 8 November re-
vealed the beginnings of a massive Tunisian reinforcement, with Luftwaffe de-
crypts ordering transfers of fighters and dive-bombers from all fronts, including
Russia. Similarly, an 11 November PORPOISE decrypt specifically stated an intent
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to form a bridgehead in Tunisia, with orders from Hitler to hold the North Af-
rica position against Allied invasion.45 Likewise, Luftwaffe ENIGMA disclosed
seizure of airfields near Tunis and Bizerte for air resupply of the bridgehead and
an order from Berlin for a panzer regiment to reinforce Rommel.46 Thus, special
intelligence provided early and unambiguous indication that Axis powers would
fight for Tunisia. Unfortunately, Allied slowness in acting on that indication led
to a winter stalemate in North Africa.
Armed Forces Headquarters also needed intelligence on the possible Vichy
French reaction. A covert plan by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) sought
to foment an uprising in the objective area of pro-Allied groups to seize control
of local authorities, media, and power stations in hopes of minimizing local op-
position. Special intelligence from Vichy diplomatic ciphers gave mixed indica-
tions on the possible response, but a late-breaking OSS report that the deputy
prime minister of Vichy France, Admiral François Darlan, was in Algiers gave
AFHQ reason to hope for a quick capitulation. Additionally, Armed Forces
Headquarters hoped that inflated figures being circulated on the British victory
at El Alamein would demonstrate an Allied victory on that continent and lessen
Vichy concern for German reaction to perceived collusion with the Allies.47 Ei-
senhower’s TORCH deputy, Major General Mark Clark, engineered some adven-
turous diplomacy in the French colonies that finally led to the surrender to
Allied forces under Darlan’s orders. Special intelligence, then, assisted AFHQ in
a classic combined political and military effort, praised by William Casey in The
Secret War against Hitler as a successful meshing of intelligence and diplomacy
in supporting operational success.48
Just after the landings, special intelligence quickly disclosed German orders
to Vichy France and actions taken in French territory. Diplomatic decrypts re-
vealed German pressure on the Vichy French to oppose the Allies at all costs and
an offer of German assistance to expel them.49 The Vichy response was largely as
predicted in the initial TORCH study, except for the Casablanca landings, where
General George Patton, Jr., encountered dogged if confused resistance by French
naval units and shore batteries. Algiers fell on 8 November, Oran on the 10th,
and Casablanca on the 11th. It is noteworthy that because during the initial
landings in all three locations the reports of subordinate commanders were
sketchy at best, the clearest picture of events available to Armed Forces Head-
quarters was provided by French naval and diplomatic decrypts.50 Decrypts of
reports to the Abwehr of a Vichy agent, as well as MAGIC reports from Oshima,
confirmed that the French fleet in Toulon had not sailed in opposition to the
landings. Moreover, the same sources later disclosed Vichy government vacilla-
tion after news of Darlan’s armistice, and an additional PORPOISE decrypt
spelled out specific German orders to occupy the whole of France in response.51
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Finally, special intelligence gave Armed Forces Headquarters important infor-
mation on German occupation of French Mediterranean air bases and Hitler’s
order to seize the Toulon fleet, which led to the immediate scuttling of the ships
by the French navy.52
Special intelligence also proved critical in judging the Spanish reaction to
TORCH, about which Eisenhower had agonized up to the day of the landings.
The Allies sought to avoid any action that might sway Madrid toward the Axis
powers and invite aggression against the Allies, especially against Gibraltar. For
instance, Armed Forces Headquarters directed the purposeful exaggeration of
the Allied victory at El Alamein among the Spanish population to demonstrate
Allied commitment to final victory and to guarantee freedom of operation from
the Gibraltar outpost.53 Abwehr decrypts had previously revealed that with
Spanish assistance the Germans had by late 1941 established observation posts
close to the strait, in Spanish territory, providing highly accurate shipping re-
ports. Significantly, special intelligence disclosed a reliable and accurate Axis ca-
pability to gauge the nature of shipping movements even in low visibility or
fog—the decrypts revealing the existence of new, highly sophisticated infrared
and low-light systems that caused the Allies grave concern.54 Moreover, London
exploited this knowledge in a formal protest to Madrid regarding Spanish neu-
trality, a démarche that ultimately led to the disruption of the German posts’ op-
erations just before TORCH convoys slipped into the Mediterranean.55 Last, after
the landings, Axis diplomatic decrypts expressly stated that no cross-Spanish in-
vasion or combined attacks on Gibraltar would occur, finally allaying American
fears of a two-front North African operation.56
ALL-SOURCE FUSION
All-source intelligence fusion integrated with operations shaped strategic de-
ception. Special intelligence facilitated the application of a deception scheme
that clouded for the enemy the nature and destination of the offensive, aiding in
the venture’s success. Although operational security was vital, TORCH’s success
was more than simply the “triumph of security” hailed by some World War II
historians.57 The steady flow of special intelligence to the London Controlling
Station (LCS, the British strategic deception center) let that organization assess
the efficacy of its measures to confuse the enemy. This first Allied marriage of
special intelligence and strategic deception was vital to TORCH’s success.
To begin with, detailed knowledge of Axis capabilities, intentions, and anxi-
eties provided an excellent framework within which invasion planners could de-
velop a viable deception plan. The deception stratagem involved multiple
scenarios and substantial resources, with the prime objective of achieving sur-
prise in the North Africa invasion. Though the value of deception has been
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stressed since the age of Sun Tzu, stratagems on the scale of those managed by
LCS were unprecedented. The task of hiding the buildup and movement of the
vast TORCH forces from enemy eyes was daunting indeed. Prime Minister
Winston Churchill was to describe in his memoirs his personal concern at the
scope and complexity of the problem.58 The fundamental precept of the
preinvasion deception plan was to cause Germany to disperse forces to prevent
concentration at the place and time of greatest Allied vulnerability—with sur-
prise as a guarantee of safe maritime passage, not a force multiplier.59
From this precept flowed other deception tasks. Playing on German appre-
hension about potential Allied offensives in Norway, the Aegean, or North Af-
rica or across the English Channel, LCS established three supporting objectives:
to tie down European Axis forces while TORCH convoys made the passage, to dis-
courage Axis and Vichy defensive preparations in French North Africa, and
most important, to conceal the destination of the expedition even past Gibral-
tar.60 In the event, intimate knowledge of German perceptions allowed LCS to
formulate a scheme that fed the expectations of the German intelligence services
and General Staff.
The Allies exploited varied means to broadcast false information to Axis in-
telligence services. The British painstakingly established a network of “turned”
foreign agents that not only provided intelligence but disseminated false intelli-
gence amid carefully selected bits of truth. The highly secret “XX Committee,”
charged with feeding Berlin misleading information on Allied order of battle,
controlled these agents, unbeknownst to their Axis handlers. Berlin relied upon
this spy network, which ringed the Mediterranean, as a prime source of military
intelligence, particularly due to the dearth of German cryptanalytic break-
throughs. The closely managed double operatives selectively planted just
enough bogus information to be believable, often disclosing noncritical or
time-late information on classified Allied activity to maintain credibility. Physi-
cal evidence, other agents’ reports, or various other means usually were arranged
for to corroborate Allied deception themes. The XX Committee also occasion-
ally dabbled in cryptologic methods, such as the transmission on several occa-
sions of fraudulent intelligence via ciphers known to be compromised,
contributing to the authenticity in enemy eyes of TORCH deception schemes.61
The Americans were far less adept at the counterintelligence game, relying
heavily on London, but they too took certain measures to contribute to the mys-
tery surrounding the huge buildup across the Atlantic. The United States dis-
persed its forces along the East Coast so as not to arouse suspicion, even sending
the air group to Bermuda to embark once the fleet was under way from
Hampton Roads, and dispatching the covering group to the Caribbean to await
the main sailings. Shipping also steered false courses when near land to simulate
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convoys to the West Indies or on North Atlantic routes to England. The fleets
maintained strict operational security in transit, to the extent of boarding and
commandeering any vessels encountered and shooting down aircraft on sight.62
LCS, however, controlled the brunt of the strategic deception effort particular
to Europe. During mid-August, LCS put into effect Operation OVERTHROW, the
first component of the three-tiered TORCH deception and cover plan, specifi-
cally designed to mislead the enemy on the reason behind the extensive buildup
of Allied shipping in Britain. This was an attempt to convince Berlin that it was
seeing a prelude to the long-awaited Allied thrust into the European continent
to push the Axis out of France.63 LCS used the extensive double-agent system to
circulate false reports, and Britain staged large numbers of landing craft, barges,
and any other shipping not dedicated to TORCH to suggest an imminent am-
phibious operation. Repeated mention in Luftwaffe ENIGMA decrypts from
ubiquitous Luftwaffe photoreconnaissance missions near the channel con-
firmed enemy awareness of this buildup; LCS measured success by the fact that
German forces in northwest Europe remained on alert and that none moved to
the western Mediterranean until early November.64
LCS designed the next deception phase to deceive the Axis regarding the con-
centration and subsequent movement of the Allied shipping to the invasion
zone from Britain. Operation SOLO I sought to give Germany the impression
that a massive naval operation was under way to invade Norway to safeguard the
northern flank of the convoy route to the Soviet Union.65 The capture of the stra-
tegic port of Narvik was included in false reports generated by the many turned
agents to suggest an Allied attempt to strangle the flow of Swedish iron ore into
Germany. These reports, combined with the reality of a large Allied naval force
embarking from Britain, clearly had the German high command concerned. The
LCS plan also called for Canadian troops not earmarked for TORCH to conduct
conspicuous amphibious exercises in the northern United Kingdom just before
the sailings to suggest rehearsals for cold-weather operations. Moreover, fast in-
vasion convoys were to remain in port until only eight days before the landings,
and the follow-up convoys until four days prior, in hope of keeping Berlin in sus-
pense over a possible Norway offensive even after the bulk of the TORCH fleet
had turned south.66 Last, spurious wireless transmissions reported the arrival of
fighter-bombers and other aircraft in a Scottish assembly area.67 The first two
parts of the overall deception plan, then, complemented one another and used
many of the same assets to obfuscate Berlin’s assessment of Allied intentions.
Once Germany discovered the convoys were en route to the Mediterranean,
however, LCS had to implement the next phase of the deception scenario.
Events unfolding in northeast Africa—the British Eighth Army offensive
near El Alamein—also contributed to Axis confusion before and after the British
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sailings. British tactical teams were busy launching a related deception scheme,
code name BERTRAM, from the Middle East headquarters in support of Mont-
gomery.68 The ubiquitous British agents disseminated an array of false informa-
tion on troop movements, force dispositions, and concentrations in Syria and
Cyprus, as well as counterfeit reports of poor readiness among British Middle
East forces. Backed up with extensive visual evidence from Luftwaffe
photoreconnaissance, these “plants” misled the Germans into a preoccupation
with a possible Allied offensive against Crete, causing them to transfer an entire
air-landing division there instead of to the Afrika Korps.69 This shift of attention
away from Malta allowed both renewed resupply via submarines and fast con-
voys and continued air assaults on the Italian supply lines to Rommel. Last, off-
shore barges loaded with flares, smoke pots, burning drums of diesel fuel, and
amplified recordings of gunfire and explosions were employed as a tactical ruse
suggesting an impending amphibious assault near Marsa Matruh; supported by
planted British media stories, this evidence of a nonexistent assault temporarily
distracted Kesselring’s staff, as illustrated in a 25 October decrypt.70 Thus, a col-
lective of exaggerated and false activity reports in the eastern Mediterranean
contributed to the Axis intelligence quandary surrounding TORCH.
The final phase of the LCS deception plan, called SOLO II, reinforced German
misperceptions on the purpose of the massed Allied forces. First, it called for the
misinformation of British personnel that their ultimate destination was Malta,
by way of the Cape of Good Hope. Second, agents disseminated false reports that
the Gibraltar fleet buildup was associated with a massive Malta resupply effort
from the east, to be made after the Cape expedition made its way northward
through the Suez Canal.71 This attempted to capitalize on German impressions
that Malta was in a desperate plight about food, fuel, and ammunition—a situa-
tion that had in fact existed but was reversed just before the invasion by tactical
deception operations and dogged Royal Navy resupply from Egypt. SOLO II ap-
pears, based on German high command presuppositions revealed by consistent
signals intelligence, to have enjoyed the success of other such deception efforts.
Decrypts as late as 6 November revealed German ignorance as to the objective of
the convoys entering the Mediterranean, relating that the “strength and compo-
sition of British forces were such that, apart from supplying Malta, [the] possi-
bility of landing in Tripoli–Benghazi area or in Sardinia or Sicily had to be taken
into account.”72 Last, Mediterranean TORCH shipping strictly adhered to
AFHQ-ordered measures such as deceptive courses meant to dupe Axis air re-
connaissance and false wireless transmissions that Kesselring’s staff associated
with Malta convoys.
As elements of the Allied armada slipped quietly into the Mediterranean,
German reactions, revealed through signals intelligence, allowed for an
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extension of the deception plans beyond those earlier planned. For instance,
Dennis Wheatley, an LCS operative, later recalled,
When the expedition entered the Strait of Gibraltar we informed the enemy that its
objective was the east of Sicily. Kesselring gave orders that no aircraft should go up
on Saturday, 7 November, but every plane available should take to the air on Sunday
to blow the convoys to hell as they passed through the Straits of Bon. At midnight our
ships turned back and the following morning landed at Algiers without opposition.73
In late October, Luftwaffe ENIGMA decrypts also had revealed that Rome re-
ported “very heavy W/T [wireless telegraphy] communication of an operational
nature between Malta, Gibraltar, and the Admiralty,” which convinced
Kesselring that a Gibraltar–Malta convoy was possible.74 Further, LCS engi-
neered a late development on 6 November, convincing Armed Forces Headquar-
ters to send a bogus unencrypted SOS from the destroyer HMS Janine reporting
that it was sinking after a bombing attack at coordinates far to the east of TORCH
convoys—an attempt to corroborate the German estimate of an eastern Medi-
terranean destination.75 Finally, November PORPOISE ciphers began to disclose
Kesselring’s concern over British activity in the eastern Mediterranean and his
personal conclusion that the convoys were linked with the British offensive un-
der way against Rommel.76 It is likely this change in focus toward the eastern
Mediterranean alerted LCS to increase Allied deceptive activity there to support
Kesselring’s conclusions and divert attention and forces from the western Medi-
terranean. Indeed, after the war Kesselring admitted that on the eve of the as-
sault he had felt that the invasion convoys were “strategically coordinated with
the movements of the British Eighth Army in North Africa [and that] therefore a
landing on the African west coast was unlikely.”77 In effect, the sum of intelli-
gence the enemy received gave cause only to reinforce the aircraft in Sardinia
and Sicily in preparation to assault the shipping when it passed through “Bomb
Alley,” just east of the Sicilian straits.
Analysis of German decrypts during TORCH sailings and landings under-
scores the effectiveness of Allied deception. Oblique references to actual opera-
tions in the eastern Mediterranean designed to divert Axis attention and forces
are on record. For example, the final deception and cover plan, dated 20 August,
stated, “Further genuine or deception operations with the object of containing
Axis Naval and Air Forces in the eastern Mediterranean are under consider-
ation.”78 Additionally, TORCH naval operational orders of 3 October stipulated
that “Mediterranean Fleet (Eastern Mediterranean) will operate as requisite to
cause diversion in the Eastern Mediterranean, possibly based on Malta.”79
Whether or not all this was part of a coordinated Allied deception program re-
mains to be seen, but collectively it drew Axis attention to the eastern
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Mediterranean, diverting precious resources (e.g., the U-boats previously sta-
tioned in the western Mediterranean) and contributing to the TORCH armada’s
safe passage. It is intriguing that aside from the British land advance in Egypt,
this eastern Mediterranean activity is mentioned only briefly in one secondary
historical source.80 None of the many works on TORCH and deception in World
War II mention it.
The evidence, therefore, that Allied forces operated purposefully to draw
German attention eastward and away from the invasion lies largely in an amal-
gam of ENIGMA decrypts viewed collectively. Certain other instances of special
intelligence also lend credence to this idea. For example, an Italian admiralty ap-
preciation in a 5 November Luftwaffe report that, along with the flow of Allied
shipping through the Strait of Gibraltar, “numerous [Allied] submarines” were
on patrol in the central Mediterranean, and that “cruisers and destroyers had
been active in eastern Mediterranean during [the] previous night” demonstrates
a degree of concern for events there.81 Hinsley’s reference to events in the eastern
Mediterranean cites a 6 November PORPOISE decrypt implying that Allied forces
in Palestine, Syria, and Cyprus supported operations associated with the Egypt
offensive.82 In another decrypt Rome warned all eastern Mediterranean Italian
commands to expect “acts of sabotage, air attacks, and parachutist-landings
against naval bases” in view of “present enemy operations.”83 Moreover, a 7 No-
vember Luftwaffe ENIGMA decrypt has Kesselring ordering the same day his air
force “to give photo recce of Cyprus and Suez precedence over other recce tasks
in the eastern Mediterranean,” implying Allied activity in the region.84 An un-
dated decrypt (with a sequence number placing it in the first few days of Novem-
ber) details the refusal of a request to move the Italian destroyer Hermes from the
Aegean because of “the enemy situation in the eastern Mediterranean.”85 Last, by
October, SIGINT revealed that the Afrika Korps faced an extreme predicament
regarding fuel and ammunition, largely due to Allied air attacks from Malta,
forcing Kesselring to dedicate assets to the protection of Italian resupply
shipping.
The most valuable aspect of special intelligence to LCS deception managers,
however, was the ability it gave them to measure success by the absence of refer-
ences to certain TORCH features. It helped confirm that their goals and plans
were secure—the lack of references to friendly objectives was useful “negative
intelligence.” The goal of deception is to divert attention away from friendly ob-
jectives, and signals intelligence allowed the Allies to “check and recheck the de-
gree of success of their deception plans and then to modify them accordingly in
order to render them even more effective.”86 Abwehr ciphers demonstrated both
the progressive dislocation of German intelligence from TORCH’s true objective
and the failure of cryptanalysis in Berlin to discern the operation’s secrets.87 One
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Abwehr decrypt provided compelling assurance of operational security when it
reported a failed German attempt to exploit documents retrieved from a crashed
Allied aircraft.88 Special intelligence from ULTRA produced such negative intelli-
gence of the highest value.89 Doenitz pointed to the deception’s effectiveness in
his memoirs, where he admitted that German high command knew nothing of
TORCH objectives, and “thanks to the conflicting reports deliberately put out by
the enemy,” precautionary concentration of U-boats had been made effectively
impossible.90
SUN TZU WOULD BE PROUD
TORCH planners’ and operational commanders’ use of signals intelligence
served as a model for future Allied operations. Signals intelligence provided
insight into the highest levels of Axis leadership decision making and guided
Anglo-American military operational decisions in the first successful mar-
riage of combined operations with theater operational deception. The TORCH
example shows that an intimate intelligence/operations relationship can be a
key to operational success. The Allies repeated this success in later operations,
reducing loss of life and shortening the war. The eventual Allied thrust into Sic-
ily during Operation HUSKY proved again that special intelligence could be suc-
cessfully wedded to operational planning and execution, and in it deception
measures again achieved surprise. Indeed, as one historian asserted, Allied em-
ployment of signals intelligence in World War II “rendered invalid the theory
that intelligence is less necessary to the offence than to the defense.”91
In the final assessment, a combination of detailed planning, aggressive signals
intelligence efforts, a viable deception scheme, a high degree of operational se-
curity, and fortuitous events produced operational surprise that in turn facili-
tated an Allied bridgehead into northwest Africa. This combination not only
demonstrated the resolve of the Allies to fight to the finish but hoodwinked the
previously undefeated military machine of Hitler’s Third Reich. After the land-
ings, intelligence and operational failures reminded the Allies that it was an er-
ror to become too comfortable, that Hitler’s war machine remained potent and
resolute, and that the road to Berlin would be long and tortuous.
Operation TORCH provides relevant contemporary lessons in how effective
“intelligence preparation of the environment” provides specific insights into
not just enemy order of battle but exploitable adversary perceptions. These are
worth briefly listing:
• The art and science of traffic and nodal analysis of adversary information/
intelligence networks is as critical as the decrypts themselves.
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• Understanding adversary civil-maritime and merchant marine shipping is
sometimes as critical as warship order of battle.
• Collaborative allied intelligence is a force multiplier; Washington would
never have penetrated the adversary so thoroughly without the masterful
intelligence tradecraft and deep European cultural insights of the British.
• Leaders must strategically manage and deeply integrate deception
operations with intelligence efforts.
• Grooming the deception stratagem over time requires expert all-source
intelligence fusion.
• Operations and deception driven by credible intelligence will fail absent
strict operational security.
• Solid intelligence preparation of the environment yields well-sourced local
intelligence, providing rapid feedback during tactical operations that
support strategic decision making.
• To be effective, deception efforts must target both adversary and friendly
forces.
• The value of continuity and consistency that can be expected from a
long-service cadre of intelligence, planning, and operations staff cannot be
overstated.
Indeed, the TORCH experience reflects most of the tenets of operational de-
ception found in current joint doctrine. The six principles of military deception
outlined in U.S. doctrinal publication Military Deception are focus, objective,
centralized control, security, timeliness, and integration.92 All of these funda-
mentals can be found in TORCH planning and execution.
On balance, Sun Tzu would be proud. The invasion’s accomplishment of ini-
tial objectives without significant loss was an achievement not often repeated.
Sadly, there seem to be few post–World War II instances of similar success, based
on smoothly integrated intelligence, operations, and deception. Milan Vego, his-
torian and scholar of operational art, argues that deception as an element of the
art of war has gone out of fashion in recent decades, that despite its proven his-
torical value, it generates little enthusiasm in the U.S. military today.93 One must
hope that Sun Tzu’s countrymen and successors are not the only generals and
admirals studying the historical efficacy of artful deception stratagems.
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“CATCHING THE FOX UNAWARE”
Japanese Radio Denial and Deception and
the Attack on Pearl Harbor
Robert J. Hanyok
The attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet by the aircraft of the Japanese StrikingForce (Kido Butai) at Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941 was
a total surprise to the American commands in Hawaii and Washington. The
completeness of the operational surprise—the Imperial Japanese Navy had
gathered the force, trained it, concentrated it, and sent it to the launch point
without discovery by American intelligence, especially its radio component—
was due largely to the success of the Japanese cover plan of radio denial and de-
ception in hiding the existence, makeup, purpose, and timing of the attack. The
Japanese navy’s denial and deception plan left American radio intelligence,
known also as “communications intelligence,” with only scraps of information
about the Japanese fleet’s movements during the weeks prior to the attack.
Even these wisps were intentionally misleading. Planners from Tokyo’s Naval
General Staff and on the Combined Fleet (Kaigun) staff had developed a syn-
chronized plan for the Pearl Harbor Striking Force
that combined the three elements of radio silence, ac-
tive radio deception, and radio intelligence in a way
that assured Tokyo that the U.S. Pacific Fleet was un-
aware of the approaching Kido Butai. Furthermore
(and this is the subtle part of the Japanese planning)
that the attack remained a complete surprise owed
much to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s scheme of sup-
planting the traditional strategic “decisive engage-
ment”—a mid-ocean surface battle with the Pacific
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Fleet—with a preemptive strike. The measure of the plan’s success was simply
that Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and his
command and intelligence staffs expected no attack, despite projections of air
assaults on Hawaii as well as suspicious activity that morning.1
Technical parts of the radio deception and silence plan (the latter known as
“denial” in modern military parlance) were executed in such a manner as to
leave the American naval radio and fleet intelligence officers swaying between
uncertainty as to the location of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s carriers and con-
viction that these ships had remained in home waters in accordance with tradi-
tional Japanese doctrine and decades of exercises. The possibility that the
Americans might have been victims of “self-deception,” the tendency of intelli-
gence analysts to rely on assumptions in accommodating new data, as later
claimed, does not mitigate the fact that the Japanese fed the Americans false data
that the latter accepted as valid intelligence.
Some claim that the Striking Force did not maintain complete radio silence
or that Tokyo’s radio deception failed to fool the Americans. This dissent comes
from two quarters: recent writings on the subject of Pearl Harbor intelligence
and the statements of certain intelligence officers assigned to Hawaii at the time.
The first group’s claim can be dismissed easily. Its thesis is that the Kido Butai
transmitted radio messages as it crossed the Pacific and was tracked by the U.S.
Navy.2 Its evidence has been expertly dismantled in books and articles.3
The second dissenting group consists of Lieutenant Commander Joseph
Rochefort, the chief of Station H (or “Hypo”), the U.S. 14th Naval District’s ra-
dio intelligence center, and Commander Edwin Layton, the fleet intelligence of-
ficer to Admiral Kimmel at the time. In statements and writings after Pearl
Harbor, both officers insisted that the Japanese, though sailing in complete radio
silence, could not have pulled off a successful radio deception against the U.S.
Navy’s Pacific area radio intelligence centers at Pearl Harbor and at Cavite (Sta-
tion C, or “Cast”), in the Philippines.4 Because of the prominent roles of both
men in the events leading up to the Japanese attack, their claims will be consid-
ered against the evidence presented later in this article.
This article is based largely on extant Japanese and American records. While
the Japanese destroyed the majority of their wartime records, some material
relevant to Pearl Harbor was captured during the conflict. Another source
comprises debriefs gathered during and after the war of knowledgeable Japa-
nese prisoners of war and other personnel. More information emerged from
the postwar decryption and translation of Japanese naval messages inter-
cepted prior to Pearl Harbor. These translations, completed between late
1945 and early 1946, provide substantial insight and detail into the planning
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for the Pearl Harbor strike, including aspects of the denial and deception
plan.
This article will first briefly consider major changes the Japanese navy made
to its strategy and to the operational organization of its carrier forces and how
these changes facilitated the denial and deception plan. Second, it will examine
the technical and operational details of the Japanese plans for radio silence, de-
ception, and monitoring. Finally, the article steps through the chronology of the
Japanese denial and deception, beginning with the Kido Butai rendezvous at
Saeki Bay in the second week of November 1941 and following it to the attack. As
we recount the Japanese actions, we also will consider the American intelligence
estimates of those actions produced in the Pacific and Asiatic Fleet commands,
as well as in Washington, D.C. This parallel examination should illustrate how
the Japanese convinced American intelligence that their carriers, the spear point
of the Imperial Japanese Navy, were still in the home islands on 7 December
1941.
THE IMPERIAL NAVY CHANGES ITS STRATEGY AND
ORGANIZATION, 1941
The success of the Japanese strike at Pearl Harbor began with strategic and orga-
nizational innovations mandated for the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) by Ad-
miral Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, during the first
four months of 1941. American naval intelligence did not detect these changes,
much less recognize their implications. These shifts, especially in strategy, were
to leave American intelligence critically susceptible to the radio denial and de-
ception tactics used by the Japanese to protect the Striking Force.
For decades, the Japanese had planned for an encounter with the U.S. Pacific
Fleet. Under the standard plan, while elements of the IJN would attack targets
elsewhere, mostly to the south, the major part of the battle fleet, encompassing
most of its carriers and battleships, would remain in home waters awaiting the
expected riposte by the Pacific Fleet. (In fact, the American plan for a naval war
with Japan, Plan ORANGE, envisioned in its most common form a phased move-
ment westward, seizing Japanese-held islands along the way.)5 The IJN would
engage the Americans, when they arrived, in “decisive battle”—a concept that
envisioned the attrition and eventual destruction in detail of an enemy fleet—
somewhere in the Pacific Ocean east of the home islands. During the 1930s, as its
carrier arm was expanded and modernized, the IJN’s exercises visualized the de-
cisive battle taking place farther to the east than originally; by 1938, it was ex-
pected to happen near the Mariana Islands. But, no matter where the decisive
battle was to be fought under successive versions of the Japanese war plan, the
fleet always initially awaited in home waters for the approaching Americans.6
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In January 1941, Yamamoto reversed this traditional “defensive-reactive”
strategy: his carriers would strike first across the Pacific at the American fleet at
Pearl Harbor. The Naval General Staff opposed Yamamoto’s plan, but by Sep-
tember 1941 it had agreed to his operation against Hawaii, war games having in-
dicated a good chance for success with two new fleet carriers, Zuikaku and
Shokaku.7
American naval intelligence missed this polar change and it continued to at-
tribute a defensive character to Japanese planning. This view was based on long
experience in analyzing Japanese fleet exercises. Since 1927, U.S. radio intelli-
gence had eavesdropped and reported on the Japanese navy’s grand maneuvers
in which the latter exercised its defensive strategy.8 Even the most recent fleet
maneuvers had run this same scenario. In early 1941, American naval radio in-
telligence still analyzed Japanese actions within the context of the old defensive
strategy, wherein the main striking force of the Combined Fleet, which included
the carrier divisions, would remain in home waters, refusing to gamble away the
defense of the home islands.9
Yamamoto made a second significant change as well: reorganization of the
Japanese carrier force. For more than a decade, the carriers had been operated in
divisions of two flattops with their escorts. In the fleet maneuvers the carrier di-
visions had been allocated to the various fleets, sometimes in the roles of escorts
or scouts but largely staying with the main force near Japan. However, in April
1941 all eight Japanese carriers (including those fitting out), plus their escorts
and plane-guard ships, were formed into a new command, the First Air Fleet (1st
AF, or Itikoukuu Kantai). This organization gave the Combined Fleet a mobile
air force of nearly four hundred strike aircraft, under one commander.
Such an operational structure was totally innovative; Britain’s Royal Navy
and the U.S. Navy still kept their carriers in small detachments and relegated
them to the roles of raiders or scouts. For instance, the November 1940 British
attack on the Italian naval base at Taranto was a one-carrier raid.10 The 1st AF, in
contrast, was a standing force and represented a concentration of naval air- and
firepower that could sweep the seas—as it would, during the first four months of
the war.11 The six main carriers of the First Air Fleet, drawn from its 1st, 2nd, and
5th carrier divisions, constituted the heart of the Kido Butai. Other Striking
Force ships were drawn from various surface combat units as escorts, along with
a number of merchant vessels (marus) as the fleet train.
U.S. naval radio intelligence recovered a reference to the 1st AF on 3 Novem-
ber 1941 but, as reported in a Pacific Fleet Communications Intelligence Sum-
mary of that date, could not ascertain its significance other than that the
formation “seemed to be in a high position” in the Japanese naval air hierarchy.12
The U.S. failure to discover and understand the Imperial Japanese Navy’s radical
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turns in strategy and organization left American naval radio intelligence vulner-
able to the later Japanese radio silence and deception. The radio “picture” the
Japanese were to present would seem to fit all too well with the decades-old,
standard Japanese naval strategy.
THE JAPANESE PLANS FOR RADIO DENIAL AND DECEPTION
From the surviving Japanese records, it is difficult to pinpoint when the Japa-
nese began planning radio denial and deception for the Pearl Harbor attack. It is
likely that the plan incubated in the Combined Fleet during the late summer or
early fall of 1941 and culminated in the October conference mentioned below.
The plan, which incorporated a mix of techniques and procedures, grew from a
tradition of communications security that had been a fundamental tenet of the
IJN since the 1905 Russo-Japanese War and had been featured in naval maneu-
vers preceding World War II.13
Much of the impetus for communications security arose from the high Japa-
nese regard for American and British radio intelligence in the Far East. This re-
spect was based on the success that Tokyo’s own radio intelligence element—the
Fourth Bureau of the Naval General Staff—had achieved against Western naval
communications in the 1930s. Specifically, it was an incident in mid-1941, when
deception planning for the Pearl Harbor attack probably had started, that con-
vinced the Japanese of the necessity of an effective radio denial and deception
plan.
In early July, Japan occupied French bases, airfields, and other military facilities
near Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay, in southern Indochina. To support the operation,
the 2nd Carrier Division (Hiryu and Soryu) sailed south toward Formosa under
radio silence. The Japanese communications plan called for the 1st Carrier Divi-
sion (centered on Akagi and Kaga) to receive traffic for the 2nd Carrier Division,
but not for Hiryu and Soryu themselves. Somewhere near Formosa, one of the car-
riers of the 2nd Carrier Division transmitted urgent messages to Tokyo. The Brit-
ish radio-intercept site in Hong Kong, on Stonecutter’s Island, was listening; it
located the Japanese carriers and sent the information to the British Far East
Combined Bureau in Singapore. A Japanese radio intelligence team aboard Soryu,
in turn, intercepted the British direction-finding message. According to a Japa-
nese officer, this incident taught the IJN that although the British could not read
its codes, “they could plot and follow ship movement.”14
This insight reinforced the Japanese naval leadership’s healthy regard for
British, as well as American, radio intelligence, which posed the main threat to
the secure movement of the Pearl Harbor Striking Force. As we shall see, they in-
corporated a number of denial and deception measures to beat it. But was this
high regard warranted?
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AMERICAN NAVAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE, 1941
In late 1941, the American naval radio intelligence against Japan was con-
ducted by the U.S. Navy’s cryptologic organization, OP-20-G. The effort was
anchored at three major sites: Washington, D.C. (whose station was known as
“N,” or “Negat”), Hawaii, and the Philippines. These three stations were in-
volved in the collection and analysis of Japanese communications. All shared
intelligence on the Japanese navy. Some of the intelligence was exchanged over
radio circuits, among all three stations and to their supported commands.
However, the bulk of the collected intelligence—transcripts of Japanese en-
crypted messages—was sent by mail to Washington for analysis. Other inter-
cept, notably call signs, direction-finding results, and “operator chatter,” was
radioed to other centers only. The stations in the Pacific—in Hawaii and the
Philippines—directly attacked current Japanese naval communications and
message traffic. In Hawaii, the radio intelligence was performed at “Hypo” (or
Station “H”), under Lieutenant Commander Rochefort. Hypo, though actually
subordinate to the commander of the 14th Naval District, shared its work with
Admiral Husband Kimmel’s Pacific Fleet, Admiral Thomas Hart’s Asiatic Fleet,
and the 16th Naval District. Station “Cast,” at Cavite, near Manila, was charged
with solving the newest version of the IJN’s main fleet operational code, known
at the time as “AN-1.” Little progress was made on this code, even with help from
the British Far East Combined Bureau.15
Three main methods were used to gather radio intelligence against the Japa-
nese navy: radio direction finding, traffic analysis, and cryptanalysis. In late
1941, these techniques produced a mixed bag of results. Radio direction find-
ing (RDF, or DF) is the attempt to locate a radio station by determining the di-
rection, or bearing, of its emissions relative to the monitoring site. Joseph
Rochefort would testify during one of the Pearl Harbor investigations that the
mid-Pacific DF net (which consisted of DF listening posts in Hawaii, Samoa,
and the Aleutians) was not “as efficient or productive of results as it might have
been. It lacked equipment and trained operators and the long distances in-
volved [over two thousand miles] which rendered an efficient RDF operation
rather difficult.”16 Ideally, all three DF posts would take bearings on a Japanese
ship or station while it transmitted a message; the three bearings would inter-
sect where the transmitter was. For a number of technical reasons, however,
such as distance, propagation characteristics, and a lack of timely communica-
tions for coordination, this ability was available only occasionally.17 Station
Cast had a DF capability and was part of a separate western Pacific DF net with
posts in Guam and Shanghai. It typically was able to obtain at least usable sin-
gle bearings on Japanese naval transmissions from the home islands.
Rochefort relied heavily on its results to assess Japanese naval activities. But a
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single bearing is limited, since it gives only the direction, not the distance or lo-
cation, of a transmitter.
DF bearings from Cast consistently placed the Japanese carriers within an arc
between 20 and 35 degrees wide, which covered the Japanese home islands.18 On
the basis of these bearings and analysis of message traffic patterns, over the sum-
mer and fall of 1941 U.S. naval analysts at Hypo and Cast developed a composite
profile of Japanese carriers. The ships, they found, routinely operated from vari-
ous bases—such as Kure, Sasebo, and Yokosuka—in the Japanese home islands
and near Formosa. In late November and early December 1941, the consistent
plotting of the call signs of the Japanese carriers within this arc would be crucial
in U.S. assessments of the ships’ status.
Traffic analysis—the exploitation of
“external” aspects of encrypted messages,
such as call signs, volume of traffic, ad-
dresses, and relationships between recipi-
ents (but not code breaking to read the
messages themselves, which is the prov-
ince of cryptanalysis)—is dependent on
the amount of radio traffic sent. In Octo-
ber 1941, Rochefort later stated, analy-
sis of IJN communications was good,
but in the month prior to Pearl Harbor
information grew scarce, as the amount
of exploitable communications de-
creased.19 In addition, because intelli-
gence derived from traffic analysis (or
radio intelligence generally) is largely in-
ferential, sometimes information was
interpreted differently by Cast and
Hypo.20
The two Pacific sites reported their traffic-analysis intelligence to command-
ers through technical summaries: Cavite issued TESTMs (apparently for “Tech-
nical Estimate Messages”), while Hypo distributed a daily “H Chronology.” The
Pacific Fleet intelligence officer, Commander Layton, passed along a daily
“Communications Intelligence Summary” to Admiral Kimmel based on the two
stations’ reports. The Far East Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence in
Washington used the TESTMs, chronologies, and COMINT summaries to issue
every Monday an estimate of Japanese ship locations.
In the all-important area of cryptanalysis, the U.S. Navy was still trying to ex-
ploit the current version of AN-1 (in mid-1942 redesignated “JN-25B”), which
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had been put into effect in December 1940. This system used some thirty-three
thousand code groups, with several thousand additional groups for commonly
used words, all of which were further encrypted with an additive key. The addi-
tive system had been solved, but this advance had revealed only the underlying
code groups. Recovery of the plaintext values of the code groups, called “book
breaking,” required officers who knew Japanese. Even with the cooperation of
the Far East Combined Bureau, the far more difficult job of recovering the
groups’ actual meanings had advanced only marginally after a year’s labor.
Translators had made a partial recovery of about four thousand groups (about
10 percent of the total), but these consisted mostly of digits, phrases, and words
from standardized, pro forma messages, such as ship movement reports.21 Even
this, however, did not mean that 10 percent of the contents of the Japanese mes-
sages, or 10 percent of all messages, could be exploited. The problem was far
more difficult: it was analogous to trying to read a foreign-language tract with a
dictionary in which only a random 10 percent of the words are defined.
The bottom line was that the American naval radio intelligence was fairly good
at deriving useful information from analysis of Japanese communications and di-
rection finding of the transmitters, provided messages were available in sufficient
quantity and identities could be recovered. When Japanese communications were
curtailed, usable radio intelligence declined. American naval intelligence needed
other sources to fill the gap—aerial reconnaissance, visual observation, espionage,
or open sources, such as newspapers. Unfortunately, due to stringent Japanese se-
curity measures and a lack of U.S. aviation resources, none of these were available.
Foreign observers, like naval attachés, diplomats, and journalists, were kept away
from the navy yards and training areas near Kyushu and the Inland Sea.22 Japanese
newspapers were censored. Foreign ships were screened from the sensitive zone.
Those that got too close were held up in port, as happened in Naha, Okinawa,
when, on 1 December, a Philippines-registered freighter was ordered held by the
Sasebo Navy District headquarters and its radio sealed.23 Attempts to elicit intelli-
gence from Japanese sailors was pointless; most of the Pearl Harbor force’s per-
sonnel were not told of their target until the final assembly at Hitokappu Wan
(Bay) on 22 November.24
As a result, as one assessment of U.S. intelligence stated at the end of Novem-
ber 1941, Washington’s and Hawaii’s estimates of the location of Japanese naval
forces were “almost totally dependent on R[adio] I[ntelligence].”25 This reliance
on a single source would be the decisive vulnerability of American intelligence
in the Pacific during late 1941.
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THE JAPANESE NAVY INSTITUTES NEW COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY MEASURES, 1941
For Japanese planners, the perceived American exploitation of their general na-
val communications system remained a constant and paramount worry. In early
November 1941, the IJN instituted new general security features in its commu-
nications structure. First, a new fleet call-sign system, HYOO9 (producing
kana-kana-numeral combinations, such as “HA FU 6”), came into operation on
1 November. This new system hampered the efforts of OP-20-G’s analysts in
Washington, Hawaii, and the Philippines to identify Japanese ships, command,
and stations. Fortunately for the U.S. analysts, the Japanese navy continued to
use the previous call signs (“drill” call signs, sometimes called “secret” calls—
numeral-kana-kana combinations like “8 YU NE”) in exercises and training.26
More important, though, was the 5 November change to Tokyo’s naval com-
munications procedure. Prior to this date, Tokyo had transmitted messages spe-
cifically to recipients, using their individual call signs. Now it sent all messages to
single general or collective call signs, such as for all ships or a shore-based radio
station, listing actual, intended recipients only in the encrypted text. When Jo-
seph Rochefort saw this new address system, he speculated that it signified the
end of all message headings.27 In postwar testimony, Edwin Layton characterized
the traffic that resulted as “calls addressed to nobody from nobody; which every-
one [Japanese] copied, and when they do that nobody is being talked to that you
can identify and therefore the forces are pretty hard to identify in traffic.”28
The Kido Butai also received supplementary and detailed communications
changes intended for it alone. These specific elements were integrated into the
denial and deception plan most likely developed at a conference on force com-
munications in Tokyo on 27 October attended by representatives of the Naval
General Staff, the First Air Force, the Combined Fleet, and the Eleventh Air
Fleet, along with the chiefs of staff of the other major fleets.29 This meeting may
have made use of the results of two Combined Fleet communications tests held
from 18 through 24 October, which focused in major part on transmissions of
the Kido Butai.30
ELEMENTS OF THE KIDO BUTAI’S DENIAL AND
DECEPTION PLAN
Although no copy of the resulting denial and deception plan for the Pearl Har-
bor Striking Force exists—most Japanese records were destroyed at the end of
the war—much of it can be reconstructed from interviews with IJN officers,
captured documents, and intercepts by the U.S. Navy’s radio-intercept stations.
What emerges is a plan, consisting of three complementary parts, designed not
only to hide the Kido Butai from American naval radio intelligence but to
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monitor the latter’s communications from Pearl Harbor so as to track the
scheme’s effectiveness. These parts were radio silence, radio deception, and ra-
dio monitoring.
Radio Silence
Imperial Japanese Navy doctrine had long made provision for radio silence. The
1937 Standard Communications Procedures divided communications into two
categories. In the first, known as “general,” case, a communication between two
navy ships or stations was complete when the receiving entity acknowledged re-
ceipt. However, a second method, “special communications,” involved unilateral
broadcasting; message acknowledgment was “not required from the radio re-
ceiving ship or station.”31 This method ensured that the Pearl Harbor Striking
Force remained silent.
General communications instructions were later amended to give command-
ers more leeway. In early 1940, the naval Wireless Procedure Rules allowed the
chiefs of staff of independent forces to issue their own orders for communica-
tions, within IJN guidelines.32 By 1941, standard IJN-wide regulations man-
dated three degrees of radio silence, of which the two highest, “very strict” and
“strict” radio silence, prohibited all communications from a unit or fleet except
in emergency. In all three situations, local commanders controlled their own
communications.33
For the attack on Pearl Harbor, known as the “Hawaiian Operation” (Hawai
Sakusen), that commander was Admiral Chuichi Nagumo. On 5 November, Ad-
miral Yamamoto issued Combined Fleet Secret Order 1, of which section 4 stip-
ulated that the Striking Force, in accordance with instructions to be detailed by
its commander, would maintain strict radio silence from the time of departure
from the Inland Sea.34 Admiral Nagumo reiterated these instructions, adding
only the simple stricture “All transmissions of messages are strictly forbidden.”35
This radio silence was accomplished at two levels: by cessation of transmissions by
individual ships and through the use of broadcast, or one-way, communications.
When the Striking Force deployed in mid-November to Hitokappu Wan, all
shipboard radio transmitters were disabled or secured. All naval radio traffic
was sent in manual Morse code; slips of paper were inserted between the con-
tacts of transmitting keys to prevent emissions.36 In other cases, fuses or portions
of circuitry were removed from transmitters to make them unusable. The com-
munications officer of the battleship Hiei put the transmitter key in a box, which
he used as a pillow.37 The day before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the transmitters
having been shut down for almost twenty days, it was decided to test them on
closed circuits (“dummy loads”). The radiomen found that many transmitters
had been made inoperative by paper residue or rust buildup on the contacts of
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hand keys. This testing perhaps saved the task force problems on the day of the
attack, when it finally communicated with Tokyo and the tankers in its fuel
train.38
A new detail of the radio silence plan was added at Hitokappu Wan. Initially,
plans called for reconnaissance aircraft from the carriers to search ahead for en-
emy or neutral ships that might discover the Striking Force. However, the force’s
air chief, Commander Minor Genda, considered this a security risk. Genda ar-
gued that pilots might get lost and ask for navigational beacons or radio direc-
tions; the Americans would hear these transmissions.39 His argument won out;
the carriers would instead keep six planes ready on their flight decks to respond
to emergencies.40 The only reconnaissance aircraft dispatched were the scout
planes from the cruisers Tone and Chikuma on the morning of the attack. Their
reports were sent to the Striking Force “in the blind”—that is, without expecting
acknowledgment. (These transmissions were not heard by the Americans.)
The major problem remaining was how to update the Kido Butai with new in-
telligence, weather, and orders as it sailed east. The Naval General Staff solved it
by resorting to the naval broadcast method—one-way transmission to a ship or
fleet using multiple frequencies and transmitters and the repeat of messages.
Shore stations transmit messages several times on different frequencies; the re-
ceiving audience does not acknowledge the messages, but reception of at least
one repetition, on at least one frequency, is considered all but guaranteed. All na-
vies at the time used this method. The main Tokyo naval communications sta-
tion would send messages to the Striking Force several times a day, on as many as
three separate frequencies in the high-frequency (HF) band, 3–30 MHz, and an-
other in the very-low-frequency (VLF, 3–30 KHz) range. U.S. radio intelligence
in Hawaii noticed the repeat traffic but concluded that the Japanese were dis-
guising traffic levels for security reasons.
Ultimate responsibility for reception and distribution coverage of broadcast
messages belonged to the refitted battleships Hiei and Kirishima, of the 3rd Bat-
tleship Division, since they had the largest and most sensitive antennas and re-
ceivers. Once a message had been copied and decoded aboard one of these ships,
its contents were disseminated throughout the Kido Butai, by semaphore flags
during the day or narrow-beam signal lamps by night.41 The ships sailed close
enough to one another, usually less than a kilometer, to relay messages by visual
means through the formation. The same signaling methods were used to ar-
range refueling and repositioning of ships.
To ensure further that all traffic was received, however, every ship was re-
quired to listen to the broadcast. Many copied the same messages, if at different
times. For example, Combined Fleet Order 11, the 3 December notification
from Admiral Yamamoto to the Imperial Japanese Navy that all vessels
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belonging to Panama, Norway, Denmark, and Greece were to be treated as en-
emy, was received by the 5th Carrier Division flagship on 4 December at 1130
(11:30 AM, Tokyo time) and by the 1st Destroyer Squadron flag at 1350 (1:50
PM) on 3 December.42
Not all American intelligence officers were convinced the broadcast method
was used to communicate to the Striking Force. Edwin Layton admitted after the
war to a joint congressional committee that he had believed that the radio si-
lence went “both ways”—that Tokyo had not transmitted anything, even the fa-
mous “Climb Mount Niitaka” (actually, Niitikayama) order. Or, he speculated,
the Japanese might have used special antennas with narrow beams.43 Neither
was the case. In fact, the ships of the Kido Butai sailed silently eastward to Pearl
Harbor, receiving current intelligence and orders as they went.
Radio Deception
Radio silence could shield the Striking Force from detection by the American lis-
tening posts spread around the Pacific. But Japanese naval officers feared that
the abrupt and continued complete cessation of radio traffic by the ships, espe-
cially after a period of training that had featured extensive communications,
would catch American attention and perhaps tip off the operation. It was not the
silence itself that concerned the Japanese but what the Americans might deduce
from it—that the carriers were on the move.44 The only way to convince the
Americans that the ships of most interest to the U.S. Navy, the carriers of the
First Air Fleet, were still at their ports or active in the Inland Sea was through ra-
dio deception. A subtle and extensive radio deception plan was put into motion
that allowed for a seamless shift to false radio traffic when the carriers went silent,
followed by seemingly real transmissions until the Kido Butai reached Hawaii.45
To set the stage for the deception, in early November 1941 the Naval General
Staff ordered the First Air Fleet and other ships, under the direction of the DF
Control Center of the 1st Combined Communications (that is, radio intelli-
gence) Unit in Tokyo, to establish a regular schedule of drill communications.
From 8 November through the 13th, Akagi, Hiei (the flagship of the 3rd Battle-
ship Division), and the 24th Division of Ships (Destroyers) were to communi-
cate with the Tokyo communications center three times a day—at 0600, 1200
(noon), and 2000 (8 PM), all Tokyo time. The participation of the DF Control
Center was significant, suggesting that it was monitoring the radio traffic for pur-
poses of evaluating the transmissions for later imitation, as well as for security.46
On 15 November, the Combined Fleet discreetly substituted new drill call
signs for the various task forces, including the Striking Force.47 The stations in-
volved in the radio deception were to use the old drill calls of the carriers, princi-
pally Akagi, and other ships of the Kido Butai for the next three weeks. These
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false communications were to be sent by regular radio operators from the major
ships of the Kido Butai who had been sent ashore to bases at Kure, Sasebo, and
Yokosuka. A communicator’s “fist,” or the characteristic unique way a radioman
taps out characters on Morse keys, was a method of identifying operators and, by
extension, their ships. So, when American listening posts heard the familiar fist
of an operator known to have sent messages from Akagi, using that ship’s call
sign, they construed the carrier to be on the bearing taken of his transmis-
sions—in this case, in the direction of one of the home-island bases.
As the carriers departed the Inland Sea and their air squadrons flew out to
join them, other aircraft, from the 12th Combined Air Group, arrived at the
newly vacated air bases. Their role was to keep up flight activity levels and asso-
ciated radio traffic with the carriers and bases, as if the previous several weeks of
training were continuing. The false traffic included call signs, procedural chat-
ter, and dummy messages between notional aircraft and carriers, along with
communications with other vessels. This “useless” traffic was sent according to
guidelines set out in the “Naval Dummy Messages and Jamming Rules” (Kaigun
Giden Booghin Kitei) promulgated by the Navy Ministry on 4 November 1941.
In order to avoid confusion or inadvertent compromise of actual information,
all false traffic consisted of dummy groups or meaningless text.48
The Japanese did not, however, reassign the carrier call signs to destroyers sta-
tioned in the Inland Sea. This claim was made after the war. Edwin Layton re-
sponded in an April 1942 memorandum that stated the Japanese shifted the
Striking Force carrier radio calls to “fishing boats in the Mandated Islands.”49
Both assertions were wrong.
While the radio silence hid the Kido Butai’s location, then, radio deception
strove to convince American communications intelligence that the strike ele-
ment of the Combined Fleet, its carriers, was still in home waters.
Radio Monitoring
With the radio-silence and deception parts of the plan in operation, the Japanese
needed a way to verify that the plan was working and that the Americans at Pearl
Harbor remained unaware of the approaching task force. The Naval General
Staff in Tokyo accordingly tasked its own radio intelligence units to monitor
American naval communications from Hawaii for any indication of an alert.
The principal Japanese intercept station that covered Pearl Harbor communica-
tions, Detachment 1 of the 6th Communications Unit, was on Kwajalein Island
with the IJN radio communications station. While the Japanese could not read
encrypted U.S. naval messages, they could identify urgent messages and individ-
ual ships, units, and aircraft, as well as locate Pacific Fleet ships and planes via di-
rection finding. American patrol aircraft were of special concern, since aerial
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searches north of the Hawaiian Islands might detect the Kido Butai. The Japa-
nese analyzed communications for any change in the Pacific Fleet’s operational
readiness; this information would be relayed to the Striking Force.50
A small radio-intercept detachment aboard Akagi performed the same mis-
sion. When the Kido Butai approached Pearl Harbor, this unit also monitored
Hawaiian commercial radio stations, KGU and KGMB, for any hint that the
Americans were aware of the approaching task force.51
DENIAL, DECEPTION, AND AMERICAN REACTION,
8 NOVEMBER–7 DECEMBER 1941
After Admiral Yamamoto issued his secret order dictating radio silence once the
task force departed for the Kurile Islands, the Kido Butai began a period of train-
ing, replenishment, and redeployment to the final assembly point at Saeki Wan,
in the Oita Prefecture, in northeast Kyushu. First, from 6 to 9 November, most of
the major units of the force headed for Kure or Sasebo to make ready for the op-
eration. Kaga arrived at Sasebo on 7 November, Akagi on the 9th. The 5th Car-
rier Division’s Shokaku and Zuikaku made Kure on 9 November. Hiryu, under
way for Kure, lost an anchor and had to return to Sasebo on 10 November. Escort
cruisers and destroyers sailed to Kure on 9 November.
It was during this repositioning that the Tokyo DF Control Center–managed
communications drill involving the Tokyo communications center, the carrier
Akagi, Hiei, and the 24th Division began. From 8 through 13 November, as
noted, these ships communicated three times a day with Tokyo. The Americans
monitored these communications, and the 10 November Pacific Fleet Commu-
nications Intelligence Summary correctly reported Akagi at Sasebo and other
carriers at Kure.52
On 12 November, the 16th Naval District reported Admiral Yamamoto’s flag-
ship, the battleship Nagato (call sign 9 HE FU), near Kure. Actually, the ship,
with Yamamoto embarked, was at the Iwakuni Naval Air Station, about thirty
miles west of Kure; but this was close enough, based on the DF bearing of 30 de-
grees taken by Cavite.53
The next day, Cavite reported Akagi near Sasebo. The carrier had left the
base that day to pick up its aircraft complement near Kagoshima, about sixty
miles to the south. Whether the DF bearing of 27 degrees was of Akagi or a sta-
tion deceptively using its call sign depends upon when the transmission was
heard. This information, though, is not in the report; it is possible that the
bearing was taken on 14 November. If this interpretation is correct, the trans-
mission should be considered deceptive, since at the time the ship actually was
heading to the rendezvous at Saeki Wan to pick up the Striking Force
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commander, Admiral Nagumo, and his staff.54 The Pacific Fleet COMINT
summary reported that the carriers were relatively “inactive” and had been in
home waters from 13 to 15 November.55
On 14 November, units of the Kido Butai assembled at Saeki Wan and the
nearby port of Beppu, except for the battleship Hiei, which had sailed northeast
to Yokosuka to pick up staff intelligence officers before continuing to Hitokappu
Wan. For the next three days the ships stayed at Saeki, and the Pacific Fleet
COMINT summaries reported that “the carriers are mostly in the Kure and
Sasebo and with the exception of a few in the Kyushu area.”56 While this state-
ment could be interpreted as covering all the possibilities, the specific locations
mentioned were centers for radio deception, and this suggests that false radio
traffic may have supported Hawaii’s conclusion.
In the midafternoon of 17 November, Admiral Yamamoto, aboard Nagato, ar-
rived at Saeki Wan for one last meeting with many of the staff and officers of the
Kido Butai. He spoke to them of his confidence in the success of the mission.
Around 1600 (4 PM), the first ships of the task force, the 2nd Carrier Division
(Soryu, Hiryu) and their escorting destroyers, slipped out of Saeki Wan, headed
southeast out the Bungo Strait past Okino Shima Island, and then turned north-
east toward Hitokappu Wan in the Kuriles. The rest of the Striking Force fol-
lowed in groups of two or four ships.
For the next few days, the Pacific Fleet intelligence barely mentioned the Japa-
nese carriers. The COMINT summary of 16 November associated unspecified
carrier divisions with the 1st Destroyer Squadron, in the Mandates. The de-
stroyer unit was believed to have worked previously with the carriers and the 3rd
Battleship Division.57 The 18 November summary placed the carrier divisions—
again, which ones were not specified—with the same battleship division but this
time the 2nd Destroyer Squadron. This summary added that the commander of
the Japanese Second Fleet may have been in command of a large task force with
elements of the Third Fleet, combined air fleets, some carrier divisions, and the
3rd Battleship Division.58 The same COMINT summary situated the 4th Carrier
Division, specifically the carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku (the latter, call sign SI TI
4), near Jaluit Island in the Marshalls, two thousand miles southeast of Japan.59
The summary assessed these latter identifications of the carriers as doubtful.60
As the ships sailed north to the cold and foggy Kuriles, the Tokyo broadcast
sent out a message from Commander, Carrier Divisions of the Combined Fleet
to all carrier units, Commander, 1st Destroyer Squadron, and Commander, 3rd
Battleship Division that beginning at midnight 19 November Tokyo time, fleet
frequencies in the HF band would be on “Battle Control” status, while those in
VLF would assume “Alert Control.” This order, Striking Force Operational Or-
der 1, meant that the HF broadcast would carry operational traffic, while the
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VLF broadcast would transmit if the traffic volume became excessive.61 It did
not order radio silence—the ships already had been ordered into HF silence, and
they could not transmit on VLF frequencies.
Japanese radio deception may have begun to bear fruit by this time. The 19
November Pacific Fleet COMINT summary observed that Hiei “appears today
at Sasebo”—that is, on the southwest coast of Kyushu.62 In reality, as we have
seen, Hiei was in Yokosuka, on the east coast of Honshu, several hundred miles
northeast of Sasebo.63
From 20 to 23 November, the ships of the Kido Butai slipped into Hitokappu
Wan, an isolated bay at Etorofu Island, in the southern Kuriles. The last ships to
arrive were the Striking Force’s three submarines, I-19, I-20, and I-23, and the
carrier Kaga. The gunboat Kumajiri, entering the bay ahead of the force, had or-
dered the local post office to curtail post, telephone, and telegraph service. When
the task force itself arrived, all shipping activity at the harbor was suspended.
Back in the home islands, further communications drills for the Combined
Fleet—except for the Striking Force—were ordered to begin on 22 November.
One drill was set to run two days, while an air-defense communications exercise
involving the naval district at Sasebo and the Eleventh Air Fleet was scheduled to
last three weeks.64
The clouds of secrecy created by the silence and deception now descended to
shroud the Kido Butai from American naval intelligence. On 22 November,
Cavite took a bearing of 28 degrees on Akagi (call sign 8 YU NA), which placed
the carrier in Sasebo. On the same day, Cavite took a bearing of 40 degrees on SO
SA 2, the fleet call sign of the commander of the First Air Fleet, and placed him in
Yokosuka.65 Of course, at the time Admiral Nagumo was at Hitokappu Wan,
aboard Akagi, where he was conducting meetings to incorporate recent intelli-
gence about Pearl Harbor into the attack plan.66
On 23 November, Cavite reported that the drill call sign (1 KI RA) of the large
carrier Zuikaku bore 30 degrees, which placed it at the naval base of Kure.67 The
COMINT summary for that day had little to say, except that the “carrier divi-
sions were relatively quiet, but that Carrier Division Three was definitely associ-
ated with 2nd Fleet operations.” The summary added that the identifications
remained valid, although there were indications of an imminent move to the
south and of the massing of additional covering forces in the Mandates.68
For the next two days, Nagumo and his staff aboard Akagi were briefed on the
latest Pearl Harbor intelligence by an officer from Yokosuka brought by Hiei.
The Striking Force’s air chief, Genda, put the naval pilots through classroom
briefings and training in flight formations and tactics to be used in the attack.
The necessity for radio silence during the voyage to Hawaii and the flight to Pearl
Harbor was emphasized.69
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On 24 November, Cavite took another bearing of 28 degrees on Akagi, call
sign 8 YU NA, locating it at Kure. Given the vagaries of direction finding, which
had placed the ship in Sasebo two days earlier, Cast concluded that it was in the
Inland Sea.70 The Pacific Fleet COMINT summaries for 24 and 25 November
carried minimal information on the all-important carriers. That of the 24th re-
ported “no definite indications of locations [for the carriers].”71 The next day’s
summary mentioned that the fleet radio traffic level was still high and that one
or more carrier divisions were “present in the Mandates.”72 On 25 November, the
Far East Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence (OP-16-F2), headed by Com-
mander Arthur McCollum, issued its weekly location of the Japanese fleet, plac-
ing all Japanese carriers in the ports of Sasebo or Kure.73
On the same day, Tokyo broadcast Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet Operational
Order 5 ordering the Striking Force to depart with the “utmost secrecy” the next
day and advance to its standby point northwest of Hawaii, to arrive by the eve-
ning of 3 December.74 At six o’clock on 26 November, the ships of the Kido Butai
raised their anchors, slowly steamed into the northern Pacific, and settled into a
cruising formation, within a box some thirty kilometers on a side. Initially, the
three submarines scouted ahead on the surface. (The submarines were later
pulled back, because high swells and mist slowed them and hindered their ability
to sight ships.) The six carriers followed behind a screen of destroyers and cruis-
ers in line abreast. The battleships Hiei and Kirishima tailed the flattops by six ki-
lometers. The seven tankers were spread among the formation. The Striking
Force sailed in complete radio silence, its transmitters disabled or disconnected.
The only connection to Tokyo was the broadcast, which continued to repeat vital
traffic.
American intelligence reports for 26 and 27 November, each covering the pre-
vious twenty-four hours of intercept, reflected the continuing effectiveness of
Japanese radio deception. The 16th Naval District transmitted an intelligence
summary stating that “our best indications are that all known First and Second
Fleet carriers are still in the Sasebo–Kure area.”75 On 25 November, Hypo,
Rochefort’s unit in Hawaii, noted that Kirishima was believed to be in Yokosuka.
On 26 November, “H” reported that “several carriers were near Sasebo, includ-
ing Car[rier] Div[ision] 4” (Zuikaku and Shokaku, which was call sign NE RU 8).
Rochefort also reported that during the evening the carriers were heard using
their “secret [drill] calls” on 4963 kilohertz, a tactical frequency, but that no
bearings were available.76 The Pacific Fleet COMINT summary for 26 November
mentioned no carriers but commented that the Third Fleet, with which the car-
riers usually were associated, had not yet left the Sasebo area.77
At about the 1000 (Tokyo) on 27 November, Cavite took bearings of 30 de-
grees on the drill call signs for Akagi and Hiryu (9 RU SI), which put them in the
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Kure area. Cavite also heard on the same bearing the call sign 8 RO SA, which it
identified as the “carrier” Koryu; an unidentified merchant ship (6 MI TA); and
another, unidentified, call sign, 7 ME NE—placing them all in the Kure area.78
Station H still plotted the carriers at Sasebo with the Third Fleet but noted that
activity at the base was “light.”79
The Pacific Fleet Communications Intelligence Summary of 27 November
carried an entry that “an air unit in Takao [Taihoku, on Formosa] addressed a
message to the Koryu and Shokaku. The carriers are still in the Home Waters.”80
The Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington added in its report for that day
that all carriers were in the “Sasebo–Kure area” (see the figure—the bases are
nearly two hundred miles apart, on different islands, but are on nearly the same
bearing as measured from Cavite) with the commander in chief of the Com-
bined Fleet.81 In reality, by this date the Striking Force had been at sea a day and
was some thousand miles to the northeast.
On 28 November, Hawaii repeated Cavite’s previous day’s bearing reports
and supplemented them with the assessment that Commander, Carrier Division
and “several” carriers were in the Kyushu area. Rochefort also stated two addi-
tional items: that the commander of Carrier Division 4 was at Sasebo and that
the “secret” (or drill) call sign for the Combined Air Fleet was being heard on
two different frequencies.82 Later that day Cavite reported no new bearings, and
16th Naval District had nothing else either. The Pacific Fleet COMINT sum-
mary reported that messages had been sent to Carrier Divisions 5 and 7, the lat-
ter probably an error in identification.83
Through 30 November, the Kido Butai continued to push eastward, reaching
on that day “Point B,” nearly a thousand miles east of the Kuriles. The sailors and
airmen kept reviewing their attack plans, while the staff received updates via the
Tokyo broadcast about the weather along the intended course, orders, updates
on the diplomatic fencing between Washington and Tokyo, intelligence from the
consulate in Honolulu, and radio intelligence from Kwajalein. Among other
items passed by from the latter was that American reconnaissance planes still pa-
trolled only to the south and west of Pearl Harbor—that is, the area to the north,
from which the air strike was to be launched, was not being searched.
Going into the last day of November, American estimates still placed the
all-important carriers in Japanese waters. The COMINT summary stated that
Hiei had exchanged messages with elements of the Second and Third fleets.84
Station H placed the carriers in the Kyushu area.85 On that day, in the 1000 hour
(Tokyo), perhaps the most critical deceptive Japanese transmission was picked
up by the Americans. Cavite heard Akagi and an unidentified station (call sign 8
RO TA), perhaps a maru, on a bearing of 27 degrees, placing them near Sasebo.
These call signs were heard on the same tactical frequency, 4963 kilohertz, as
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before. The summary added that the carrier had been in contact with several
marus.86 Rochefort and Layton interpreted this new intercept differently; but
neither suspected that the transmission might have been phony. In testimony in
mid-1945 before the Hewitt Inquiry, one of the Pearl Harbor hearings con-
ducted by the Navy, Rochefort suggested that the radio activity on the tactical
circuit indicated that some sort of exercise or operation, like a fleet problem or
maneuver, was beginning.87 Layton, testifying in 1946 before the joint congres-
sional Pearl Harbor investigation, said he had told Admiral Kimmel that he
thought Akagi was talking to “some tanker Marus.”88 (Thirty years later, Layton
changed his story, claiming that Cavite had misidentified the call sign 8 YU NA
[it had not] and that the carrier had been in radio silence—thereby implicitly re-
fusing to acknowledge the Japanese deception.)89
On 1 December, the Japanese completely replaced the current service, or fleet,
call-sign system. This change hindered recovery of ship and formation identity
and, coming only a month after the previous, expected call-sign replacement,
led Layton and Rochefort to believe the Japanese were “preparing for active op-
erations on a large scale.”90 They also observed that four to five days prior to the
change the Japanese stations had been repeating old messages to the old call
signs, probably in an attempt to minimize undelivered traffic. The COMINT
summary reported “no change” with respect to the carriers.91
Despite the paucity of intercepted carrier communications—or, conversely,
and more likely, because of the very same handful of apparently valid intercepts
and DF bearings—U.S. naval intelligence estimates at all levels continued to
place the Japanese carriers in home waters, with one or two possibly near the
Marshall Islands. Layton, in his 1 December location report, placed at least four
carriers near Formosa and one in the Marshall Islands. When asked by Admiral
Kimmel about the other carriers, he said he had no current information but that
if pressed, he believed they were in the Kure area, probably refitting from opera-
tions six weeks earlier. 92 For Kimmel’s command, the main interest was the “all
important Japanese naval movements south,” whereas the carriers seemed to be
in Japanese waters.93
In Washington on the 1st, Commander McCollum published his weekly esti-
mate, placing all six of the Kido Butai carriers in Kyushu or Kure and the battle-
ships Hiei and Kirishima in Sasebo or Kure.94 This estimate was passed to the
Chief of Naval Operations. Down the hall from McCollum, Captain Richmond
Kelly Turner, head of War Plans, placed three Japanese carriers in the Mandates,
in his Daily Information Summary.95
For the next six days the Pacific Fleet’s radio intelligence and other intelli-
gence centers maintained the same estimate, that the majority of Japanese flat-
tops were in home waters while a few light carriers of the Carrier Division 3 or 4
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had deployed to the Mandates or near Formosa. The only additional intercept of
note was a DF bearing by Cavite of 30 degrees on Akagi’s call sign on 4 December
in the noon hour (Tokyo), which placed the carrier near Kure.96 Cavite’s 5 De-
cember TESTM reported an odd incident, that it had heard the fleet call sign YU
NE 8, which was not identified at the time. Why this call sign, which was in fact
the First Air Fleet’s call under the new system that became effective 1 December,
had been used is unclear; it might have been an oversight or an intentional twist
in the deception plan by the radio operator. The remainder of the reports and
summaries during this last week before the attack had little different to offer.
Station H on 3 December “believed the carriers are in Sasebo.” On 4 December
the carriers were plotted in the “vicinity of Kyushu,” and on 5 December Hypo
reported that “it is believed they [carriers] remain in the vicinity of Kyushu.”97
Layton’s COMINT summaries during this period did, however, note how “si-
lent” the carriers had become. The 2 December summary reported a “complete
blank of information on the carriers,” followed by “no information” on 3 De-
cember and by a 5 December report of “no traffic from the Commander Carri-
ers.” It seemed that the Japanese flattops had disappeared.98 The “silence” of the
carriers and the lack of traffic or information are relative statements. The “trans-
missions” that were believed to be emanating from the carriers had declined in
volume, and it was to this situation that Layton’s comments referred.
Yet the carriers’ silence did not unduly disturb Layton, Rochefort, or Kimmel.
Admiral Kimmel, in his statement to the 1946 congressional investigating com-
mittee, suggested the absence of Japanese carrier radio traffic after 1 December
was “not [an] unusual condition since during the six months preceding Pearl
Harbor when there were seven periods of similar uncertainty.”99 The fact that the
carriers were not originating radio traffic, he added, did not mean that the carri-
ers were on a secret mission.100 In 1944, Rochefort stated before the Hart Inquiry,
a wartime hearing on Pearl Harbor by the Navy, that while “there was great un-
ease over the lack of [carrier] traffic . . . [,] the inability to locate more . . . carriers
was not considered in itself, as a bad sign.”101 Layton added a technical nuance to
this rationalization: “Radio silence would have been a ‘give-off ’ if they had been
in the traffic, but they were not in the traffic at all though the fact that the carri-
ers were not addressed had led us to the belief erroneous as it was, that they were
unconcerned and were remaining in home waters.”102 Layton also considered
that silence might have indicated preparations for future operations.
Another possibility, according to testimony by Rochefort and Layton, was
that the Japanese had been holding the carriers back because they could not af-
ford to lose them in the initial fighting and would need them for the “decisive”
battle.103 That the Japanese had never before attempted such a large-scale radio
silence was discussed at the time, but the implications were not addressed. The
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few intercepts and less than a dozen DF bearings on various Japanese carriers
placing them in home waters only reinforced the above impression of the dispo-
sition of the Japanese flattops.
Meanwhile, as the Striking Force moved closer to Hawaii, Japanese radio in-
telligence gathered up tidbits from American transmissions indicating that the
deception was holding. On 4 December the Japanese intercepted an urgent, pri-
ority message from the commander of the 14th Naval District (Hawaii) to a
number of ships and local commands. Although the Japanese analysts could not
read the message, they believed that it might have been related to the sighting of
an oil slick from a submarine. The Japanese had seen this type of message a
month earlier. However, there was no evidence that the Striking Force had been
compromised, and this reassurance was broadcast to it.104 Through 6 December,
Japanese radio intelligence detected no special alerts. Patrol planes continued to
fly south of the islands, and a few had deployed to Midway and Johnston islands.
Aboard Akagi, the Japanese team monitoring the Honolulu commercial radio
stations detected no evidence of an alert in the American fleet. The path was
clear.
On the morning of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Cavite took a bearing on what
it believed was Akagi and reported that the flagship of the First Air Fleet was in
the area of the Nansei Islands, south of Kyushu. This item was reported to
Kimmel’s command just as the first wave of torpedo and dive-bombers hit the
anchored American fleet.105
In Washington, just about three hours before the attack, Secretary of State
Cordell Hull met with Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Secretary of the
Navy Frank Knox to review the latest Japanese diplomatic messages and intelli-
gence. Among the papers in their folders was a report on the location of combat
ships of nations around the world, including Japan. Compiled by the Office of
Naval Intelligence, the report combined recent information that, in turn, pri-
marily relied on radio intelligence reports from Hawaii and the Philippines. It
placed all six carriers and the two battleships of the Striking Force in either
Sasebo or Kure.106
About six hours later, after the Japanese attack, American naval radio monitors
on Oahu intercepted the Kido Butai’s first transmission since mid-November—a
message from the commander of the First Air Fleet aboard Akagi to its supply
train organizing a refueling rendezvous. But efforts to pursue the Japanese went
awry, because the U.S. Navy’s DF equipment could not discriminate between the
transmission’s “front and rear azimuth”—that is, whether the transmission had
come from north or south of Pearl Harbor. Layton would say later that Kimmel
eventually decided to send search planes to the south, because of earlier intelli-
gence of possible carriers in the Marshall Islands.107
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In early 1941, Admiral Yamamoto’s chief of staff, Admiral Shigano Fukudome,
speculated about the plan to attack Pearl Harbor: “But to carry the war to the
threshold of the enemy’s power, he must catch the fox unaware.” The radio si-
lence and deception plan supporting the Pearl Harbor Striking Force worked as
well as any of the Japanese planners could have hoped. The American command
at Pearl Harbor was caught totally unaware. Even the last-moment discovery of a
Japanese minisubmarine could not crack the conventional assessment by the
Americans that the Japanese navy was set in its prewar defensive posture. Ameri-
can naval intelligence held to this view largely because the Japanese radio silence
and deception supplied seemingly valid intelligence that substantiated it.
The individual techniques of the denial and deception parts of the plan
would never have worked as effectively had it not been for the complete change
in Japanese strategy and the organization of the carrier force carried out under
Admiral Yamamoto in early 1941. U.S. naval intelligence missed that change and
clung to the opinion that Japan’s navy would act as it had exercised over the pre-
vious decade—the carrier force would remain with the bulk of the Combined
Fleet awaiting the American Navy’s move across the Pacific.108 In late 1941 the
intelligence officers and analysts in Cavite, Pearl Harbor, and Washington inter-
preted the carriers’ seeming inaction and radio silence, as well as the occasional
intercepts and DF bearings of carrier transmissions, in that light—as indica-
tions that they were still in home waters, awaiting orders or preparing for the
probable foray against Japan by the Pacific Fleet.
Even the fact that relatively few deceptive transmissions were intercepted by
the Americans—a dozen at best—may have worked in favor of the Japanese.
Such limited intelligence would not move the Americans from their conclusion
that the carriers were still in Japanese waters. The impression the deceptive
transmissions created moved right up the chain of American naval intelligence
reporting—from field-site messages to fleet summaries to the estimates created
in the intelligence and planning staffs of the Navy Department—and was pre-
sented to the leadership of the Roosevelt administration as late as the morning
of the attack. In a sense, Joseph Rochefort was correct in that there was an ele-
ment of “self-deception” here. The self-deception, though, was grounded in in-
telligence that seemed valid within the context of presumed Japanese strategy.
The only problem for the Americans was that Yamamoto had changed the script.
In postwar testimony before the various Pearl Harbor hearings, Rochefort,
Layton, and others suggested that they had not been certain at the time of Pearl
Harbor about what the radio intelligence implied about the carriers’ actions. Yet
nowhere do their prewar reports reflect any question, doubt, or suspicion about
the validity of any of the intercepts or bearings. If there was doubt or
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uncertainty, it arose because the carriers were not heard for a few days. Layton
and Rochefort later admitted that there had never been any sense that the carri-
ers might be involved in a surprise attack. In any case, their conclusions about
the location of the carriers in Japanese waters were accepted at Pacific Fleet
Headquarters in Pearl Harbor and in the Chief of Naval Operations staff in
Washington. In the weeks leading to 7 December, all levels of American naval in-
telligence unanimously reported to their seniors that the main Japanese carrier
forces were at their bases in Japan.
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EASTERN EXIT
Rescue “. . . From the Sea”
Gary J. Ohls
Throughout the decade of the 1990s, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps spentconsiderable time and energy attempting to define their roles in a new secu-
rity environment created by the end of the Cold War. The decline of Soviet
power, accentuated by large cutbacks in military spending and a withdrawal
from Central and Eastern Europe, left the United States without a peer competi-
tor—politically, diplomatically, or militarily—on the world scene.1 As ideas and
concepts churned throughout the Department of Defense, the Navy and Marine
Corps issued a series of strategic and operational concept papers that defined
the new security environment along with the roles and missions of the sea ser-
vices. The Department of the Navy issued the most relevant of these documents
during the first half of the 1990s.
Perhaps the most important paper to address post–Cold War security con-
cerns was the September 1992 document entitled “. . . From the Sea: Preparing
the Naval Service for the 21st Century.” This concept paper clearly identified a
new direction for the naval services and defined a combined vision for the
Navy and Marine Corps.2 Unlike some earlier efforts, “. . . From the Sea” be-
came widely influential within the naval services and throughout the Depart-
ment of Defense.3 Among other things, it expressed
the expeditionary nature of the post–Cold War mis-
sion for both the Navy and Marine Corps while cap-
turing the strategic temper of the time. It also
reiterated the uncertainty that existed within the op-
erational environment as leaders attempted to
recalibrate their thinking.4 But if uncertainty existed
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at the operational and strategic levels in the minds of some, “. . . From the Sea”
clarified the direction for the sea services during that period and for the
near-term future. It unequivocally directed the Navy and Marine Corps team to
provide the nation with “Naval Expeditionary Forces—Shaped for Joint Opera-
tions—Operating Forward from the Sea—Tailored for National Needs.” Its stra-
tegic message emphasized the shift “away from open-ocean warfighting on the
sea toward joint operations from the sea.”5 The word “from” constituted the key
term in this new naval concept statement and thereby elevated the role of the
U.S. Marine Corps within the larger naval mission of the time.6 Yet even as naval
thinkers codified in their policy statements the concepts of littoral-focused ex-
peditionary warfare and sea-based forward presence, the Navy and Marine
Corps embodied these concepts through numerous incursions in Somalia, on
the Horn of Africa.7
Among other things, “. . . From the Sea” emphasized the importance of unob-
trusive forward presence—as opposed to the forward defense concept of the
Cold War—and the flexibility of sea-based forces. That meant that naval expedi-
tionary forces could not only come from the sea and return to the sea but also be
sustained from the sea. This approach offers policy flexibility, because sea-based
expeditionary forces can project either power or assistance ashore yet do not en-
croach on the sovereignty of nations while at sea.8 Once ashore, naval expedi-
tionary forces present a relatively small “footprint,” because their support is
based at sea, thereby reducing exposure, vulnerability, and host-nation resent-
ment.9 By concentrating on the littoral regions of the world and recognizing the
importance of power projection and maneuver from the sea, “. . . From the Sea”
reinforced the importance of the Navy and Marine Corps team as an integrated
element of sea power.10
In January 1996, the Marine Corps issued a document that augmented “. . . From
the Sea”; it was entitled “Operational Maneuver from the Sea,” or, as it became
known, simply OMFTS. Although the paper was published after the last Ameri-
can incursion in Somalia, its ideas and concepts expressed were greatly influ-
enced by those operations as well as other actions occurring in the early 1990s.11
Many officers within the Navy and Marine Corps contributed to the develop-
ment of these various concepts, but one of the earliest inputs to OMFTS resulted
from the experiences of Major General Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., during Operations
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and in the evacuation of the American em-
bassy in Mogadishu, Somalia—Operation EASTERN EXIT. In a 1991 memoran-
dum to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Jenkins emphasized that future
operations—either combat or humanitarian—should involve very rapid,
long-range insertions at points along the coastline where gaps in coastal de-
fenses would permit the avoidance of enemy strength. Speed of maneuver and
1 2 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
132
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss4/1
flexibility in the location of the launching point (that is, distance from the shore-
line) constituted key elements of Jenkins’s precepts. Although this approach
would ultimately require development of new equipment, it also involved a new
application of existing systems and a change in the mind-sets of leaders. He sug-
gested the concept be named “Maneuver from the Sea,” or perhaps “Maneuver
War from the Sea.”12 Five years later, the Commandant published the OMFTS
concept paper, which included all of Jenkins’s ideas. The concepts of “. . . From
the Sea”and OMFTS are clearly demonstrated in the series of incursions into So-
malia early in the last decade of the twentieth century. The first of those events—
known as Operation EASTERN EXIT—proved to be as dramatic as it was
proficient.
During December 1990 the eyes of the world and the attention of its leaders fo-
cused on the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. For months, the United States
had been building a strong naval and military presence throughout the region in
response to Saddam Hussein’s 2 August 1990 attack upon and occupation of Ku-
wait. Under the leadership of vice admirals Henry H. Mauz, Jr., and Stanley R.
Arthur, NAVCENT (that is, the naval component of U.S. Central Command)
had created a force in excess of a hundred ships, the largest American fleet as-
sembled since World War II.13 The buildup had begun under Admiral Mauz and
continued with Arthur, who assumed command of NAVCENT just six weeks be-
fore the 15 January 1991 deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Despite
that cutoff date, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Frank Kelso II,
did not consider war to liberate Kuwait as imminent and chose to implement the
already-planned change of command at NAVCENT on 1 December 1990. Gen-
eral H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander in chief of Central Command, con-
sidered Arthur one of the most aggressive admirals he knew and interposed no
objection. Additionally, Arthur had considerable experience within this opera-
tional area, having created the post of NAVCENT back in 1983.14
When Arthur took command of NAVCENT in December 1990, Rear Admiral
John B. “Bat” LaPlante commanded its amphibious element, which would ulti-
mately consist of thirty-one ships, loaded with two Marine expeditionary brigades
(MEBs) and one special-operations-capable Marine expeditionary unit (MEU
[SOC])—roughly seventeen thousand Marines. LaPlante’s Marine counterpart,
Major General Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., commanded both the 4th MEB and, as senior
Marine officer afloat, the overall Marine landing force, which ultimately included
5th MEB and 13th MEU (SOC).15 In the language of doctrine, LaPlante served as
Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and Jenkins as Commander, Land-
ing Force (CLF).16 (The Marine element afloat under Jenkins’s command should
not be confused with the I Marine Expeditionary Force—I MEF, pronounced
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“One MEF”—ashore, under Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer; it had a differ-
ent mission and reporting structure.)17 The primary role of LaPlante as Com-
mander, Task Force (CTF) 156, the amphibious task force, and Jenkins as CTF 158,
commanding the embarked Marines, involved preparing for an amphibious as-
sault against Iraqi positions on the Kuwaiti coastline in the upcoming Operation
DESERT STORM. This required planning and operational rehearsals, the capstone
event being a major landing exercise in Oman during late January 1991, desig-
nated SEA SOLDIER IV. This rehearsal included the entire force under LaPlante and
Jenkins, and it would constitute the largest amphibious landing since Exercise
STEEL PIKE in October 1964.18
Schwarzkopf often impressed on Arthur the importance of convincing Iraqi
commanders that an amphibious landing would be part of any future war for
Kuwait.19 Although the threatened landing was intended primarily as a decep-
tion, LaPlante and Jenkins needed to prepare for an actual assault landing
should the course of war so dictate. With proper training, including large-scale
rehearsals, the amphibious force would be capable of both deception and com-
bat.20 The importance of this exercise, coupled with firm arrangements coordi-
nated through Omani and U.S. State Department representatives, caused both
Arthur and LaPlante to consider the exercise dates for SEA SOLDIER IV as fixed
and definite. They also believed that the entire amphibious force must partici-
pate in the landing, to achieve NAVCENT training objectives.21 The diversion of
ships or Marines for any cause—no matter how important—would disrupt their
planning and degrade combat readiness. This issue would influence the think-
ing of Arthur and LaPlante when conditions within Somalia necessitated an
American rescue mission in the days just preceding DESERT STORM.22
As events eventually played out, LaPlante and Jenkins did not conduct an am-
phibious landing during DESERT STORM. But as a deception, their operations
constituted the most successful undertaking since the Second World War.23 The
major reasons for its success include the degree to which the Navy and Marine
Corps prepared for the landing, especially the SEA SOLDIER IV rehearsal. Leaders
at Central Command also provided the American news media opportunities to
observe and report on the amphibious preparations. The film footage taken dur-
ing their visits to the fleet showed up on television newscasts throughout the pe-
riod leading up to the DESERT STORM ground attack. The fact that only the
highest levels of command knew the amphibious landing was actually a ruse
contributed as well. Even Jenkins—the senior Marine officer afloat—was not in-
formed, although he had suspicions for various reasons, including the constant
press coverage. The deception tied down five or six divisions (depending on the
time frame) along the coast of Kuwait and drew an Iraqi reaction every time
LaPlante and Jenkins made a move in the Persian Gulf.24 The key commanders
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believed that the hard training by the amphibious force during Operation
DESERT SHIELD—capped by SEA SOLDIER IV—established the credibility that
fooled Iraqi leaders.25
Amphibious Squadron 6 (PHIBRON 6), commanded by Captain Alan B.
Moser, had been among the first naval forces to sail to the Arabian Sea after Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait. Moser’s squadron consisted of five ships loaded with some
2,100 Marines from units of Jenkins’s 4th MEB. By January 1991 they had been
at sea over four months, conducting training and preparing for the looming bat-
tle with Iraq. Prior to deploying for DESERT SHIELD, Moser’s squadron had spent
only a few weeks in port at Norfolk, Virginia, following a routine Mediterranean
deployment.26 PHIBRON 6 was typical of the Navy and Marine forces that de-
ployed for DESERT SHIELD, in that its elements responded to the crisis on very
short notice and in various stages of training.27 But during their time at sea the
sailors and Marines of the amphibious task force conducted a series of training
exercises, including IMMINENT THUNDER and SEA SOLDIER I–III, and achieved a
high level of preparedness.28 Nevertheless, they urgently needed the training of
SEA SOLDIER IV to ensure their ability to conduct a large-scale landing if re-
quired.29 SEA SOLDIER IV was particularly critical because Jenkins’s landing
force consisted of three distinct elements (4th MEB, 5th MEB, and 13th MEU
[SOC]) that did not have a common higher headquarters. It amounted to a com-
mand roughly the size of a small Marine expeditionary force but without a MEF
headquarters to structure and direct it.30 Therefore, when LaPlante and Moser
received the warning order to prepare for an amphibious evacuation of the U.S.
embassy in Mogadishu, their immediate concern involved the new operation’s
impact on this critical exercise and subsequent combat landings should such ac-
tion become necessary during the impending war with Iraq.31
On 1 January 1991, as LaPlante increased the tempo of war preparation,
NAVCENT received an alert message indicating that civil war and internal clan
conflict in Somalia might endanger U.S. citizens and require a military response.32
This warning did not surprise Arthur, who had been monitoring message traffic
from Somalia and had noticed in it an increasing sense of urgency.33 The follow-
ing day, Ambassador James K. Bishop in Mogadishu requested military assis-
tance to evacuate Americans from the U.S. embassy there due to the chaotic
violence occurring throughout the city.34 The Pentagon immediately directed
Central Command to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) to
rescue American citizens from Somalia.35 Arthur tasked LaPlante with planning
the NEO and proposing a contingency task force to execute the mission.
LaPlante summoned Moser to a meeting on his flagship, the amphibious assault
ship USS Nassau (LHA 4), then in port at Dubai. Having limited knowledge of
conditions “on the ground” in Mogadishu, the two commanders envisioned a
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force capable of performing missions across the entire range of amphibious op-
erations, including both surface and air actions. (Only later in the planning pro-
cess did it become obvious that a surface evacuation across the beach would not
be practicable.) In addition to identifying the necessary amphibious ships and
Marines for the mission, they proposed the assignment of two destroyers, which
could provide fire support and electronic warfare capability, should that become
necessary.36
Despite the irregular nature of the fighting in Mogadishu, amphibious com-
manders were seriously concerned that sophisticated weapons systems might be
present, particularly within the government faction. During much of the 1970s
Somalia had been a Cold War ally of the Soviet Union and had received both
modern weapons and advisers.37 That relationship had soured and the Soviets
had eventually withdrawn their support, but American commanders needed to
consider the possibility that Cold War weapons—especially surface-to-air mis-
siles and electronic warfare equipment—remained in Somali hands and could
threaten their rescue mission.38 LaPlante therefore recommended a seven-ship
response force—four amphibious ships, two destroyer escorts, and one oiler—
to conduct the operation, under Moser’s command.39
Concurrent with LaPlante’s planning, Jenkins considered issues relating to
the landing force that would conduct the operation on the ground. He tasked
Colonel James J. Doyle, Jr., the commander of Brigade Service Support Group 4,
then located on the amphibious dock transport USS Trenton (LPD 14), to serve
as commander of the mission to Mogadishu. Jenkins instructed Doyle to create a
special-purpose command element—designated 4th MEB, Detachment 1—
aboard the amphibious assault ship (and helicopter carrier) USS Guam (LPH 9)
to plan the operation and exercise command and control during its execution.
Doyle relocated from Trenton to Guam, taking several key members of his Bri-
gade Service Support Group 4 staff, which he integrated with officers from vari-
ous headquarters elements to create an even more experienced, professional,
and eager group.40 Equally important, Guam’s commanding officer, Captain
Charles R. Saffell, Jr., and the Marine commander of troops aboard Guam, Lieu-
tenant Colonel Robert P. McAleer, along with their staffs, began planning for the
operation even before the arrival of Doyle and Moser. Once the two command-
ers arrived on Guam with their own skeleton staffs, they could take advantage of
work already advanced. The staff planning and subsequent execution thus
amounted to a collaborative effort among Navy and Marine officers who knew
their jobs, knew their doctrine and procedures, and in many cases knew each
other personally.41
Arthur recognized the importance of rescuing Americans in Somalia but did
not want to send seven ships to do the job. He viewed the action as strictly an
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extraction operation, to get people
out of and away from Mogadishu.
There would be no ongoing oper-
ation ashore in Somalia or afloat
in the Indian Ocean. At least, Ar-
thur hoped to limit the mission to
that role, because he needed all
his ships for DESERT SHIELD and
DESERT STORM—including the
critical SEA SOLDIER IV workup.
Once he sent ships out of the op-
erational area, Arthur and his
commanders knew, getting them
back could be a problem. For ex-
ample, the evacuees coming out
of Mogadishu would require transfer to a safe port. Could he bring them back to
Oman, or would he have to send his ships to other locations—such as Mombasa,
Kenya, or the island of Diego Garcia—even farther from the scene of action? Ad-
ditionally, commanders throughout the fleet remembered the 1990 evacuation
of Americans in Liberia, Opera-
tion SHARP EDGE, which had
lasted five months and ultimately
involved four ships and some
2,100 Marines. Not wanting to
degrade combat readiness in the
Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf any
more than absolutely necessary,
Arthur decided that a two-ship
amphibious task force with the right mix of helicopters and Marines could ac-
complish the mission in Somalia.42 Two of the amphibious ships at anchorage
near Masirah, Oman—Guam and Trenton—not only had the necessary configu-
ration but also were located nearest to the Horn of Africa.43 LaPlante assigned
these two ships to conduct the operation and sent Moser—whom he held in
high esteem and hated to lose—to act as commodore of the amphibious task
force.44
The need for this rescue mission to Somalia had resulted from the breakdown of
governmental control and subsequent social strife throughout that nation, espe-
cially in the capital city of Mogadishu.45 By 1989, twenty years of dictatorial rule
under President Mahammad Siad Barre had produced three substantial
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clan-based rebel factions, including the Somali National Movement (SNM), ac-
tive in northern Somalia; the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), primarily in
the south; and the United Somali Congress (USC), focused in Mogadishu and
central Somalia.46 Over the next two years, political turmoil became increasingly
fierce, spawning clan warfare and rampant criminal activity. As Siad Barre lost
grip on power in Somalia, the rebel elements further broke down into subclan
conflict, increasing the bloodshed and undercutting efforts at unification.47 In
early December 1990, conditions had deteriorated to the point that Ambassador
Bishop evacuated nonessential embassy personnel and called on all American
citizens to leave the country. He even sent his wife and daughter out of Somalia,
to underscore the seriousness of the situation and encourage others to depart.48
Most foreign missions in Mogadishu took similar actions as the fighting in-
creased and social disintegration worsened. Although not specifically targeted
by any Somali faction, the U.S. embassy and its staff often became the victims of
gunfire and random acts of violence.49
After meeting with the Somali president and prime minister in the closing
days of December, Bishop concluded that the government had neither a plan nor
the ability to control the growing crisis. As carnage and lawlessness spread, the
need to evacuate remaining Americans increased, while the ability to do so de-
creased. The situation constituted the kind of “chaos in the littorals” that the
OMFTS concept paper would later decry as a war of “all against all.”50 In re-
sponse, Bishop moved Americans into relatively secure areas in and around the
embassy, while Italian officials made a fruitless effort to arrange a cease-fire
among the factions. With the failure of this effort, the American ambassador re-
alized his options were narrowing, and on 2 January he requested military assis-
tance to evacuate the U.S. embassy. On the following day Bishop perceived that
conditions were so bad that only a helicopter-borne evacuation had any chance
of rescuing the remaining Americans from Mogadishu.51 His urgent request for
help received immediate attention in Washington and set in motion the plan-
ning and execution of Operation EASTERN EXIT, which came to be considered by
many a model for this type of action.52
In response to the Pentagon’s execution order for EASTERN EXIT, officers at
Central Command deployed two C-130 and one AC-130 aircraft to Kenya and
ordered Guam and Trenton to set sail toward Mogadishu. In reality, commanders
at Central Command had already initiated these actions, in anticipation of or-
ders from the National Command Authority. After meeting with LaPlante
aboard Nassau, Moser took five members of his squadron staff and four officers
from Tactical Air Control Squadron 12 to Masirah in a P-3 Orion and then
helicoptered aboard Guam.53 Doyle had already arrived, and the two com-
manders collocated their operations center in the ship’s Supporting Arms
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Control Center. Although this arrangement appears somewhat ad hoc, creat-
ing special-purpose organizations for various expeditionary actions is normal
for Marine and naval officers of the amphibious service.54 The officers assem-
bling on Guam to plan and execute this rescue mission had considerable experi-
ence in this type of operation, and many had worked together before.55 The
planning began immediately upon receipt of the warning order and continued
after the two ships departed Masirah just before midnight on 2 January 1991.56
With the amphibious force in motion, officers at Central Command and
NAVCENT continued to consider alternative methods for conducting the evac-
uation. In fact, various possibilities had been under consideration at all levels of
command from the beginning of the crisis, and it had not yet become clear that
only one option remained viable. Initially, the preferred course of action in-
volved sending aircraft with security detachments on board into the Mogadishu
airport and flying American evacuees out of the country. Several other foreign
missions had done exactly that during the last few days of December.57 But this
required a permissive environment, and leaders at Central Command came to
realize from Bishop’s messages that such conditions no longer existed.58 The em-
bassy could not even communicate with the Mogadishu airport to obtain per-
mission for landing evacuation aircraft, because the telephone lines were all
down. More important, the airport was nearly two miles from the U.S. embassy,
and Bishop did not believe Americans could move safely on the city streets, due
to the extreme violence. Central Command also considered the use of special
operations forces, going so far as to direct that six MH-53 Pave Low helicopters
with tanker support be prepared to conduct the evacuation.59 This option never
progressed beyond the initial concept, because the Pave Low helicopters were
preparing for the imminent launching of DESERT STORM.60 Additionally, the
special operations forces were heavily committed along the Iraqi border and in
the western desert looking for Scud missiles.61 It now became apparent that only
an amphibious evacuation by ship-based helicopters remained viable and of-
fered a prospect for success regardless of the situation on the ground.62
By 4 January, conditions had deteriorated so much that Bishop requested two
platoons of paratroopers be dropped to protect Americans until the amphibious
task force could arrive.63 Colonel Doyle and other commanders considered it a
bad idea, because the space available for a drop zone was so small that para-
troopers might be scattered outside the embassy. Such an operation also in-
creased the number of people requiring evacuation.64 More important, by the
time Bishop made his request events had outpaced its rationale: Moser’s task
force was nearing a position to launch its helicopters, sooner than Bishop had
expected, and the rescue team would likely arrive before paratroops could be
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delivered.65 Fortunately for all concerned, Schwarzkopf refused to authorize the
paratroop drop.66
When Guam and Trenton originally received orders to sail, they were located
in the northern Arabian Sea off the coast of Masirah, Oman, approximately
1,500 miles from Mogadishu. Guam had a top speed of twenty-four knots,
whereas Trenton could make about eighteen knots maximum. There was no re-
quirement to keep the ships together, and initially Guam steamed at near maxi-
mum speed, outpacing Trenton. Saffell received orders to slow to a more
fuel-efficient speed, with which he complied. But as the situation in Mogadishu
became clear, the ship resumed its initial speed. Neither Moser nor Saffell was
concerned about fuel usage, because they had plenty on board and could replen-
ish in Mombasa if necessary.67 In any case, it had become essential that the ships
close the distance to Somalia as fast as possible and that imperative trumped fuel
economy.
Planning and conducting operations had become second nature to Moser,
Doyle, their staffs, the officers of the ships, and the embarked Marines. In addi-
tion, existing doctrine, standing operating procedures, and training in rapid
planning techniques greatly facilitated their effort and ensured the prompt issu-
ance of well conceived orders.68 The question of when to launch the rescue force
remained under discus-
sion, but Bishop’s anx-
ious messages forced the
issue into the forefront.
While Moser and Doyle
prepared for the evacua-
t i o n i n Mo g a d i s h u ,
LaPlante and Jenkins—
exhibiting high confi-
dence in their subordi-
nates—monitored events
from Nassau and contin-
ued preparation for SEA
SOLDIER IV, scheduled to
begin in Oman on 19 Jan-
uary 1991.69
In the early morning
hours of 5 January 1991,
two Marine Corps CH-
53E Super Stallion heli-
copters lifted a small
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amphibious force from Guam’s deck and headed for Mogadishu, 466 miles to
the southwest.70 It was now clearer than ever that only the helicopter-borne am-
phibious option offered any hope for saving the Americans in time.71 The
CH-53Es, because they were designed to conduct in-flight refueling, had a
long-range insertion capability; they remain today the only U.S. heavy-lift heli-
copters that can fly into an uncertain environment at such a long distance.72 Al-
though assigned to Trenton, these two helicopters cross-decked to Guam to load
the evacuation force and then launch for Mogadishu.73 The Super Stallions car-
ried a sixty-man force consisting of forty-seven Marines from 1st Battalion, 2nd
Marines (an element of Jenkins’s 4th MEB), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
Robert P. McAleer, and four Marines from Doyle’s headquarters elements. It
also included a nine-man Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) team under Commander Ste-
phen R. Louma, USN.74 McAleer’s 1st Battalion had been the helicopter-borne
assault element of Regimental Landing Team 2 (RLT-2), composed primarily of
the 2nd Marine Regiment.75 As such, McAleer’s Marines had become very profi-
cient in helicopter operations from the many exercises and rehearsals con-
ducted at sea. Additionally, their predeployment training at Camp Lejeune,
North Carolina, had included noncombatant evacuation exercises.76
Doyle ordered McAleer to accompany his Marines into Mogadishu, while he
remained at sea, where he could keep close contact with Moser and have better
communications.77 In addition to assigning McAleer to command the Marines
and SEALs under Louma, Doyle appointed Lieutenant Colonel Willard D. Oats
as overall commander of the forward element.78 Oats would be the senior officer
on the ground in Mogadishu, working primarily with the ambassador after ar-
riving at the embassy. Major William N. Saunders served as the logistician for
the mission and specifically supervised the evacuation control center (ECC),
which would process evacuees and prepare them for departure.
Sending two lieutenant colonels, one Navy commander (Louma accompa-
nied the SEAL team), and a major in addition to the normal complement of offi-
cers and noncommissioned officers seems excessively top heavy. But Doyle
considered this “an unconventional operation with potentially extraordinary
consequences” and wanted a “few guys with gray hair” in the landing zone. Loss
of American life in the embassy at Mogadishu would distract the nation as it ap-
proached the critical point of war in the Persian Gulf. Additionally, Doyle clearly
remembered the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis and how it had constrained Ameri-
can action for 444 days. Either scenario could unhinge DESERT SHIELD and
DESERT STORM planning, resulting in unthinkable consequences.79
Essentially, Doyle organized the NEO team in a Marine air-ground task
force structure, as illustrated in the figure below. In Doyle’s organizational
plan, Oats functioned as the senior officer ashore, although McAleer held the
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same rank and commanded most of the Marines. Fortunately, command is-
sues never became a problem, despite the large number of high-ranking offi-
cers ashore, because Oats and McAleer tended to be of one mind throughout
the operation.80 Additionally, Bishop clearly understood his role in the oper-
ation and remained firmly in control of events throughout.81 The ambassa-
dor had been involved in the evacuation at Monrovia, Liberia (Operation
SHARP EDGE), a few months earlier and EASTERN EXIT clearly benefited from
his experience.82
While evaluating alternate courses of action, Moser and Doyle considered
launching the helicopters directly from their initial positions in the northern
Arabian Sea, some 1,500 miles from the target area. They again considered it
when the ships reached a point 890 miles away, but ultimately, as noted above,
they launched the aircraft from a distance of 466 nautical miles.83 In addition to
Bishop’s distressed calls for help, a number of issues contributed to the decision
to send the helicopters at this juncture, including in-flight refueling require-
ments, the availability of tanker support, the arrival time over Mogadishu, and
the availability of AC-130 gunships to provide cover.84 Anticipating the need for
in-flight refueling, Arthur had earlier contacted U.S. Air Force representatives at
Central Command and learned that they could not provide tanker support, due
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to other commitments. He had then approached Major General Royal N. Moore,
commanding general of the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, and arranged for Marine
Corps KC-130 tankers to refuel the Super Stallions.85 This proved challenging
enough, as the 466-nautical-mile flight meant refueling twice, over open water
at night, by pilots who had not recently practiced the procedure.86 The first refu-
eling would enable the helicopters to arrive at Mogadishu, and it occurred at a
point that would allow the helicopters to return to Guam should the effort prove
unsuccessful. The second refueling provided sufficient fuel for locating the em-
bassy and ensuring that the outbound flight could clear the Somali coastline.87
In the event, aerial refueling proved difficult, for a variety of reasons. The lack
of night-vision capability in the KC-130 tankers (one pilot in each of the
CH-53Es wore night-vision goggles) made it difficult for their crews to see the
helicopters at the rendezvous point. It had been over a year since the helicopter
pilots practiced refueling, not having anticipated any such requirement during
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. They had even taken the refueling probes
off their aircraft, making it necessary to reinstall them prior to takeoff. Fortu-
nately, Captain Saffell was himself an aviator and was acutely attuned to the
problems and risks of nighttime refueling over an open ocean.88 He delayed the
helicopter launch until he saw the KC-130s on radar and then tracked both
groups to ensure a rendezvous.89 One helicopter experienced a fuel leak while re-
fueling, which the crew chief repaired in flight, but not before the Marines and
SEALs received a good dousing of gas. It appears that the air crew had not only
removed the probes but failed to service the equipment.90 The second refueling,
just fifty-three nautical miles from Mogadishu, went somewhat more smoothly
and provided enough fuel to locate the embassy and depart from Mogadishu. Yet
another refueling would be required during the flight back to Guam, which
proved successful though problematic.91
Another source of problems during the flight to Mogadishu was navigation,
because the Omega navigation system on the CH-53Es could not always acquire
the three land-based signals it needed. The part of the Indian Ocean in which the
task force operated had dead spaces, resulting in inconsistent fixes.92 As a result,
the pilots relied on dead reckoning (based on preflight calculations),
pathfinding support from the KC-130 refuelers, and positive control from the
ships while within radar range.93 When the Omega could obtain fixes, the pilots
used them as backups.
Launching beyond 466 miles would have multiplied the problems faced by
the pilots in conducting the long-range insertion due to the additional refueling
requirements and navigational complications. Conversely, waiting for a closer
departure point would very likely have proved disastrous for the embassy per-
sonnel, as local conditions continued to worsen. In retrospect, it seems that
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Moser, Doyle, and the planners of EASTERN EXIT aboard Guam calculated the
launch point just about right.94
After receiving the last inbound refueling and a final fix on their position
from the KC-130s, the helicopter pilots began their approach into the city. If
navigating across part of the Indian Ocean had been difficult, locating the em-
bassy proved equally vexing. The initial information available during the plan-
ning phase regarding the location and configuration of the compound proved to
be out of date and inaccurate.95 A Marine warrant officer who accompanied
Doyle from Trenton had served on the Marine security guard detachment in So-
malia several years earlier, and he pointed out that the embassy had moved in-
land from the position indicated on their maps and planning documents.96
Updated coordinates and an aerial photograph were received later in the plan-
ning process and proved helpful in identifying the new embassy location. They
also eliminated any residual consideration of landing over the beach with sur-
face forces, because the Marines would likely have had to fight their way across
Mogadishu, and American leaders wanted to avoid becoming involved in Soma-
lia’s civil war. Despite updated information, the embassy compound proved dif-
ficult to identity from the air, particularly at low altitude in the early morning
light.97 The pilots spent nearly twenty minutes flying over Mogadishu and even-
tually made a second approach from the sea before finding their objective.98
As the Super Stallions arrived over the U.S. embassy at approximately 0620 in
the morning of 5 January, the compound was receiving a large volume of gun-
fire, and some 150 Somalis with ladders had gathered at one of the embassy
walls.99 Flying low into the cantonment area, the helicopters scattered the assem-
bled miscreants and landed within the embassy grounds.100 The Marines disem-
barked and established a perimeter to defend the compound and protect
subsequent evacuations.101 The SEAL team assumed responsibility for protect-
ing the ambassador and reinforced the Marine security guard detachment (Ma-
rines permanently stationed at the embassy, as opposed to those arriving in
helicopters) protecting the chancery building.102
The two helicopters remained on the ground for approximately one hour, as
an Air Force AC-130 gunship loitered overhead to gather intelligence and offer
fire support if required. The Super Stallions took off for their return flight to
Guam—now some 350 miles away—with sixty-one evacuees, including all non-
official Americans in the compound; the ambassadors from Nigeria, Turkey, and
the United Arab Emirates; and the Omani chargé d’affaires.103 The original plan
called for the CH-53Es to return to Guam and bring a second echelon of Marines
into the embassy; Oats believed he needed another forty-four Marines to ensure
security and process the evacuees efficiently and effectively. But when the two
CH-53E helicopters departed with the evacuees, it would be a one-way trip.
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After another difficult refueling in route, the Sea Stallions landed on the deck of
Guam just under eight hours after their initial departure from the ship. They
would not return to Mogadishu with reinforcements but rather fly to Trenton,
where their role in the mission ended.104
Doyle did not perceive a direct threat against the evacuation force in
Mogadishu and, in conjunction with Moser, chose not to dispatch additional
Marines.105 Sending in more troops implied a longer operation and increased
the number of people needing evacuation from the embassy. Although it was a
risky call, events once again bore out Doyle’s judgment. Even had Doyle wanted
to insert the additional Marines, he would not have been able to do so with the
CH-53Es, because their crews were exhausted from the wearing flight in and out
of Mogadishu and not yet capable of another demanding mission. With the
Super Stallions back on Trenton, Marine CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters stationed
on board Guam would carry out subsequent evacuations, once the ships
brought them within range of the embassy.106
Meanwhile, Marines and embassy employees in Mogadishu prepared for subse-
quent evacuations, although the shortage of staff to operate the ECC severely hin-
dered the process. With conditions worsening in the city, security remained
marginal despite the arrival of the Navy and Marine Corps team. There had not
been enough Marines on the helicopters to process evacuees efficiently and provide
adequate security as well.107 This had motivated Oats to request the forty-four addi-
tional Marines. He did not want to weaken perimeter security by using McAleer’s
Marines in the ECC but eventually felt it necessary to do so. The final decision not to
send more troops into Mogadishu forced Bishop, Oats, and the other hard-pressed
Americans to complete their tasks with the personnel on hand.108 Doyle realized
that Oats’s job was difficult, but absent a concerted effort to storm the embassy he
felt another high-risk insertion flight could not be justified.109
Conditions worsened throughout Mogadishu, and consular representatives
from numerous nations sought refuge in and evacuation through the American
embassy. Bishop at first required foreign nationals to make their own ways to the
embassy, but when the Soviet ambassador declared that he and his remaining
staff would require assistance, Bishop agreed to escort them with permanent
embassy security personnel. To augment this force he contracted the Somali po-
lice, under a Major Sayed, who agreed to support the effort for a fee. The ambas-
sador used a similar approach in escorting members of the British mission into
the American embassy.110 On one occasion, a team of Marines, SEALs, and em-
bassy security personnel ventured into Mogadishu in hardened vehicles to res-
cue twenty-two people from the Office of Military Cooperation and return
them safely to the embassy grounds.111 The twenty-two included Colonel David
O H L S 1 3 9
145
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2008 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008
Stanley, the chief of the office, along with the ambassador from Kenya and mem-
bers of his family and staff.112
The understaffed ECC established by Saunders on the embassy grounds
worked hard to identify and process evacuees under difficult circumstances.
Since augmentation of the evacuation force had been denied, Oats utilized
members of the embassy staff along with, as noted, some of McAleer’s Marines
to provide administrative help (checking identities, screening potential evacu-
ees, creating manifests, etc.), as best they could. Although ultimately successful,
the preparation of evacuees for movement out of Mogadishu fell far short of
ideal, causing problems at the departure site and aboard the ships—particularly
in identifying and accounting for authorized evacuees.113 As the Marines within
the embassy struggled with their problems, the officers and crews of Guam and
Trenton began addressing the needs of evacuees. This included establishing a
medical triage station, arranging berthing for both genders, caring for children,
protecting individual property, accounting for evacuees by nationality and sta-
tus, and providing food and clothing, while at the same time supporting opera-
tions ashore.114
As night approached on 5 January, Marine CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters—
flying in four waves of five aircraft each—commenced evacuation operation off
the decks of Guam, now positioned approximately thirty miles at sea. To mini-
mize the risk of hostile fire, all evacuation flights by the Sea Knight helicopters
occurred at night, with the embassy compound darkened. The Marine pilots
and infantrymen used night-vision devices.115 Even with such equipment flight
operations at night in an uncertain environment can be very dangerous, but the
Marines believed they had better control of these complications than they would
have had over the hostile elements that freely operated during daylight.116 The
evacuation started smoothly until Major Sayed, who had earlier assisted in the
transportation of foreign consular personnel into the American embassy, sud-
denly arrived with two trucks full of soldiers. Carrying a radio and hand gre-
nade, Sayed demanded that the evacuation cease immediately—his government
had not approved the flights.117 Bishop and Oats refused to halt the operations,
and the ambassador ultimately persuaded the Somali officer not to interfere.118
Bishop accomplished this through skillful negotiation, the help of several thou-
sand dollars, and the keys to an embassy automobile of Sayed’s choice. In the
process, Bishop managed to take possession of the major’s radio, to prevent him
from calling antiaircraft fire on the departing helicopters.119
This incident created some confusion in the last evacuation waves, because
Bishop insisted on remaining in the compound so as to be available to handle
such problems through the end of the evacuation. He and his security team had
been scheduled to depart in the third wave, but his decision to remain to the end
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meant that only four helicopters on the third wave were full and departed as
planned. The fifth helicopter remained on the ground until the arrival of the
fourth wave. Having an extra helicopter in the final wave created confusion,
causing inaccuracies in the serial manifests and the helicopter loading plan. That
confusion in turn nearly resulted in a small communications team’s missing the
last flight out of Mogadishu (the crew chief on one of the Sea Knights spotted
the Marines and placed them aboard his aircraft).120 Ultimately, all personnel
approved or designated for evacuation, including the entire NEO force, de-
parted safely and arrived on board Guam or Trenton.121 As the last helicopter de-
parted, a large mob entered the embassy grounds, looting and destroying
everything in sight. Well before sunrise on 6 January 1991, the last Sea Knight set
down on the deck of Guam and Ambassador Bishop declared the evacuation
complete.122
The final evacuation flight occurred without the support of the AC-130, be-
cause the gunship had detected a radar of the type associated with a Soviet-built
SA-2 surface-to-air missile site tracking it and had moved off station. The pres-
ence of SA-2 missiles confirmed the commanders’ concerns about the presence
of sophisticated weapons in Somalia. The SA-2 posed a definite threat to the
AC-130 aircraft, but Doyle had not been concerned for the CH-46 helicopters,
because he believed they would fly too low to be tracked by its radars.123
The amphibious evacuation in Mogadishu ultimately extracted 281 people,
including sixty-one Americans, thirty-nine Soviet citizens, seventeen British
citizens, twenty-six Germans, and various numbers from twenty-eight other na-
tions.124 This included twelve heads of diplomatic missions—eight ambassadors
and four chargés d’affaires. Unfortunately, Bishop had determined that none of
the many Somali foreign service nationals in the embassy compound could be
evacuated, although they had remained loyal. Bishop did not even have enough
cash to pay all their wages due. Though they faced an uncertain future, the So-
malis accepted their fate, remained on their job to the end, and never attempted
to rush the helicopters or create serious problems for the evacuation effort.125
The influx of civilians on Guam and Trenton severely taxed their resources
and ability to provide support, of course. But Saffell described the response of
the sailors and Marines as “awesome,” noting that they gladly gave berthing
space and personal items to ease the plight of the evacuees.126 Additionally, the
Guam’s medical staff treated one evacuee with an abdominal gunshot wound
and another with a knife wound.127 Also, the Sudanese ambassador’s wife gave
birth to a baby boy on board Guam. (In keeping with an old Navy tradition, the
lad’s name was engraved on the inside of the ship’s bell.)128
On 11 January Trenton and Guam off-loaded their passengers in Muscat,
Oman, without fanfare and resumed their duties in support of DESERT SHIELD
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and DESERT STORM. Bishop had wanted the evacuees transported to Mombasa,
but Schwarzkopf ordered the ships back into the area of impending conflict in
the Gulf of Oman.129 Omani officials were at first reluctant to accept the refu-
gees, but stellar work by the American ambassador in Oman persuaded them to
do so. Before taking leave of the sailors and Marines, Ambassador Bishop praised
their competence and professionalism, concluding his remarks by saying, “Few
of us would have been alive today if we had been outside your reach. It was only
due to your efforts that we made it.”130
In many ways, EASTERN EXIT is a textbook example of how to conduct an am-
phibious evacuation. The Commandant of the Marine Corps at the time, Gen-
eral Alfred Gray, referred to it as a “very complex and somewhat dangerous
mission.”131 Gray should know about complex and dangerous NEOs, since he
played a prominent role in the evacuation of Saigon in April 1975.132 Although
Gray also called the mission “flawless,” many problems arose throughout the ac-
tion. But the professionalism of Marines and sailors overcame those obstacles
with solutions sufficient to ensure success.133 The operation demonstrated that
the amphibious capability of the United States could respond to nearly any exi-
gency virtually anywhere in the world, even when distracted by larger and more
important missions, such as DESERT SHIELD and the upcoming DESERT STORM.
Navy and Marine Corps leaders considered EASTERN EXIT a demonstration of
the excellence of the sea services and an example of the value of amphibious ca-
pability within the expeditionary environment. The operation also demon-
strated that modern amphibious actions depend as much on aviation assets—
particularly helicopters—as on traditional surface landing vehicles. This is not
surprising, considering that the U.S. Marine Corps pioneered the military use of
helicopters for a variety of applications, including vertical assault during the Ko-
rean War.134
As part of the complete revision of Marine Corps doctrine that occurred dur-
ing the second half of the 1990s, General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant from
1995 to 1999, used EASTERN EXIT as a case study for understanding and imple-
menting expeditionary concepts in the emerging new world order.135 More im-
portant, EASTERN EXIT made clear that the professional Navy and Marine Corps
team that had matured over several hundred years continued to provide Ameri-
can political and diplomatic leaders with a range of military options unknown
anywhere else in the world, or at any other time in history.136 The commitment
of forces to EASTERN EXIT had no impact on the subsequent war with Iraq. After
off-loading the evacuees in Oman, the entire task force returned to normal duty
and fully participated in SEA SOLDIER IV, the important final workup for DESERT
STORM.137 As subsequent events showed, Schwarzkopf ’s air and ground war
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proved sufficient to defeat Saddam Hussein’s forces—with a little help from the
amphibious feint of LaPlante and Jenkins. The ability to move seamlessly from
DESERT SHIELD to EASTERN EXIT to SEA SOLDIER IV and on to DESERT STORM
clearly illustrates the capabilities needed to implement the operational and stra-
tegic concepts espoused in “. . . From the Sea” and “Operational Maneuver from
the Sea.”
EASTERN EXIT received little press coverage due to the larger events of
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, yet many in the Department of Defense ap-
preciated its significance. Not only did the Marine Corps include it as a case
study in subsequent doctrinal publications, but the Navy also mentioned it in
Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare.138 Captain Moser assisted in the
lessons-learned process by preparing an instructional seminar that became part
of the curriculum at the Armed Forces Staff College, in Norfolk, Virginia.139
Lieutenant Colonel McAleer also created a briefing, which he presented to the
Landing Force Training Commands at the amphibious bases in Little Creek, Vir-
ginia, and Coronado, California.140 More notably, he briefed the material to Cap-
tain Braden J. Phillips, Colonel Michael W. Hagee, and the 11th MEU (SOC)
staff during their predeployment training at Camp Pendleton, California. As
commanders of Amphibious Squadron 1 and 11th MEU (SOC), respectively,
Phillips and Hagee led the next Navy and Marine Corps team to implement the
precepts of “. . . From the Sea.” In August 1992, the United States returned to So-
malia to assist in humanitarian relief during operation PROVIDE RELIEF—a pre-
cursor to Operation RESTORE HOPE. That September, the PHIBRON 1 and 11th
MEU (SOC) team deployed to the Indian Ocean and returned to the Horn of Af-
rica as the United States attempted to help a nation in crisis.141
After the American evacuation of its embassy in Mogadishu, conditions had
continued to deteriorate in Somalia. To some extent, the large quantities of
weapons and ammunition previously supplied by the Soviet Union and later by
the United States fueled the fighting. As rebel factions gained ground against
Siad Barre, they often captured armories and munitions supply centers with
which to arm their forces and allies.142 By late January 1991—about two weeks
after the evacuation and just as General Schwarzkopf began the air operations
phase of DESERT STORM—forces under Mohamed Farah Aideed drove Siad
Barre from Mogadishu and, by May 1992, into exile in Kenya and Nigeria. Al-
though many factors contributed to the defeat of Siad Barre and the collapse of
his rule, Aideed was largely responsible for the final victory. He not only drove
Siad Barre out of Somalia but also defeated his three subsequent efforts to regain
control. Aideed believed this success earned him the right to lead the nation, but
other warlords disagreed. The clans could not unite to form a new government;
warfare continued, and chaotic conditions persisted. The extreme violence
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made food distribution difficult, creating critical shortages in many parts of So-
malia. Reports fostered an impression of widespread starvation, causing the
United Nations to request international intervention to alleviate suffering and
restore order. It was for this reason that, a year and a half after EASTERN EXIT,
American naval expeditionary forces would return to Somalia and once again
apply the concepts of “. . . From the Sea.”143
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BOOK REVIEWS
NEW INTERNATIONAL ENERGY ORDER
Klare, Michael T. Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy. New York: Metropolitan
Books, 2008. 352pp. $26
In this timely volume, Michael Klare,
author of thirteen books, including Re-
source Wars and Blood and Oil, provides
in-depth projections of global demand
and supply for all forms of energy, in-
cluding petroleum, natural gas, coal,
and uranium. A key theme is the con-
fluence of two troubling trends. The
first is the unprecedented height of fu-
ture energy demand (one estimate fore-
sees a 57 percent increase in global
energy consumption by 2030). China
and India are expected to account for
nearly half of this increase. “Peak oil” is
shorthand for the second trend. The
world has been “seeking more” and
“finding less.” “Easy oil” is displaced
with higher-cost “tough oil,” found in
unstable or inaccessible regions and
therefore more difficult or expensive to
extract. Other nonrenewable energy re-
sources show a similar trend. Further,
increasing carbon emissions make the
use of more abundant coal resources
problematic.
Klare assesses in detail the geopolitics of
energy region by region, with a replay
of “the Great Game,” as nations com-
pete for access, power, and control.
Russia’s rise as “an energy juggernaut”
under former president Vladimir Putin
is particularly impressive. Putin con-
cluded that energy was the key strategic
factor in securing Russia’s economic se-
curity, and as such must be com-
manded by the state. Klare details how
Putin successfully renationalized con-
trol of energy resources, with the value
of Gazprom (the largest Russian extrac-
tor of national gas in the world) rising
from $9 billion in 2000 to $250–$300
billion in 2006.
To avoid a replay of Cold War–like en-
ergy competition, Klare argues, cooper-
ation between nations is necessary—
and should begin between the United
States and China, which will account
for 39 percent of international energy
consumption by 2030. Proposals he dis-
cusses include developing petroleum al-
ternatives; increased industrial
efficiency; climate-friendly coal; and
collaborative efforts in these and other
areas with Russia, Japan, India, and Eu-
rope. Klare’s comprehensive assessment
of a “new international energy order”
will be invaluable to strategists as they
strive to better understand what is
155
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2008 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008




Smith, Paul. The Terrorism Ahead: Confronting
Transnational Violence in the Twenty-first Cen-
tury. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2007. 258pp.
$79.95
Paul Smith’s The Terrorism Ahead is a
superbly written blend of history, con-
temporary analysis, and personal reflec-
tion. It is the product of thorough
research and study plus a decade’s
worth of vigorous debate with an inter-
national cast of students, colleagues
(Smith is currently a professor at the
Naval War College), counterterrorism
practitioners, and academic specialists.
The author’s arguments thus merit seri-
ous and thoughtful consideration. As a
participant in many of these debates (I
am a former colleague of Smith’s, and
we did not always agree), I can attest to
the “trials by fire” to which the ideas
expressed in this book were subjected.
The Terrorism Ahead provides a com-
prehensive, balanced, yet succinct over-
view of the key contemporary debates
in terrorism studies. Smith skillfully ex-
amines terrorism in its wider historical,
geopolitical, and technological contexts.
This contextualization of the global en-
vironment in which terrorism lives and
evolves is the book’s great strength, and
what makes it a valuable contribution
to the literature.
Chapter 2, “Historical Evolution,” is
one of the best one-stop short histories
of terrorism in print. One might also
single out chapter 8, where Smith tack-
les terrorism financing and associated
legal issues. The closing chapter pre-
sents a compelling analysis of the “root
causes” debate and its implications for
U.S. policy, plus a thought-provoking
look at the future. In this chapter,
Smith argues that five conditions will
shape terrorism in the years ahead: de-
mography, globalization, transnational
crime, weak/failed states, and climate
change. Smith is one of the few people
working in terrorism studies to seri-
ously consider the implications of cli-
mate change.
Throughout the work, Smith also ex-
plains how changes in communications,
information, and weapons technologies
have helped shape the conduct of ter-
rorism. It would have been interesting,
therefore, if he had added a discussion
of emerging and predicted advances in
technologies—such as nanotechnology
and genetic engineering—that may pro-
vide future tools for terrorists.
All in all, The Terrorism Ahead is an en-
gaging, comprehensive, and thoughtful
consideration of the challenge of terror-
ism. It should find itself equally at
home on the bookshelves of specialists,
general readers, and students.
CHRISTOPHER JASPARRO
U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Quantico, Virginia
Cordesman, Anthony. Salvaging American De-
fense: The Challenge of Strategic Overstretch.
Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2007. 488pp. $49.95
Anthony Cordesman, current holder of
the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
at the Center for International and Se-
curity Studies in Washington, D.C., is
one of the most prolific defense analysts
in the United States today. Salvaging
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American Defense is much like the ex-
tant body of research produced by
Cordesman over the last few decades. It
is filled with information that is in-
tended to be comprehensive, even ency-
clopedic. Yet this approach can have its
drawbacks. The book’s subtitle prom-
ises to discuss “the challenge of strategic
overstretch” and its chapters are orga-
nized around ten specific challenges, yet
the author fails to offer a sustained ar-
gument about how to grapple with
them. Instead, the chapters offer
program-by-program vignettes,
military service–by–military service
comparisons, and agency-by-agency de-
scriptions of difficulties. Within the vi-
gnettes, comparisons, and descriptions
are piecemeal solutions—some of
which make an enormous amount of
sense, while others smack of improvisa-
tion or are contradictory to diagnoses
and solutions offered pages earlier.
Evaluating the individual parts of so
massive a work is difficult. Absent ex-
pert knowledge of an extremely wide
range of issues and programs, this re-
viewer is left to seek out those modest
areas of national security where he has
some competence or general insight.
Here the news is largely positive.
Cordesman’s discussions of U.S. Navy
force structure, policies, and programs
seem largely sensible, even when his
language is somewhat intemperate. It is
hard to argue with the author’s diagno-
ses and solutions when he uses the
words of public officials and military
officers, not to mention the analyses of
seasoned analysts, to underpin his argu-
ments. His account of military “trans-
formation” is reasoned, although in my
judgment Cordesman may be a bit too
enamored of the promised benefits of
transformation and too hopeful that the
national security establishment can
overcome what is perhaps the largest
problem with transformation: “It is
brutally clear that strategy and planning
documents that are not integrated with
force planning and long-term budgets
become hollow wish lists or—at the
minimum—more of a problem than
part of the solution.”
Like many defense experts, Cordesman
is not shy about offering recommenda-
tions to fix what is wrong with U.S. na-
tional security policy. In his final
chapter, he offers fourteen “major
changes,” all of which are ambitious.
Unsurprisingly, given the enormous
scope of these recommendations,
Cordesman offers few details about how
they might be implemented.
PETER DOMBROWSKI
Naval War College
Thornton, Rod. Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and
Response in the 21st Century. Hoboken, N.J.:
Wiley, 2007. 256pp. $69.95
Asymmetric warfare, although anything
but new, is among the current
political-military hot topics of the day.
The success of al-Qa‘ida in striking the
World Trade Center, and the difficul-
ties encountered by the United States
and its partner countries in achieving
stability and security in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, has convinced some observ-
ers that those who would wage
asymmetric warfare against powerful
states may now have the upper hand.
Other analysts, less willing to go quite
so far, agree that asymmetry will be a
notable facet of most military conflicts
for the foreseeable future.
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Unfortunately, discussions of asymmet-
ric warfare all too often devolve into ef-
forts to push pet programs or ideas,
attack or defend political leaders, and
substitute emotion for understanding.
Thankfully, Asymmetric Warfare is cut
from a different cloth. Dr. Rod Thorn-
ton, an authority on security issues at
King’s College London, has produced a
practical and useful primer on this im-
portant subject. In doing so, he also dis-
pels several common misconceptions,
including the ideas that asymmetric
means unequal, and that asymmetric
warfare is solely a tool of the weak.
While asymmetric warfare can be prac-
ticed by any actor, it is the modern ter-
rorist who creates the most concern.
Thornton takes a close look at terrorists
as adversaries and how “new” terrorists
differ from their historical predecessors.
He identifies three characteristics as
particularly important: an increased de-
gree of fervor, an increased ability to
implement attacks, and an increased
ability to cause mass casualties. The au-
thor takes the time to explain why these
changes have occurred and how they
might manifest themselves in future
attacks.
Thorton does not overlook the relation-
ship among terrorism and asymmetric
warfare and strategic communication.
In addition, he explores how an asym-
metric opponent would seek to win a
war through attacks on infrastructure
and the use of deception, electronic
warfare, and psychological operations.
Each of these issues is dealt with in
some detail.
Asymmetric Warfare is not a perfect
book. A deeper discussion of historical
examples of asymmetric warfare would
have been a powerful addition to the
work. It may also be that Thornton
overstates the vulnerabilities of some of
the unmanned systems he examines.
However, these flaws are minor at best.
Asymmetric Warfare is a valuable addi-
tion to current security-related litera-
ture. It is especially useful for readers
new to the field who are seeking a co-
gent and readable description of asym-
metric warfare, its various facets and
aspects, and potential methods that




Kamphausen, Roy, and Andrew Scobell, eds.
Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Explor-
ing the Contours of China’s Military. Carlisle, Pa.:
Army War College, 2007. 582pp. (Information
about free copies can be obtained at www
.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs.)
This edited volume combines high-level
inquiry into the larger purposes and di-
mensions of People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) reforms with fresh data that are
difficult to find elsewhere. Its overall
theme, the likely future dimensions and
missions of China’s military, is ad-
dressed in contributions from leading
experts in the field.
The chapters, organized by service, are
solidly grounded in Chinese sources and
knowledge of Chinese organizations. In
a characteristically sound overview of
China’s national military strategy, David
Finkelstein is scrupulous in his explana-
tion of the relative authority of various
Chinese military documents. Evan
Medeiros assesses that while Chinese nu-
clear doctrine has become increasingly
sophisticated (while remaining opaque
to foreign analysts, particularly in the
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area of “no first use”), “the development
of conventional missile doctrine is . . .
potentially incomplete.”
There is attention to both hardware and
software, with particular focus on the
human dimension of PLA capabilities. In
a persuasive defense of the value of
open-source research, Dennis Blasko ex-
plains that the ground forces, which still
dominate the PLA, are modernizing and
undertaking new nontraditional mis-
sions, including domestic and interna-
tional humanitarian operations. While
restructuring and modernization are
likely to occupy the ground forces for
years, Blasko notes that salaries for many
PLA personnel doubled in 2006.
A wide range of possibilities is considered.
Phillip Saunders and Erik Quam offer
several alternative scenarios for PLA Air
Force (PLAAF) force structure, and in-
sights into the key factors that shape
them. In assessing future PLAAF opera-
tional concepts, Kevin Lanzit and Ken-
neth Allen state that the PLAAF is trying
“to become actively involved in managing
China’s military space program with an
emphasis on the informatization aspects.”
While the authors are careful to offer bal-
anced assessments of capabilities and limi-
tations, it is clear that dramatic new
possibilities are emerging for the PLA. In
his chapter on command, control, and tar-
geting, Larry Wortzel judges that PLA
“informatization” could be remarkably
rapid and successful. “PLA officers seem
convinced that using ballistic missiles to
attack naval battle groups is a viable con-
cept, and they obviously are actively pursu-
ing the capability,” Wortzel asserts, adding
that “the PLA will have near real-time re-
gional intelligence collection capability
from space in a few short years, if it does
not already have it.” On this note, Michael
McDevitt estimates that China “currently
has seven satellites in orbit that can con-
tribute to ocean surveillance.” China’s first
radar satellite, launched in 2006, “can
probably inspect objects as small as twenty
meters in length and is thus excellent for
identifying ships.” While Chinese nuclear-
powered ballistic-missile submarine
(SSBN) development faces a high barrier
to entry in terms of acoustic signature re-
duction, McDevitt judges, China’s navy
may be preparing “to arm nuclear attack
submarines with nuclear-tipped cruise
missiles.” Bernard Cole projects that, de-
spite current limitations in naval aviation
and training, “the PLAN of 2016–17, at
three times its present size, will dominate
East Asian navies, with the possible excep-
tion of the JMSDF [Japan Maritime
Self-Defense Force] . . . and will offer a very
serious challenge to the U.S. Navy when it
operates in those waters.”
In the final chapter, Ellis Joffe concludes
that the need to deter Taiwan from de-
claring independence has driven much
of China’s recent military moderniza-
tion, and Beijing is growing increasingly
confident in this regard. Yet Beijing re-
mains far from reaching its presumed
goal of achieving a “paramount position
in the East Asian region.” It is hoped that
this volume’s contributors will continue
to probe the possibility of such a transi-
tion occurring—with the understanding




Yoshihara, Toshi, and James R. Holmes, eds. Asia
Looks Seaward: Power and Maritime Strategy.
Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2008. 226pp. $49.95
As the first decade of the twenty-first
century draws to a close, the most
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comprehensive changes in global eco-
nomic activity, the global correlation of
military force, and relationships among
globally significant political actors are
taking place in Asia. The fact that so
many Asian nations rely heavily on
oceanborne commerce for petroleum is
but one reason why the course of these
developments must depend on how the
parties concerned exercise sea power.
Thus, Toshi Yoshihara and James
Holmes’s volume of essays by leading
academics on Asian nations’ experi-
ences and practices of maritime strategy
is timely. Yoshihara sets a high standard
for the other authors in his introduc-
tion, where he specifies issues he in-
tends for the work to address, and
identifies the key questions hanging
over contemporary Asian maritime af-
fairs with unusual clarity of thought
and equally exceptional clarity of
expression.
Different chapters address Yoshihara’s
questions from different perspectives.
chapter 2 presents a broad narrative of
Chinese maritime activity, while chap-
ters 3 and 4 present detailed historical
studies of Anglo-Japanese relations and
the U.S. Navy’s operations in the Pacific
region, respectively. The book then re-
turns to twenty-first-century concerns,
with chapters on the People’s Republic
of China’s (PRC) ongoing naval
buildup, the PRC’s oil tanker fleet, In-
dian maritime activity, Japanese mari-
time thought, and China’s maritime
relations with Southeast Asia.
All these chapters are relevant to
Yoshihara’s initial questions. The ques-
tions, however, raise more issues than
any book could possibly address. Read-
ers of Gabriel Collins’s study of the
PRC’s tanker fleet, for instance, are
likely to want a comparative analysis of
how other Asian countries transport
their oil. Chapters on India, Japan, and
Southeast Asia are invaluable, but Rus-
sia, the Republic of China, and the Re-
public of Korea surely deserve attention
as well. Numerous authors mention Al-
fred Thayer Mahan, but none explore
the points he raises in The Problem of
Asia and Its Effect upon International
Politics (Little, Brown, 1905). The Prob-
lem of Asia emphasizes the importance
of Africa and the Middle East to what
twenty-first-century writers might call
Asia’s sea lines of communication. A
chapter on the PRC’s trade and diplo-
matic activity in those regions could
have been revealing, whether or not the
author shares Mahan’s views. Since this
book could never have covered all as-
pects of Asian maritime strategy com-
pletely, Yoshihara might have helped
readers understand its particular contri-
bution by including a conclusion sum-
marizing the steps the authors had
taken toward that goal. Readers are,
however, almost certain to find this
book valuable in their own studies of
sea power in Asia.
THOMAS M. KANE
Director, Centre for Security Studies
The University of Hull
Oren, Michael B. Power, Faith, and Fantasy:
America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present.
New York: W. W. Norton, 2007. 800pp. $17.95
Michael Oren’s Power, Faith, and Fantasy
is an indispensable historical account of
America’s encounters with the volatile
Middle East. A renowned historian, Oren
fills a vacuum in the literature, as most of
it dates to the post–World War II era.
Oren begins by identifying the central
motifs (the “golden threads”) of Amer-
ica’s involvement in the region since the
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1700s. As he notes, “The most tangible
and pervasive of [these] themes is power.”
During the Barbary Wars, the United
States Navy displayed its newfound power
to good effect. The second theme is faith.
He portrays this in his description of the
countless American missionaries who
toiled under the harshest conditions. The
third theme is fantasy—that is, the re-
gion’s exotic and mysterious images and
stereotypes. Consistent throughout the
book is the discussion of how crucial the
U.S. Navy was to the region. Naval War
College readers will enjoy the insight into
the Navy’s earliest ventures and missions
in the Middle East.
In spite of the massive changes that have
occurred in the region since 1776 or in-
deed over the last century—the discovery
of oil, the two world wars, the Arab-
Israeli conflict, the peace process, and ter-
rorism—Oren makes a good case that to-
day’s problems between the United States
and its various Middle Eastern partners
and adversaries revolve around these
same intersecting threads. He emphasizes
in particular the dire need to make a shift
from “fantasy” to reality in U.S.–Middle
East relations generally.
This extensively researched book is well
written, comprehensive, and fascinating.
Given our dilemmas in U.S.–Middle East
relations today, policy makers and the




Bodansky, Yossef. Chechen Jihad: Al Qaeda’s
Training Ground and the Next Wave of Terror.
New York: HarperCollins, 2007. 464pp. $27.95
The importance to the global jihad of the
Chechen wars that have roiled the Cau-
casus region for more than fifteen years
is something Western commentators on
terrorism persistently underestimate. For
most Western observers, the battle for
Chechnya has more to do with tribal-
cum-national conflicts and human rights
abuses than fighting against the forces of
armed radical Islam. Russian claims that
it, too, is waging its own “war on terror”
(a view that held currency in the United
States only briefly after 9/11) now fall on
deaf ears. For most people outside the
former Soviet Union, the arduous Rus-
sian struggle against Chechen
mujahideen has evaporated from the
headlines and amounts to a forgotten
war.
This is unfortunate for many reasons,
not least that al-Qa‘ida considers the ji-
had in the Caucasus to be a major front
in its global campaign. The first
Chechen war (1994 to 1996) was a hu-
miliating debacle for Moscow that re-
sulted in the establishment of a
Chechen pseudostate, which soon fell
under the influence of Islamic radical-
ism. Al-Qa‘ida believed this to be a
clear win for its cause.
The second Chechen war, which began
in 1999 and coincided with the rise of
Vladimir Putin, presents a much differ-
ent picture. For all intents and pur-
poses, Russia has won—Moscow has
successfully reestablished its authority
over most of the breakaway region. For
al-Qa‘ida, by the same token, Chechnya
today is a much less promising venue
than it was a decade ago.
The continuing neglect of Chechnya in
the “terrorism studies” canon is, there-
fore, a problem. Chechnya has much to
teach Western counterterrorists about
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effective tactics, techniques, and proce-
dures against the mujahideen. Russia’s
trial-and-error efforts there could prove
important to Western audiences. A
good book on this subject is therefore
something very much to be desired.
Unfortunately, Yossef Bodansky’s
Chechen Jihad is not that book. The au-
thor is a prolific writer on terrorism in
general and its radical Islamic variant in
particular, but his viewpoint lacks per-
spective and subtlety. Bodansky’s treat-
ment of the Chechen conflict follows
his usual pattern of offering a detailed,
chronological narrative, veering into a
“you are there” account, devoid of any
real analysis. Moreover, the author
boasts of many unnamed sources in
Moscow’s security and intelligence
agencies that have given him the “real”
story to which others are not privy. The
reader is bluntly told that all is to be
taken on faith, with no endnotes, as is
customary in Bodansky’s writings, so as
to protect his sources. It is, therefore,
impossible to determine where the au-
thor gets his material or what its valid-
ity may be. In this connection,
Bodansky’s silence on many controver-
sies relating to Russian intelligence in
its struggle with the mujahideen is both
revealing and troubling.
In spite of all this, however, a close ex-
amination by anyone well versed in the
subject will reveal that most of
Bodansky’s information is in fact
gleaned not from clandestine meetings
in dark alleys but from (translated)
press accounts (it appears that
Bodansky knows none of the relevant
languages). In other words, the author
is relying on practices associated with
sensationalist journalism, not serious
analysis, much less scholarship.
Chechen Jihad is best left on the shelf; it
has nothing of substance to offer seri-
ous students of al-Qa‘ida and terrorism.
JOHN R. SCHINDLER
Naval War College
Scahill, Jeremy. Blackwater: The Rise of the
World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army. New
York: Nation Books, 2007. 480pp. $26.95
Jeremy Scahill, an investigative journal-
ist for The Nation, takes on Blackwater
and the privatization of war and secu-
rity with a vengeance. His fervor and
intensity, no doubt prized characteris-
tics in the world of investigative jour-
nalism, are on display here in spades.
Scahill deconstructs the legal, political,
and moral issues that are interwoven
with the use of private security contrac-
tors like Blackwater Lodge & Training
Center, Inc., in admirable fashion,
pointing out the substantial and vexing
issues that are presented by corpora-
tions engaging in activities formerly
and traditionally reserved for the armed
forces of nation-states. Regrettably,
however, his passion generates stray
voltage as his manuscript degenerates
into an attack on the Bush administra-
tion’s Iraq war policy, and further re-
gresses into an assault on the Bush
administration generally, political con-
servatism, and the Christian right. By
the final pages, Scahill’s vitriol discred-
its him and takes the wind out of the
sails of any reasonable argument he
otherwise presents regarding the dan-
gers posed by Blackwater and its sister
companies. This is too bad, because the
author’s meticulous research and will-
ingness to take on an administration
patsy are commendable and necessary.
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A cursory review of Scahill’s online
postings, blogs, and congressional testi-
mony reveals a clear and evident bias.
But hardly any reasonable military pro-
fessional would argue that the actions
of companies like Blackwater have not
harmed the coalition forces’ counterin-
surgency effort in Iraq. Downstream
and third-order effects of these some-
times reckless and frequently arrogant
mercenaries are not part of the calcula-
tion—they get paid for keeping the
principal alive and unharmed. On the
other hand, Scahill’s rejection of private
security companies as a concept leaves
little room for the possibility that com-
panies like Blackwater could be useful
in the national security apparatus if fu-
ture administrations and Congress
could muster the political will to con-
trol them under an effective and feasi-
ble system of accountability. Moreover,
while there is plenty to condemn about
Blackwater’s legacy, tactics, and man-
agement, that is only half of Scahill’s
story. That Blackwater founder Erik
Prince is a deeply and evidently reli-
gious conservative is prima facie evi-
dence, according to Scahill, that he and
his business is or should be thoroughly
discredited.
Finally, Scahill laments that Blackwater
has been able to recruit seasoned intelli-
gence and operational professionals,
such as Cofer Black, without acknowl-
edging that it is a common practice for
corporations to recruit talent from the
government, and vice versa. He paints
Black, in particular, as a sellout, when
Black’s hiring by Blackwater only fol-
lows the typical pattern of Washington
professionals across many vocations.
Faulting his decision to move to the
private sector is shallow and naive.
The bottom line on Blackwater is that it
is worth reading. The book is a useful
medium to take stock of the myriad is-
sues that confront policy makers on this
controversial subject. Yet Scahill’s an-
tipathy toward all things Bush, Republi-
can, and the Christian right ultimately
takes over. Coupled with untidy organi-
zation and the author’s tendency to re-
peat himself, this renders his work less
constructive and credible than it other-
wise might have been.
R. G. BRACKNELL
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Regimental Judge Advocate,
Regimental Combat Team 5, Al Asad, Iraq
Slim, Hugo. Killing Civilians: Method, Madness,
and Morality in War. New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 2008. 300pp. $29.95
Hugo Slim has written a remarkable and
disturbing book that everyone con-
cerned with the safety of “civilians”
should read—and then join the public
debate about protecting them. Slim
states that while the word “civilian” has
long been an ambiguous concept, it is
one we must do more to support be-
cause it is grounded in basic Western
values. He encourages wide public dis-
cussion about defending and expanding
the civilian concept in an age of terror-
ism, failing states, and ethnic strife. He
has fulfilled this purpose admirably, with
a deep and wide breadth of scholarship
that should spark serious debate at all
levels.
This book is remarkable because the au-
thor, who has worked in humanitarian
assistance for more than twenty years,
tells of the horrendous evil that men do
with a dispassionate tone that allows
both the deadly logic of civilian killing
and its terrible results to seep into the
reader’s mind. It is disturbing. This
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reader was taken aback to realize that
rather than build revulsion, the accumu-
lation of damning evidence created the
same “not my job” effect that allows na-
tions to ignore atrocities against whole
peoples.
Slim describes in detail the “seven
spheres of civilian suffering”: direct vio-
lence (murder, genocide, etc.), rape and
sexual violence, forced movement, im-
poverishment, famine and disease, emo-
tional suffering, and postwar suffering.
The book’s most disturbing aspect is the
six chapters that describe the painful de-
tails about civilian killing. Only one
chapter is dedicated to promoting civil-
ian protection. This offers practical ex-
pressions of philosopher Howard
Gardner’s seven “levers” for changing
human minds as Slim’s answer to the di-
lemma: reason, research, resonance
(emotion and morality), representa-
tional redescription (shared identity), re-
sources and rewards, real world events,
and resistance. Oddly, Slim’s suggestions
as to how to apply these levers, such as
international criminal courts, fail to res-
onate with the same passion as the myr-
iad justifications for civilian killing. But
this may be the point: killing results
from the strongest passions, while the
act of sparing life results from the more
enduring, yet more difficult to evoke,
feelings of mercy, compassion, and love.
ROBERT L. PERRY
Naval War College
Gati, Charles. Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washing-
ton, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt.
Cold War International History Project. Stan-
ford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2006. 264pp.
$49.95
Historians are charged with applying
twenty-twenty hindsight to incidents
that, at the time, seem to be only a curi-
ous combination of blurring events.
Charles Gati, a leading commentator on
Central European history and politics,
does just that in Failed Illusions, his
study of the abortive Hungarian Revo-
lution of 1956 against the Soviet Union.
His book was fifty years in the making,
partly because many of his primary
sources have only recently been made
available. Although he was a firsthand
observer of events in Hungary in the
1950s, Gati delayed this work to ensure
that it reflected an appropriate level of
objectivity. Gati was in Budapest at the
time of the revolution, having recently
been fired from a state-run newspaper
for no ostensible reason. While this
made him sympathetic to the revolu-
tion, he readily admits to a certain
naiveté about why it was happening.
This work is largely a result of his per-
sonal quest to retrospectively under-
stand this seminal event that shaped his
life. He emigrated to the United States
shortly after the revolution.
Imre Nagy, prime minister of Hungary
and the leader of the revolution, is the
story’s protagonist. Through superb us-
age of primary and personal sources,
Gati humanizes this ultimately tragic
figure. The book’s most profound in-
sights are in its handling of the decision
makers in Moscow and Washington.
Moscow possessed the ultimate power
and was responsible for the decisions
that led to the Soviet invasion of Hun-
gary in November 1956. However,
Gati’s use of recently opened records
proves conclusively that Soviet leader-
ship was not “trigger happy.” It is eye
opening to see just how close the Soviet
politburo came to allowing Hungary to
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embark on its “Titoist” escapade. The
de-Stalinization theme set by the Twen-
tieth Communist Party Congress of the
Soviet Union in February 1956 made a
major impact on Soviet thinking. Nikita
Khrushchev, Anastas Mikoyan, and
even such hard-liners as Mikhail Suslov
seemed predisposed to allow Budapest a
significant degree of autonomy in its in-
terpretation of communism. Were it
not for the massacre of party officials in
Budapest’s Republic Square, Gati ar-
gues, the revolution stood an excellent
chance to succeed.
Perhaps the bigger nemesis was Wash-
ington. The combined incompetence of
the Central Intelligence Agency; the mis-
guided, provocative propaganda of the
Radio Free Europe (RFE) team in Mu-
nich; and the White House refusal to fo-
cus on the plight of Budapest during the
Suez crisis created a “perfect storm”—
encouraging the Hungarian Revolution
without any serious thought of ever sup-
porting it. This would not have been so
painful had not 96 percent of all Hun-
garians, most of whom ravenously de-
voured the RFE reports, thought that the
United States would provide unlimited
support for the revolution.
This account certainly warrants reading
by history buffs and public policy mak-
ers alike. Gati has a way of personalizing
the day-by-day accounts of the action in
Budapest that makes for an easy read.
However, the reader is left with a series
of provocative questions. What made the
Soviet politburo overturn its decision
and ultimately send in tanks to Hun-
gary? Was Washington capable of focus-
ing on more than one flash point at a
time? Would at least one fluent
Hungarian-speaking CIA agent in Hun-
gary have made a difference in U.S. pol-
icy? Fortunately for his readership, Gati




Pearlman, Michael D. Truman and MacArthur:
Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Re-
nown. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2008.
352pp. $29.95
Michael D. Pearlman retired in 2006 as
professor of history at the Army Com-
mand and General Staff College. He
now offers a complete history of the po-
litical, diplomatic, and military factors
leading to President Harry S. Truman’s
April 1951 firing of General Douglas
MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Far
East. A presentation at times overdone
for general readers, this scholarly work
will interest those who specialize in
American strategic and diplomatic deci-
sion making from post–World War II
through the Korean War.
Problems between Truman and his
viceroy in Asia began early in the Ko-
rean War. In August 1950 Truman or-
dered MacArthur to rescind a public
statement sent to the annual conven-
tion of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, in
which MacArthur advocated preserving
Taiwan for a future attack on mainland
China. This statement was in direct
conflict with White House policy to
keep the war in Korea limited.
Late in December 1950, after the Chi-
nese attacked across the Yalu River in
Korea, MacArthur responded to a Joint
Chiefs of Staff message with a
counterproposal. He advocated these
decisive destructive blows: a blockade
of Chinese coastal areas, destruction of
Chinese industrial capacities to wage
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war, and Nationalist Chinese forces to
counterattack on the mainland.
Early in 1951, when the Chinese com-
munist forces began to falter in the face
of tougher American and allied resis-
tance, MacArthur became bolder and
attacked the Truman administration’s
concept of limited war in Korea. On 24
March MacArthur preempted the ad-
ministration by announcing his willing-
ness to negotiate with enemy
commanders.
Truman conferred with his key advisers
and a consensus emerged that MacAr-
thur’s insubordination called for his
dismissal. The occasion, though not the
cause, was a letter from MacArthur to
Joseph Martin, the senior Republican in
the House of Representatives. The let-
ter, which praised a speech of Martin’s
calling for a second front in China, was
read into The Congressional Record on 5
April. Six days later, MacArthur was
fired.
Pearlman’s credentials are manifest. He
has produced a thorough account of de-
cision making, bureaucratic and parti-
san politics, and old grudges and
resentments. The latter are sometimes
extraneous, but to his credit, he also ex-
amines another aspect of the Korean
conflict—events behind closed doors in
Beijing and Moscow. The work offers
valuable information on Sino-Soviet re-
lations during this period, though the
author might have expanded on this
subject beyond the limited issues of Sta-
lin’s fear of an American nuclear attack
and his sales of arms to Mao Tse-tung.
In sum, this is a first-rate research effort
by a distinguished historian, writing in
a lively style that somewhat counterbal-
ances the book’s density, and of consid-
erable value and interest to students of
the period.
DOUGLAS KINNARD
Emeritus Professor of Political Science
University of Vermont
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IN MY VIEW
AN END TO UNPLEASANT BEHAVIORS
Sir:
In his brief review of Diana West’s The Death of the Grown-Up: How America’s
Arrested Development Is Bringing Down Western Civilization (Spring 2008, pp.
138–39), Professor Jeffrey H. Norwitz of the Naval War College failed to alert
readers to the controversial nature of West’s argument. West’s position is that
one factor—the lack of self-discipline—is the basic cause of the decline of
American influence in the world. Now, according to West, the United States
lacks the ability to deal effectively with attacks on it and on its allies by organiza-
tions (al Qaeda and related terrorist groups) that do in fact have a sense of
self-discipline and shared commitment. For that reason, The Death of the
Grown-Up calls for an end to what Professor Norwitz calls “decades of immature
behavior.”
The weakness of Diana West’s argument is that it attributes a wide range of
unpleasant behaviors and unsuccessful government policies to one single fac-
tor—the “death” of the ideal of the adult as a responsible, self-disciplined, and
self-sacrificing individual. This intense focus on one cause of social decline and
moral decay is echoed, ironically enough, by Osama bin Laden and his allies. The
western world, according to bin Laden and al Qaeda, lacks discipline and order.
The West, especially the United States, poses a direct threat to Muslims every-
where because the West attacks the order present in Islam directly, through the
occupation of Muslim lands, and indirectly, through modern media, through
modern ideas about the role of women in society and the family, and through
systems of education that denigrate religion and respect for traditional wisdom.
Diana West and bin Laden might seem strange intellectual companions, but
they have famous (or infamous, as the case may be) company—Karl Marx and
Sigmund Freud, to name just two intellectuals who made the mistake of ascrib-
ing the ills of the world to a single factor. In the case of Marx, the single factor
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was the means of production and distribution. For Freud, it was the great inner
tension between the desires of the individual psyche and the demands of an or-
dered society. Like Ms. West, both Marx and Freud pointed to a factor that mat-
tered. But also like her, Marx and Freud laid too much responsibility at the feet
of one variable or cause of behavior.
If serious studies of contemporary societies have shown anything, it is that
most individual behavior within a society, its institutions, and its organizations
is shaped by many factors that interact with one another. We are not beings
driven only by our economic environment or by our psychological desires or by
the ways we have been raised. We are interesting, puzzling, and frustrating crea-
tures because our behavior is often difficult to predict and because it is often im-
possible to show that how our societies fare is the result of some one behavior or
psychological factor.
Just as bin Laden’s view of the world is flawed, so is West’s. But does that
mean neither should be read? Absolutely not. Yet it’s important to note that all
single-factor explanations for social or political behavior should be evaluated
with great caution. I can’t think of one that has proven correct or has been
shown to be the one and only key to understanding the complexities of human
social, economic, and political behavior. Consequently, we should beware of
embracing any single-factor explanation for present or past events, no matter




In criticizing my book review of Diana West’s The Death of the Grown-Up: How
America’s Arrested Development Is Bringing Down Western Civilization (Naval
War College Review, Spring 2008, pp. 138–39), Professor Tom Hone missed the
point of both and, in doing so, misrepresented West’s book as a simplistically
narrow homily on what ails society. He could not be more mistaken.
Professor Hone erroneously decries West for isolating a “single factor” re-
sponsible for her warning about western civilization’s decline. Were that true,
then his objection would be justified. However, saying that West and Osama bin
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Laden are “intellectual companions” is indefensible and shocking, given West’s
reputation as a voice for a muscular approach to radical Islam. The fact of the
matter is that West drives deeply into the erosion of personal, family, and soci-
etal values with astute analysis and convincing evidence that many factors are re-
sponsible. Even a cursory read of the book discloses that the author examines
post–World War II attitudes, business strategy to celebrate youth, print media,
music and movie industries, and even the law as separate factors. And it is an
easy step to the realization that each of these elements has multiple root causes.
West yearns for societal maturity evidenced by sound decision-making
principles, proven core values, critical analysis, lessons learned, embrace of his-
tory, reevaluation based on success and failure, movement past self-gratification
to selfless service, and acceptance that complex problems require complex
solutions. Is the book controversial? Only to those who sense West’s rapier-like
finger poking them in the chest.
JEFFREY H. NORWITZ
Naval War College
I N M Y V I E W 1 6 3
169
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2008 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008
170
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss4/1
RECENT BOOKS
Polmar, Norman. Aircraft Carriers: A His-
tory of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence
on World Events, vol. 2, 1946–2006.
Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2008. 560pp.
$49.95
Norman Polmar needs no introduction to
readers of the Review, and neither, proba-
bly, does volume 1 of this work (pub-
lished in 2006 and covering the years 1909
to 1945). The present book brings the car-
rier and carrier-aviation stories up
through 2006, with looks farther ahead:
the early Cold War years, Suez, Vietnam,
the Falklands, the advent of the “super-
carriers” and subsequent periodic debates
on fundamentals, the nuclear mission,
and others. Particularly interesting chap-
ters focus on costs and on Soviet-Russian
work and experimentation in the type.
Five appendices, and 350 (often very
striking) photographs, many tables and
maps.
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